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12
1 Introduction
In April 2010, President Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev met in Prague to 
sign the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), which mandated significant 
reductions in US- and Russian-deployed strategic nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles. 
In their public remarks, the presidents praised New START as a harbinger of deeper cuts in 
nuclear arsenals, further cooperation on non-proliferation and nuclear materials security, 
and expanded discussions on missile defence. Obama also underscored America’s “unwa-
vering commitment to the security of our European allies” and the “determination of the 
United States and Russia – the two nations that hold over 90 percent of the world’s nuclear 
weapons – to pursue responsible global leadership”.1 Medvedev called the treaty a “win-
win” agreement that “enhances strategic stability”, while noting that each side “can use its 
own discretion to defend the makeup and structure of its strategic offensive potential”.2 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies and partners welcomed New START, as 
well.3
Nine years later, the optimism voiced by the US and Russian leaders in Prague has evap-
orated. In February 2014, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine torpedoed the Obama administra-
tion’s hope, broadly shared by Europeans, for improved cooperation. Soon thereafter, the 
United States and its NATO allies launched successive measures, which focused on con-
ventional forces, to strengthen deterrence and collective defence along NATO’s eastern 
periphery.4 At the same time, the United States and its allies paid renewed attention to 
nuclear aspects of deterrence. This was prompted by their concerns over Russia’s exten-
sive nuclear forces modernization programme, hints of new thinking in Russian military 
1  White House 2010.
2  Ibid.
3  See e.g. https://www.presidentti.fi/halonen/public/defaultcf33.html?contentid=190040&nodeid=41412&con-
tentlan=2&culture=en-US.
4  In April 2014, the United States dispatched some 600 paratroopers from the 173rd Airborne Brigade to Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland to enhance ongoing military-to-military relationships and demonstrate assurance of 
America’s commitment to its NATO Allies. For NATO’s response, see NATO 2014.
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circles about how those forces might be leveraged for strategic advantage in a crisis, and 
instances of nuclear “sabre rattling” by President Vladimir Putin and other Russian officials.
In particular, the prospects for preserving or expanding negotiated reductions of nuclear 
weapons look grim. In July 2014, after more than a year of senior-level diplomatic engage-
ment with Russian officials, the Obama administration announced that Russia had violated 
core provisions of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A landmark ac-
complishment of the Cold War, the treaty banned all land-based US and Soviet (later, Rus-
sian) ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometres. In Feb-
ruary 2019, after additional talks with Russian officials proved fruitless, President Donald 
Trump declared that the United States will “suspend its obligations” under the treaty and 
begin the six-month process of withdrawal, “unless Russia comes back into compliance”.5 
The following month, Putin signed a decree suspending Russia’s obligations under the 
treaty, while accusing the US of violations. The withdrawal period ended on August 2, and 
the INF Treaty is no longer in force.
New START will expire on February 5, 2021, unless Washington and Moscow agree before 
then to extend its provisions by another five years, as permitted by the treaty. US officials 
have been non-committal on the treaty’s extension, claiming that Russia had rebuffed 
their efforts to negotiate a successor agreement on strategic arms and obtain reductions 
in non-strategic nuclear forces, a category where Russia enjoys a large – and apparently 
growing – advantage.6 Putin reportedly suggested to Trump that they “consider the pos-
sibility” of such an extension during their August 2018 meeting in Helsinki.7 In May 2019, 
US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov agreed, 
according to Pompeo, to “gather together teams that will begin to work not only on New 
START and its potential extension, but on a broader range of arms control issues that each 
of our two nations have”.8 As of early August 2019, however, the sides have not announced 
a start date for formal negotiations.
Potential changes in the strategic balance that most directly affect Europe understand-
ably preoccupy Finnish authorities and experts. Yet developments in geographically dis-
tant regions can threaten the international environment upon which Europe’s (including 
Finland’s) security and prosperity increasingly depend. These include: the emergence of 
China as a “peer” military competitor to the United States and Russia; heightened regional 
challenges posed by a nuclear-armed Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea) 
and, potentially, Iran; the growing nuclear weapon capabilities of longtime rivals India and 
5  White House 2019.
6  Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018, 74.
7  Bender 2018.
8  US Embassy & Consulates in Russia 2019. 
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Pakistan; and persistent concern over non-state actors seeking access to nuclear weapons 
or radiological materials. Arguably, such developments portend additional and less pre-
dictable stressors on deterrence beyond Europe for many years to come.
Given such hard realities, this report seeks to inform and stimulate further debate on how 
best to deter conflicts that can directly threaten global peace and security, posing grave 
risks to Finland’s security, sovereignty, and its most important institutions and values. To 
do so, our research has focused on the following questions:
•	 What are the basic principles of deterrence?
•	 How has deterrence, as understood and practised during the Cold 
War, changed in light of certain post-Cold War developments?
•	 What are the major trends in the nuclear-related policies and capa-
bilities of the four nuclear weapon states most directly involved 
in European security affairs – Russia, the United States, France, 
and the United Kingdom?
•	 What are the challenges facing the specific deterrence role of 
NATO, an avowed “nuclear Alliance”; and the possible creation, 
over time, of an alternative “European” approach?
•	 What are the prospects for preserving existing arms control and 
non-proliferation regimes and/or pursuing new approaches, in-
cluding efforts to eliminate nuclear weapons globally?
•	 In light of the above assessments, what new challenges are posed 
to the Nordic-Baltic region, in general, and Finland, in particu-
lar?
The report draws upon public seminars, expert workshops, and publications by the Finnish 
Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) under its project entitled “New Challenges for Stra-
tegic Deterrence in the 21st Century”, which is part of the implementation of the Govern-
ment Plan for Analysis, Assessment, and Research. Aimed at a broad readership of gov-
ernment officials, parliamentarians, non-government experts, academics, media, and the 
public, the report does not contain detailed technical descriptions of weapons systems, 
their operational deployment, or potential effects. That said, any such descriptions con-
tained in this report are based on authoritative government publications and/or research 
products of highly respected non-government organizations and experts.
15
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2 Deterrence – a primer
Basic notions of deterrence took shape in ancient times. “When there is mutual fear, men 
think twice before they make aggressions upon one another,” observed Hermocrates of 
Syracuse, according to the Athenian historian Thucydides. A similar sentiment –“Si vis 
pacem, para bellum” (“If you want peace, prepare for war”) – was credited to the Roman 
general Vegetius.9 The advent of nuclear weaponry in 1945 and the hardening of ideolog-
ical and military divisions, first in Europe and then globally, made deterrence a primary 
strategic goal of the world’s most powerful states and alliances. Simply put, the aim of de-
terrence was to prevent the Cold War from turning “hot”, and it has continued to serve this 
basic purpose, albeit in changed circumstances, to the present day.
Despite a large body of research on the subject, strategic affairs theorists and practitioners 
do not share an agreed definition of deterrence. In general, however, the term is applied 
where:
•	 one adversary declines to take action, such as military aggression, 
against another because the former fears unacceptable retalia-
tion by the latter – a situation known as “deterrence by punish-
ment”; or
•	 one adversary declines to take action because it fears the other 
can prevent that action from succeeding – a situation known 
as “deterrence by denial”.
These situations are not mutually exclusive. A potential aggressor might be deterred be-
cause it simultaneously fears retaliation for its actions and harbours doubts regarding its 
ability to overpower the target of aggression in the first place. For example, proponents 
of missile defences often emphasize the complementarity of deterrence by punishment, 
enabled by nuclear-armed missiles or aircraft, and deterrence by denial, made possible by 
9  Tertrais 2018a. 
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modern air defences and interceptor systems that can defeat or degrade ballistic missile, 
cruise missile, or bomber attacks. 
To be stable over the long-term, deterrence must be linked to the practice of “reassurance”. 
Reassurance, in this context, has two purposes. On the one hand, European, Canadian, and 
Asian beneficiaries of the US “nuclear umbrella” must be confident (or reassured) that such 
protection will be effective and unequivocal in peacetime or in a crisis. Otherwise, those 
allies could be tempted either to seek accommodations with their adversary or to acquire 
independent deterrent capabilities of their own, possibly including nuclear weapons. (See 
also discussion of “extended deterrence” in chapter 3 of this report.)
On the other hand, the adversary state that is the target of deterrence must be reassured 
that it will not suffer harm (for example, a pre-emptive strike) if, in fact, it does not pursue 
the aggressive action feared by the deterring state and its allies. In other words, “without 
credible reassurance, there is no incentive to comply with deterrent demands”.10 
While the basic concept of deterrence is straightforward, understanding how it might 
function or fail in specific circumstances involves complex and dynamic factors. Quanti-
tative measures – such as the size, composition, deployment, and readiness of a state’s mil-
itary forces – are important but partial indicators of that state’s ability to deter or, if neces-
sary, defend against an adversary. Qualitative factors also play a critical role. These include 
a nation’s history, strategic culture, confidence in its allies and/or partners, institutional 
arrangements (for example, its command and control mechanisms), and the skills and 
psychology (observed and/or assumed) of its political and military leadership. Moreover, 
such quantitative and qualitative assessments affect the calculations of the side exercising 
deterrence as well as the side that is the target of deterrence. In short, there is no fixed for-
mula for establishing, measuring, or guaranteeing a condition of deterrence involving two 
or more parties because, as the eminent British strategist and negotiator, Michael Quinlan, 
observed: “Deterrence is a concept for operating upon the thinking of others.”11 
Understanding the dynamics associated with nuclear deterrence is especially challeng-
ing. As the American military theorist, Bernard Brodie, wrote in 1946: “(T)he most vital step 
in any American security program for the age of the atomic bombs is to take measures to 
guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind…Thus far the 
chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief 
10  Long 2008. 
11  Quinlan 2005. 
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purpose must be to avert them.”12 Yet translating Brodie’s insight into specific measures 
that would “guarantee” retaliation is no easy task. 
One reason for this is that empirical data on the effects of nuclear weapons in wartime is 
limited to the experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, when the United 
States used one weapon against each target, killing an estimated 300,000 people. Since 
then, extensive studies of bombing survivors and their descendants, data from atmos-
pheric and underground nuclear weapons test explosions, improved performance char-
acteristics of nuclear weapons delivery systems, and increasingly sophisticated modelling 
and simulation tools have greatly enhanced understanding of the physical effects of a hy-
pothetical use of nuclear weapons against certain types of targets.13 Moreover, the United 
States acted in 1945 without fear of incurring a nuclear response. Hence, the American 
“theory of victory” was straightforward: the nuclear bombing would break Japan’s ability 
and will to resist, forcing it to accept unconditional surrender without a costly invasion.14 
Yet once nuclear weapons are available to both sides in a conflict, their destructive power 
does more than complicate any theory of victory. It raises the question of whether “victory” 
is attainable in any meaningful sense. 
12  Brodie 1946. 
13  An estimated 2,056 nuclear test explosions have been conducted by eight nations since 1945, according to the 
Arms Control Association (2019a). 
14  Roberts 2016. According to the author, “a theory of victory is a set of concepts for how to force termination of a 
war in a manner favorable to one’s objectives and to achieve an acceptable post-war balance of power”. 
18
N U C L E A R  W E A P O N  E F F E C T S
A nuclear detonation produces an immediate hot fireball (with temperatures equivalent to the 
interior of the sun), extreme thermal radiation (able to cause severe burns and ignite fires at 
great distances), air blast and ground shock waves, prompt and residual nuclear radiation, and 
electromagnetic pulse (EMP) that can damage or destroy unprotected electronic components 
in computers, vehicles, aircraft, communications equipment, and radars. The projected effects 
of a specific weapon would depend on various factors, including its yield (a one kiloton, or KT, 
weapon produces an explosive force equivalent to 1,000 tons of TNT) and height of burst (on, 
above, or below the ground or water surface), the distance between the target and “ground 
zero” (or GZ, the point on the Earth’s surface closest to the detonation), weather conditions, 
and target “hardness”. (A “hard” target might be a deep underground command centre or 
missile silo, and a “soft” target might be an exposed military base or industrial facility.)
While estimated casualties from a nuclear conflict vary significantly depending on targets and 
weapons selected, various unclassified studies give an order of magnitude approximation. 
For example, according to a 2016 Nuclear Matters Handbook produced by the US Department 
of Defense:
“A single, low-yield nuclear weapon employed in a major metropolitan area produces total 
devastation in an area large enough to produce tens of thousands, and possibly more than 
300,000 fatalities… A very low-yield, 1-KT detonation produces severe damage effects 
approximately one quarter of a mile (0.4 km) from GZ. Within the severe damage zone, almost 
all buildings collapse and 99 percent of persons become fatalities quickly… A low-yield, 10-
KT detonation produces severe damage effects approximately one half mile (0.8 km) from GZ. 
Moderate damage extends approximately one mile and light damage ranges approximately 
three miles. A high-yield, strategic 1-megaton (1,000 KT) detonation produces severe damage 
effects slightly beyond two miles (3.2 km) from GZ. Moderate damage extends out beyond four 
miles (6.4 km) and light damage encompasses beyond 12 miles.”15
A study published in 1979 by the US Congress’s Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
examined four hypothetical scenarios of US-Soviet nuclear warfare. These involved 
reciprocal attacks against one city in each country (Detroit and Leningrad, each of which had 
approximately 4.3 million inhabitants at the time), major oil refineries, ICBM silos, and a broader 
range of major military and economic targets. The study produced estimates of 220,000 
American dead (and an additional 420,000 seriously injured) and 390,000 Soviet dead (and an 
additional 1.26 million seriously injured) in the scenario of a limited exchange (with a single 
1 megaton weapon) targeting only the two cities. However, in the scenario of all-out attacks 
against economic and military targets using a substantial fraction of each side’s arsenal, the 
estimates rose to an estimated 20–165 million American and 23–100 million Soviet fatalities 
within 30 days. In the latter scenario, the lower estimates assumed: extensive pre-attack civil 
defence measures (such as evacuation of major urban areas) had occurred; Soviet fatalities 
would be marginally lower, given the relatively higher percentage of the population living in 
15  Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Matters 2016.
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rural areas; and the widely-held belief that the Soviets would employ more high-yield weapons 
than the United States. The study also found that “survivors wouId find themselves in a race 
to achieve viability (i.e. production at least equalling consumption plus depreciation) before 
stocks ran out completely. A failure to achieve viability, or even a slow recovery, would result in 
many additional deaths, and much additional economic, political, and social deterioration. This 
postwar damage could be as devastating as the damage from the actual nuclear explosions”.16 
While the OTA study proved controversial at the time, it is worth noting that only three years 
later, a highly classified Pentagon briefing prepared for President Ronald Reagan estimated 
that a large-scale Soviet nuclear attack could result in 50–110 million American casualties.17 
16  Johns et al. 1979.
17  Clark 1982.
Other issues arise with any means of deterrence, but are especially intractable when nu-
clear weapons are involved. 
Deterrence may be linked to the distinctive concept of “compellence”, a form of coercion 
which entered the strategic lexicon in the mid-1960s. According to American strategist 
Thomas Schelling, whereas deterrence is “a threat intended to keep (an adversary) from 
starting something”, compellence is “a threat intended to make an adversary do some-
thing”.18 The two concepts are linked because an international actor (country A) deter-
mined to deter an adversary (country B) must have an idea of how to react if country 
B nonetheless pursues its aggressive act. But it might be very difficult for country A to 
convince country B that it is prepared to take an action that no one in their right mind 
would deliberately decide to take. Hence, a rational choice for country A is to avoid threats 
that are not credible (such as unleashing a “nuclear holocaust”) but to credibly threaten to 
increase the risk of an outcome that is unacceptable to country B. As Schelling explained, 
the combination of compellence and “brinkmanship” could have the effect of putting 
an adversary into an intolerably risky situation, thereby achieving the goal of deterrence, 
which is to avoid the conflict in the first place.19 
18  Schelling 1966. 
19  Ibid. Schelling acknowledges that while adversaries might somewhat control the level of risk, they do not con-
trol the risk itself. In other words, while neither side may choose to launch a nuclear war, during a crisis a war may 
unintentionally break out. According to Schelling: “(I)nternational relations often have the character of a competi-
tion in risk taking, characterized not so much by tests of force as by tests of nerve… the perils that countries face 
are not as straightforward as suicide, but more like Russian roulette.” 
20
A related issue is that the mere existence of a nuclear arsenal cannot guarantee deterrence 
if its possessor has no feasible concept for its use, or is known or believed by others to rule 
out any possibility of its use, however remote. As Quinlan explained: “Firstly, it is unrealistic 
to suppose that a firm intention never to use (nuclear weapons), and the lack of any plans 
for use, could be permanently and dependably concealed from an adversary… Secondly, 
it cannot reasonably be supposed that the commitment of thousands of individuals – of-
ten in very demanding tasks – could be durably sustained in the known absence of plan-
ning which they could regard as seriously intended.”20 
The dilemma here is that any combination of these factors – lack of confidence in the reli-
ability or effects of the weapons that comprise a state’s deterrent, fear of retaliation if the 
deterrent is used, and absence of feasible plans or political will to employ deterrent forces 
– could produce a situation of “self-deterrence”. In such a case, a reluctance to act by a 
threatened state becomes exploitable by a determined aggressor, who may calculate that 
it is better to attack sooner rather than later. 
A final general point: Looking back at the nearly 75 years since the Second World War, it is 
remarkable that not one of the tens of thousands of nuclear weapons produced over that 
time – thousands of which were, or still are, operationally deployed – was detonated in 
an actual conflict. Many point to this as prima facie evidence that nuclear deterrence has 
“worked”. Others argue that the nuclear weapons developed in pursuit of deterrence have 
done more to threaten peace than preserve it.21 
Such debates rely to some extent on counterfactual analysis – namely, comparing what 
actually happened and what might have happened in the absence of certain key assump-
tions or facts. While interesting, such debates are not central to this report. In the nuclear 
age, net assessments regarding the political and military requirements of deterrence, as 
well as judgments regarding its presumed stability or fragility in periods of heightened 
tension, are and will remain inherently imprecise. Given the stakes, however, such assess-
ments cannot be avoided. 
20  Op. cit., Quinlan, 11.
21  Lebow & Stein 1995.
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3 The changing nature of deterrence 
The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 did not mark, as Francis Fukayama 
wrote two years earlier, the “end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ide-
ological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form 
of human government”.22 Of course, there were reasons to celebrate. After all, during the 
45-year span of the Cold War, hundreds of millions of men and women and scores of coun-
tries were caught up in its ideological, diplomatic, economic, and intelligence battles. The 
United States and the Soviet Union managed to escape a direct military clash, but they en-
gaged in proxy warfare – and, on occasion, intervened with their own forces – in parts of 
Asia, the Middle East, Africa, the Caribbean region, and Central America. 
For many, the end of the Cold War, above all, reduced their fears of a “nuclear Armaged-
don”. Those fears were understandable. At their high points, the US nuclear arsenal num-
bered over 31,000 weapons (in the late 1960s), while the Soviet arsenal held over 45,000 
(in the mid-1980s).23 Most of those weapons were at least several times more powerful 
than the bombs used against Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and a few nuclear tests produced 
yields more than a thousand times higher.24 While nuclear arsenals of the remaining “P-5” 
were small in comparison with those of the superpowers, they were not insignificant. At 
their Cold War high points, France held some 540 weapons, the United Kingdom 500, and 
China 230.25 
Understanding how the major Western powers (particularly the United States) and the So-
viet Union came to conceive of and manage deterrence during the Cold War helps to ex-
plain aspects of contemporary thinking and force structures. It also serves as a cautionary 
22  Fukuyama 1989. 
23  This was the historical high point for the US stockpile (International Panel on Fissile Materials 2015).
24  According to the US Department of Energy, the estimated explosive yield for the Hiroshima bomb was 15 kilo-
tons (KT), or the equivalent of 15 thousand tons of TNT. The estimated yield for the Nagasaki bomb was 21 KT, see 
US Department of Energy (n/d). The largest US test, Castle Bravo, had an estimated yield of 15 megatons (MT), or 
the equivalent of 15 million tons of TNT, and the largest Soviet test, Tsar Bomba, had an estimated yield of 50 MT. 
25  The “P-5” refers to permanent members of the UN Security Council. For the estimated French, UK, and Chinese 
stockpile numbers, see: https://thebulletin.org/nuclear-notebook-multimedia/.
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tale, reminding us that past success in navigating the uncharted waters of global competi-
tion between nuclear-armed adversaries was not preordained. 
The following sections examine three aspects of deterrence as they were understood and 
practised during the Cold War, and discusses how each of these has changed during the 
post-Cold War period.
3.1 Deterrence: from a “bipolar” to a “multipolar” security 
environment
From the earliest days of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union viewed 
each other as implacable opponents in an essentially bipolar contest for global leadership. 
Although their race to develop and produce nuclear weapons and associated delivery sys-
tems became a central feature of that contest, American fears of a global Soviet offensive 
predated the Soviets’ first explosion of a nuclear device in August 1949. In a November 
1948 National Security Council (NSC) report approved by President Harry Truman, Soviet 
policies were identified as the “greatest single danger to the [United States] within the 
foreseeable future”.26 Asserting that Soviet leaders ultimately sought “domination of the 
world”, the report cited intelligence estimates of Soviet “capability of overrunning in about 
six months all of Continental Europe and the Near East as far as Cairo”. 
In April 1950 – nine months after the Soviet nuclear test – Truman’s top advisors warned 
that, in the event of a general war, “it must be anticipated that atomic weapons will be 
used by each side in the manner it deems best suited to accomplish its objectives”. By 
1954, they predicted, a Soviet surprise attack could devastate “vital centers” of Western 
Europe, the United States and Canada. The report cited intelligence estimates that the So-
viets could possess 200 nuclear weapons by 1954, which is described as “a critical date for 
the United States (since) the delivery of 100 atomic bombs on targets in the United States 
would seriously damage this country”. At the time of the report, the US nuclear stockpile 
included about 369 weapons, and the US Air Force had more than 250 nuclear-capable 
aircraft. While US nuclear-armed aircraft could seriously damage Soviet war-making capac-
ity, the advisors cautioned that this would not necessarily force Moscow to sue for peace 
or prevent Soviet forces from occupying Western Europe. In other words, US superiority in 
numbers of nuclear weapons and long-range bombers would not guarantee strategic suc-
cess if deterrence were to fail.
26 26 Souers 1948.
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Two months later, the Truman administration’s worst fears seemed to be realized when 
Communist North Korea launched its invasion of US-backed Republic of Korea (South 
Korea). US intelligence concluded that Moscow was behind the attack.27 Fearing the ag-
gression in Korea might be a prelude to a Soviet attack against Western Europe, Truman 
decided to strengthen the US military posture by dispatching non-nuclear components 
of nuclear weapons to certain European bases where, if required, they would be mated 
with fissile material components and loaded onto US bombers.28 In late 1950, Truman re-
portedly considered the use of nuclear weapons in Korea, as requested by General Doug-
las MacArthur, following China’s intervention in the war. Truman ultimately rejected that 
request, fearing an outcry from US allies, an expanded conflict with China, and the risk of 
direct confrontation with the Soviet Union.29 
In 1953, Truman’s successor, Dwight Eisenhower, came close to authorizing the use of 
nuclear weapons before the warring sides reached an armistice in June of that year. He al-
most certainly would have done so if China and North Korean had broken the agreement, 
and he communicated that warning to their leaderships. At the same time, Eisenhower 
tried to convince allied counterparts of the likely need to use nuclear weapons in Ko-
rea if deterrence failed. But even some of the closest allies proved sceptical, at one point 
prompting a frustrated Eisenhower to dismiss as “fatuous” a British official’s argument that 
“if we avoid the first use of the atom bomb in any war (then) the Soviets might likewise ab-
stain”.30 Soviet archives again indicate that the threat of US nuclear weapons use did not 
substantially affect the policies of the Soviet leadership, which was more concerned about 
the political uncertainty caused by Stalin’s death.31
The Korean War profoundly affected the early US approach to deterrence and the role of 
nuclear weapons. The war exposed the danger of committing large land forces to Asia, 
which sapped US strategic reserves and put heavy burdens on the national budget. (Eisen-
hower, like other fiscal conservatives at the time, believed nuclear weapons would be sig-
nificantly less expensive than conventional forces.) The war also forced US decision-makers 
to consider the inherent political and military risks of employing nuclear weapons to block 
aggression by Chinese and North Korean forces viewed as allies of, and highly dependent 
upon, the Soviet Union. 
27  The US assessment of Soviet responsibility for instigating the war might have exaggerated Moscow’s influence 
over North Korean decision-making, according to Soviet archives studied by the Woodrow Wilson International 
Center for Scholars. See Weathersby 1993.
28  In the autumn of 1950, the Truman administration also tripled the US defence budget and stipulated that the 
number of US Army divisions in Europe should be increased from one to five. 
29  Delpeche 2012. 
30  Jackson 2005. 
31  Weathersby 1999. 
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At the same time, the Korean War influenced broader US calculations on how best to 
deter direct Soviet aggression in Europe, where Soviet conventional military power was 
overwhelming. In December 1953, Eisenhower acknowledged in a speech to the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) that “even a vast superiority in numbers of (atomic) 
weapons, and a consequent capability of devastating retaliation, is no preventive, of itself, 
against the fearful material damage and toll of human lives that would be inflicted by sur-
prise aggression”.32 However, faced with assessments that the growing Soviet nuclear arse-
nal might diminish the credibility of the US deterrent, the Eisenhower administration felt 
compelled to unveil an overarching concept for the possible use of nuclear weapons. 
Hence, Eisenhower’s Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, told NATO ministers in April 
1954: “In any war forced upon us by the Soviet Bloc, we and our Allies must be free to use 
atomic weapons against appropriate elements of the enemy’s military power where it is 
to our military advantage to do so.”336 US officials believed this so-called “massive retal-
iation” concept, which sought to deter any Soviet attack by threatening rapid escalation 
to general nuclear war, would be buttressed by deploying US nuclear weapons to Europe. 
Initially, these forward-based and relatively low-yield “tactical” nuclear weapons were as-
signed to US Army units equipped with “dual capable” artillery. By deploying such units 
close to the inner German border, the United States signalled its willingness to use nuclear 
weapons early in a conflict rather than risk their capture by Soviet invaders – an approach 
to deterrence known as “use it or lose it”. 
But the massive retaliation concept was relatively short-lived.34 By 1958, alarmed by Soviet 
advances in nuclear weaponry and delivery systems, prominent US military leaders joined 
Dulles in questioning whether massive retaliation would remain a credible deterrent for 
much longer, especially in cases of “limited” Soviet aggression in regions where US forces 
were not immediately involved. Indeed, Dulles doubted “whether the massive use of nu-
clear weapons (by both sides) could be consistent with (US) survival”.35 
By 1962, the John F. Kennedy administration, convinced that massive retaliation was no 
longer a credible organizing principle for deterrence, began shifting to a “flexible response” 
strategy. Flexible response counted on a build-up of US and allied conventional forces to 
32  Eisenhower 1953.
33  Michel 2017. Dulles hinted at the new “massive retaliation” concept in January 1954, stating that: “…there is 
no local defense which alone can contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. … [The United States 
therefore has decided] to depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate, instantly, by means and at places of 
our choosing.” (Dulles 1954).
34  Miller 2011. In November 1957, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), US General Lauris Nor-
stad, in effect modified the massive retaliation concept, telling allies that the first US response to a Soviet attack 
would be massive use of nuclear weapons by theatre-based forces against the invading forces. Only if that failed, 
he suggested, would there be a massive US attack on the Soviet homeland.
35  US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 1958.
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deter or, if necessary, defeat aggression on the level at which the Soviets chose to fight.36 
The new strategy did not entail abandonment of the forward-based nuclear capabilities, 
which continued to grow under the Kennedy administration. However, it placed greater 
emphasis on the defence of allied territory (in effect, deterrence by denial) and raised the 
threshold for when the United States might be forced to employ nuclear weapons, while 
maintaining a calculated ambiguity regarding how and when it might decide to do so. 
Flexible response raised concerns among some US allies, who argued that any use of nu-
clear weapons in Europe should be: “gradualist” to avoid unwanted escalation; and mainly 
targeted against Warsaw Pact territory to minimize damage to the Federal Republic of 
Germany (FRG) or other allies. The new concept was broadly welcomed, however, by those 
who believed that the greatest threat of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons was 
likely to arise from an inability or unwillingness to deter or, if necessary, defeat non-nu-
clear aggression by non-nuclear means. 
Still, flexible response was not applicable to every theatre of US-Soviet competition. So-
viet leader Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to place intermediate-range nuclear missiles and 
shorter-range systems in Cuba, some 90 miles from the US mainland, brought the sides to 
the brink of a nuclear war in October 1962.37 Many historians consider the near-term result 
of the crisis – Khrushchev’s speedy withdrawal of the missiles and his tentative moves to-
wards “détente” – a net victory for the United States.38 However, it ultimately strengthened 
the position of Soviet hardliners who, after ousting Khrushchev in 1964, favoured an accel-
erated nuclear build-up to achieve strategic parity with the United States while reversing 
Khrushchev’s cutbacks in the military’s conventional capabilities. 
By the late 1960s, major gaps between the size and structure of US and Soviet strategic 
nuclear forces had narrowed; in fact, the Soviets achieved a modest numerical superi-
ority in land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).39 President Richard Nixon 
acknowledged, in a report to Congress in February 1970, that the once-feared situation of 
mutual vulnerability (or “mutually assured destruction”, popularly known as “MAD”) had fi-
nally arrived, stating: “Both the Soviet Union and the United States have acquired the abil-
ity to inflict unacceptable damage on the other, no matter which strikes first. There can be 
no gain and certainly no victory for the power that provokes a thermonuclear exchange.”40 
36  The flexible response concept was officially adopted by NATO in 1967.
37  Op. cit., Delpech. Delpech cites several instances, in addition to Cuba, where the United States or Soviet Union 
considered or used implicit or explicit nuclear threats (or “signalling”) to influence the outcome of crises involving 
Berlin, the Taiwan Strait, Vietnam, and the Middle East. 
38  Six months after the crisis, the United States removed its intermediate range Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
39  Op. cit., Long, 34.
40  Nixon 1970.
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This did not mean that either side had abandoned its search for strategic advantage. Nev-
ertheless, despite adjustments to doctrines and force structures on both sides over the 
next decade or so, their nuclear standoff did not fundamentally change.41 In 1984 Pres-
ident Ronald Reagan seemed to echo Nixon when he declared: “A nuclear war cannot 
be won and must never be fought. The only value in our two nations possessing nuclear 
weapons is to make sure they will never be used.”42 At the same time, formal guidance on 
nuclear weapons employment approved by Reagan in 1981 states in part that: “The most 
fundamental national security objective is to deter direct attack – particularly nuclear 
attack – on the United States and its Allies. Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur, the 
United States and its Allies must prevail…This requires that we be convincingly capable of 
responding in such a way that the Soviets or other adversary would be denied their polit-
ical and military objectives. Stated otherwise, we must be prepared to wage war success-
fully. Our nuclear forces (both the strategic Triad and theater forces), in conjunction with 
general purpose forces, must hold at risk the full range of enemy military capabilities that 
threaten the United States and its Allies.”43
The statements by Nixon and Reagan underscore Washington’s virtually exclusive preoccu-
pation during the Cold War with deterring the Soviet threat. That said, American concerns 
over the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons beyond the Soviet Union and United 
Kingdom, which Eisenhower had mentioned in his UNGA speech in 1953, grew over the 
next few years. For example, a 1957 intelligence report estimated that three countries – 
France, Sweden, and Canada – could produce nuclear weapons “within the next few years”, 
while ten or more countries could do so, either alone or with substantial foreign assistance, 
within a decade.44 However, only China, which detonated its first nuclear device in 1964, 
posed a long-term military threat to the United States. As a former senior US official points 
out: “The overall size and structure of U.S. nuclear forces (during the Cold War) were a 
function of the requirements of deterrence of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, with any 
other contingency deemed a lesser-included problem.”45 
Moreover, US deterrence requirements were not only based on analysis of Soviet mili-
tary capabilities. Other factors influencing US strategy and policy included: decades of 
41  See Secretary of Defense & Director of Central Intelligence 1983. A key judgment of the assessment states: “The 
strategic nuclear balance is probably adequate to deter a direct nuclear attack on the United States or a major at-
tack on Europe.” The assessment also warns: “We are greatly concerned, however, about the effects of strategic nu-
clear imbalances on the behavior of the two sides in crises and lesser conflict situations.” 
42  The Reagan Vision 2019.
43  White House 1981. As Roberts points out, despite the document’s emphasis on deterrence, some of its lan-
guage was controversial “because it seemed to imply that nuclear wars could be won”. But as one official involved 
in formulating the guidance later explained: “While it was difficult to foresee anyone winning such a conflict, it 
seemed far preferable to set a national goal of ‘prevailing’ rather than, say, ‘losing’.” (op. cit., Roberts, 13).
44  Central Intelligence Agency 1957. 
45  Op. cit., Roberts, 12.
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intelligence gathering and all-source analysis aimed at understanding Soviet doctrine, 
command and control structures, and leadership psychology; information and insights 
gleaned from a wide range of bilateral and multilateral contacts with Soviet political, dip-
lomatic, and military officials through formal and informal meetings, visits, and arms con-
trol-related negotiations; the growth of a relatively large American cadre of Soviet affairs 
experts within and outside government; and a serious and sustained effort among gener-
ations of defence intellectuals to study and improve US deterrence theory, test it in sophis-
ticated war-gaming, and integrate their findings in advice to policy-makers. None of this 
cumulative knowledge safeguarded against the risk of strategic miscalculation, miscom-
munication, or technical error leading to a breakdown of deterrence and the outbreak of a 
military conflict with direct superpower involvement.46 Yet taken as a whole, such factors 
seemed to favour the status quo by convincing each side to act cautiously when approach-
ing the other’s core national security interests.
Today’s relationship between the United States and Russia differs, in many respects, from 
the US-Soviet competition during the Cold War. Yet despite significant reductions in the 
size of their nuclear arsenals and periods of improved relations during the 1990s and early 
2000s (discussed in other parts of this report), some aspects of their earlier bipolar compe-
tition are now resurfacing. The United States and Russia once again see each other primar-
ily as geo-strategic adversaries. According to the Trump administration’s National Security 
Strategy of December 2017, Russia has become a “revisionist power” that seeks to “restore 
its great power status”, relying in part on new military capabilities “including nuclear sys-
tems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United States”.47 Russian 
leaders portray the West (in particular, the United States and NATO) as aggressively encir-
cling their country to gain strategic dominance, while attempting to weaken Russia’s re-
gional influence and domestic cohesion through support for “colour revolutions” along its 
periphery. 
But the United States and Russia must cope with multipolar challenges as well. In particu-
lar, China’s rise as a global economic, political, and security actor has transformed it into 
a second “peer competitor” (alongside Russia), according to US officials.48 Although the 
general thrust of US policy over the past three decades has been to encourage China to 
become a “responsible stakeholder” in the international system, US officials have com-
bined this with a “hedging strategy” to deter and, if necessary, defeat any Chinese aggres-
sion. For their part, Chinese complaints about perceived US “encirclement”, “hegemonic”, 
and “containment” strategies have echoed, to some extent, those made by Russian leaders. 
46  In 1983, the KGB misinterpreted a NATO command post exercise, ABLE ARCHER 83, as a prelude to a US nuclear 
attack. See Fischer 2007.
47  White House 2017.
48  Garamone 2018.
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In fact, there is no shortage of potential flashpoints that could spark a US-Chinese military 
confrontation, including: China’s rapid militarization of disputed territories and maritime 
zones in the Western Pacific; US defence ties with Taiwan; and the bilateral defence alli-
ances with South Korea and Japan, which have been threatened, at various times, by Chi-
na’s ally, North Korea. 
Moreover, while US concerns regarding Chinese nuclear weapons capabilities were “essen-
tially a footnote” during the Cold War and for some years thereafter, this is no longer the 
case.49 According to a recent US official assessment, China invests considerable resources 
to maintain a limited, survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory 
strike.50 In addition to research, development, and production of new nuclear warheads, 
China is reportedly developing new mobile missiles armed with multiple independently 
targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) and penetration aids, and improving its nuclear-ca-
pable strategic bomber and sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) capabilities. Such efforts 
will likely boost the overall number of Chinese warheads able to attack US and allied tar-
gets. As one expert emphasizes: “From a U.S. perspective, the move to MIRV warheads is a 
major concern, as it introduces significant new instability to the military balance.”51 Hence, 
it seems more a question of when, not if, the United States will no longer be able to base 
its nuclear force size and posture decisions principally on Russia, with China considered a 
“lesser-included problem”.
During the last few years, Russia and China have developed their strategic partnership. 
Looking to deepen its ties with Beijing, Moscow has been careful not to openly voice con-
cerns over China’s improving military capabilities, including the nuclear realm. This also 
may reflect Russia’s confidence that it is able to deter China’s potential aggression. For ex-
ample, Dmitry Trenin, one of the foremost Russian national security experts, has pointed 
out that: “the Russians feel confident that the Chinese, who have worked so hard to grow 
economically, will value their well-being as much as the Russians do – which means that 
the threat of a nuclear strike should deter China from attacking Russia”.52
China’s current and projected military capabilities are not the only issue for the United 
States and its allies. When it comes to China’s approach to deterrence, nuclear doctrine, 
49  Op. cit., Roberts, 147. As the author notes: “China deployed its first delivery system capable of reaching the 
United States in 1981 and over the next fifteen years placed only approximately twenty nuclear-armed ICBMs into 
silos—where they were vulnerable to preemptive attack.”
50  US Defense Intelligence Agency 2019. Note that the Pentagon’s Missile Defense Review 2019 states that China 
has deployed 75-100 ICBMs, including a new road mobile system and a new MIRVd version of its silo-based ICBMs, 
in addition to four advanced SSBNs each capable of carrying 12 SLBMs. “Consequently, China can now potentially 
threaten the United States with about 125 nuclear missiles.” (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, III). see also 
Kristensen & Norris 2018a.
51  Op. cit., Roberts, 150.
52  Trenin 2012. 
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and crisis management, gaps in US understanding appear to be at least as great as those 
involving Russia. China has deflected any suggestion that it should participate in negoti-
ated limits on nuclear forces, sometimes adding a caveat that deep cuts in US and Russian 
arsenals must come first. In addition, China has rebuffed repeated US efforts to hold reg-
ular, high-level, government-to-government talks on “strategic stability” issues, although 
since 2018, the sides have established a high-level military-to-military dialogue.53 While 
useful informal dialogues of non-government experts (occasionally including government 
officials in their “private capacity”) have taken place, the paucity of government-to-gov-
ernment discussions on strategic stability issues limits each side’s ability to explain its 
most serious concerns and offer or receive reassurance from the other.54
North Korea’s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles raises somewhat 
different questions regarding US deterrence of regional challengers.55 According to the 
North Korean government, its nuclear forces are strictly for self-defence against threats 
of US “aggression”. As one government statement put it: “The bloody lesson of the war in 
Iraq… is that only when a country has physical deterrence forces and massive military de-
terrence forces that are capable of overwhelmingly defeating any attack by state-of-the-
art weapons, can it prevent war and defend its independence and national security.”56 
While the precise size and technical characteristics of the North Korean nuclear arsenal are 
subject to debate, there is no question that it is relatively small and unsophisticated com-
pared to that of the United States (as well as Russia and China).57 Still, US analysts assess 
that certain North Korean missiles are capable of striking Japan, South Korea, and US terri-
tories and forces in the Western Pacific. Indeed, North Korea has not shrunk from explicitly 
threatening all three countries with a nuclear attack.
There is broad agreement among Western experts that North Korea’s leadership views the 
country’s nuclear capabilities as a guarantee of regime survival. Yet certain actions and 
statements suggest that its leadership might also see nuclear brinkmanship as a means of 
advancing policy objectives, beginning with a politically and economically advantageous 
53  Brookings 2019.
54  Op. cit., Roberts, 152–159. According to Roberts, “Washington and Beijing have shared interests in ‘keeping nu-
clear weapons in the background’ – that is, in not allowing new forms of competition at the strategic military level 
to interfere with efforts to improve the political relationship and deepen cooperation in areas of shared interest… 
For China, (this is done) by providing transparency about policy and strategy but not about capabilities and by 
resisting U.S. efforts to feature nuclear dialogue more prominently in ongoing military-to-military and political-mil-
itary leadership dialogue. For the United States, nuclear weapons are best kept in the background by normalizing 
them in the relationship and sharing information, perspectives, and concerns…”. 
55  Op. cit, Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019, IV. According to the MDR, North Korea has “neared the time” 
when it could “credibly threaten” the US homeland with a missile attack. 
56  Op. cit., Roberts, 61.
57  Estimates of the size of the North Korean arsenal range from 20 to 60 nuclear warheads.
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settlement of the longstanding conflict with South Korea. More worrisome, North Korea’s 
thinking (or theory of victory) might include scenarios where its non-nuclear capabilities 
(for conventional, chemical, biological, and cyber warfare) could be employed, possibly 
in conjunction with the threat or even limited use of nuclear weapons, in ways that could 
sow divisions between South Korea and its US protector, allowing the North to impose its 
terms for a settlement.58
This situation poses multiple dilemmas for the United States. Notwithstanding efforts to 
engage North Korea in a process of denuclearization through a combination of economic 
sanctions and diplomatic outreach (including three summit meetings between Trump and 
North Korea’s Kim Jong Un), US officials have apparently ruled out (for now, at least) any 
substantial change in the US conventional force posture in South Korea or loosening of 
existing international sanctions on North Korea. Such moves would likely be viewed, on 
both sides of the Demilitarized Zone, as weakening the American deterrent and defence 
commitment to South Korea. The US use of “signalling” – for example, the deployment and 
exercising of nuclear-capable bombers and combat aircraft in the region – might reassure 
some in South Korea and Japan, but others might see it as a provocative move vis-à-vis 
the North. Similarly, the deployment of US missile defence systems on and offshore South 
Korea and Japan has sparked some domestic opposition there, as well as protests from 
China (on the grounds that those systems pose a threat to Chinese deterrent capabili-
ties). In addition, the nature of the North Korean regime and its very limited interactions 
with the United States suggest that the risk of miscalculation during a crisis would be very 
high.59
A failure of deterrence on the Korean peninsula would have dramatic consequences be-
yond the immediate and devastating effects of a war. These could include: a sharp deteri-
oration in US relations with China and Russia, which border North Korea; reappraisal of US 
alliances with South Korea and/or Japan, especially if one or both of those allies viewed 
Washington as partly responsible for the conflict; and the transfer of significant US military 
assets from Europe to meet urgent warfighting and stabilization tasks in Northeast Asia.
Unlike North Korea, Iran has stopped short of becoming a nuclear-armed state. Indeed, 
Iran has never acknowledged that it seeks a nuclear weapon capability, but has argued 
that it needs – and has the right – to develop advanced nuclear technology as an alter-
native energy source. However, a number of Western governments have voiced concern, 
58  Op.cit., Roberts, 60–78. 
59  Ibid., 78. Roberts observes that North Korean leaders “may calculate that America is in decline and no longer 
ready to pay a significant price to defend the interests at stake on the Korean peninsula… Conversely, the United 
States and its allies may calculate that the resolve in Pyongyang is weak, perhaps because of a belief that nuclear 
war is unwinnable and thus will not actually be fought”.
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since at least the late 1990s, that Iran’s nuclear programmes were intended, either princi-
pally or at least in part, to develop a weapons capability. Absent an official Iranian state-
ment, outsiders ascribed a range of motives to those Iranian leaders believed to favour a 
nuclear weapons option.60 
After more than a decade of international pressure on Iran, which included sanctions by 
the United States, European Union, and United Nations, Iran and the “P5+1” agreed in July 
2015 on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Under the JCPOA, Iran “reaf-
firmed that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop or acquire any nuclear 
weapons”. 61 The agreement restricts Iranian nuclear activities, establishes an intrusive 
verification and monitoring regime (some provisions last for up to 25 years), and contains 
a permanent prohibition on certain weaponization activities. In testimony to a US Senate 
committee in January 2019, the Director for National Intelligence stated: “We continue to 
assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activ-
ities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device… Iran’s continued implementation 
of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile 
material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year.”62
Since Trump’s May 2018 announcement of the US withdrawal from the JCPOA and re-im-
position of sanctions against Iran, the longstanding tension between Washington and 
Tehran has grown progressively more volatile. In late June 2019, Trump authorized and 
then cancelled a US military strike against Iran in response to the downing of an American 
surveillance drone. He also approved new sanctions targeting Iran’s supreme leader and 
other top officials, and threatened that “any attack by Iran on anything American will be 
met with great and overwhelming force”.63 
Iran, for its part, announced at the beginning of July that it had breached the JCPOA 
restrictions on its stock of low-enriched uranium and surpassed the technical level for 
60  Yaphe & Lutes 2005. According to the authors: “Tehran believes it needs advanced nuclear technology that 
could be used in weapons production for numerous reasons: weapons of mass destruction were used by Iraq 
against Iran in their 8-year-long war; Iraq was working on a nuclear weapons device in the 1980s and Iranians as-
sume Baghdad will want them again; Israel, India, Pakistan, and the United States have them; Iran is strategically 
isolated and needs self-sufficiency to defend itself in the event of attack; and the possession of such weapons 
would give the regime legitimacy, respectability, and protection. All these reasons give the regime a substantial 
interest in pursuing the nuclear option. However, concern about possible intimidation or blackmail by the United 
States is probably paramount in Tehran’s calculus, and the expanded U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf and 
Central Asia since 2001 has likely heightened the regime’s sense of vulnerability.” 
61  The original parties to the agreement were China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United King-
dom and the United States, with the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security 
Policy, and the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
62  Coats 2019.
63  Sanger, Kirkpatrick & Kershner 2019. On July 31, the US Treasury Department announced sanctions against 
Iran’s foreign minister “because (he) acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, the Supreme 
Leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran.” US Department of Treasury 2019.
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uranium enrichment set by the agreement. Although Iranian officials have stopped short 
(as of early August 2019) of announcing a full withdrawal from the JCPOA, they declared 
that the threatened US military strike and additional sanctions imposed by Washington 
meant “closing the doors of diplomacy”.64 If the JCPOA were to collapse entirely, and if Iran 
restarted the full spectrum of activities previously banned or limited by the agreement, it 
could reduce the time needed for Iran to produce a nuclear bomb – if it chose to do so –
from approximately one year to roughly two to three months.
Despite their deep disagreement with the United States over the JCPOA and re-imposi-
tion of sanctions on Iran, a number of European governments broadly share long-stand-
ing American concerns about the implications of a potentially nuclear-armed Iran. Among 
these are fears that, if emboldened by the possession of nuclear weapons, Iranian leaders 
would expand and intensify their military intervention in the region and support for ide-
ologically sympathetic terrorist organizations. This, in turn, might convince at least a few 
other Middle East countries to seek to acquire nuclear weapons of their own.65 Iran’s large 
inventory of ballistic missiles and its reported programmes to increase their range, accu-
racy, and lethality serve to compound such fears.
However, many of the potential tools (apart from the JCPOA) to deter Iran from acquiring, 
threatening to use, or using nuclear weapons would be hard to apply under current and 
foreseeable circumstances. For example, unlike the situation in Europe and the Asia-Pa-
cific region, the United States does not have a formal defence alliance with any Middle 
East country except Turkey, a NATO ally. Negotiating and obtaining the consent of the US 
Senate for one or more such alliance(s) with Middle East partners who feel threatened by 
Iran, but who are often at odds with each other on different issues, would be extraordinar-
ily difficult.66 Absent a formal commitment seen as binding more than the incumbent US 
administration, it might be hard to reassure many states in the region that feel threatened 
by Iran that they can count on a US nuclear umbrella.
The United States could take other steps to strengthen regional deterrence against 
Iran. These might involve, for example, expanding its conventional force posture in and 
around the Gulf and taking further steps to improve its partners’ air and missile defence 
64  Karimi & Gambrell 2019.
65  Israel is widely believed to possess nuclear weapons, but this has not been confirmed by official Israeli govern-
ment statements. Declassified US documents strongly suggest the US government had come to believe, by 1969, 
that Israel “had developed nuclear weapons”. See US Department of State 1969 & Davies 1969. Among the Gulf 
states, Saudi Arabia is especially concerned by Iranian nuclear potential. King Abdullah reportedly told a former 
senior US official in 2009 that “if (the Iranians) get nuclear weapons, we will get nuclear weapons”. See Roberts 2016, 
223.
66  Statements by U S Presidents and various Congressional resolutions have pledged US support for the security 
of Israel, but neither side has seriously pursued the notion of a bilateral defence alliance comparable, for example, 
with US treaties with Japan, South Korea, and Australia. 
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capabilities. None of these would be politically easy or inexpensive to carry out. Moreover, 
lurking in the background is the challenge (similar, in some ways, to that posed by North 
Korea) of avoiding miscalculation and miscommunication with Iranian government and 
military authorities with whom the US government has had such difficult relations since 
1979. 
Developments in post-Cold War Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran are not the only 
examples of how deterrence has been affected by the shift from a bipolar to multipolar 
security environment. The US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and Israeli bombing of a Syrian 
nuclear reactor in 2007 demonstrated a willingness to take “preventive” action against 
perceived threats by state actors, thus dissuading potential proliferators from follow-
ing the Iraqi or Syrian examples.67 Indeed, US officials later cited the invasion of Iraq as a 
major reason for then Libyan leader Gaddafi’s decision, in December 2003, to dismantle 
Libyan weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programmes under an international inspec-
tion regime. As a result of the September 2001 al Qaeda attacks in the United States, fears 
that terrorist networks might acquire nuclear, radiological, chemical and biological WMD 
mounted precipitously. This prompted growing interest – especially in the West, but to 
some degree in Russia, as well – in national and international measures to prevent WMD 
proliferation to such networks. Prominent US strategists also explored whether deterrence 
concepts and tools are applicable to terrorist networks, or at least to their state sponsors.68 
Further research is necessary to understand how deterrence, as understood and prac-
tised during the Cold War, can be adapted to better fit with the 21st century security envi-
ronment, but promising work is already underway. For example, American experts have 
advanced the idea of “tailored deterrence”, which entails “a shift from a one-size-fits-all 
notion of deterrence toward more adaptable approaches suitable for advanced military 
competitors, regional WMD states, as well as non-state terrorist networks, while assuring 
allies and dissuading potential competitors”.69 The requirements of tailored deterrence 
would include more detailed and discriminating knowledge of the leaders that one seeks 
to deter, their values, objectives, and their appetite (or lack thereof ) for risk-taking. The 
views of potential adversaries regarding Western capabilities, intentions, and credibility 
will also be important.
67  Bunn 2005. According to the author: “While deterrence is focused on convincing an adversary not to undertake 
acts of aggression, dissuasion is aimed at convincing a potential adversary not to compete with the United States 
or go down an undesirable path, such as acquiring, enhancing, or increasing threatening capabilities.” 
68  Ibid.
69  Ibid.
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3.1 Extended deterrence
According to the concept of extended deterrence, a country is able and willing to deter 
aggression not only against its own territory, population, and/or vital interests, but also 
against that of an ally (or allies). As with bipolar deterrence, the credibility of extended 
deterrence depends to a high degree on the adversary’s perceptions of the capabilities 
and intent of the country that provides the extended deterrence assurances. However, in a 
situation of extended deterrence, the perception of the ally (or allies) receiving the assur-
ances is just as important. After all, by accepting extended deterrence, the ally (or allies) 
in question implicitly or explicitly acknowledge their inability (for example, due to tech-
nological, resource, or treaty constraints) or unwillingness (for example, due to political 
concerns or competing national priorities) to develop, build, and maintain the range of 
military capabilities, including nuclear weapons, necessary to credibly deter a potential 
aggressor. Before accepting de facto dependency as an alternative to accepting a higher 
risk of being attacked by, or forced to appease, their adversary, the ally (or allies) seeking 
protection must believe that the extended deterrence provider has a compelling mutual 
interest in the arrangement, since the notion of altruism is not a reliable basis for interna-
tional security relationships.70 
In the United States and Europe, the concept of extended deterrence took shape during 
the early days of the Cold War. Although not necessarily limited to nuclear weapons, such 
weapons quickly became the sine qua non of the US commitment to European defence 
under the NATO Treaty due to the overwhelming size and capabilities of Soviet conven-
tional forces, especially their heavy concentration of armoured divisions opposite the FRG. 
In December 1949, four months after the treaty’s entry into force, Allied ministers ap-
proved their first “strategic concept”, which called for “a powerful deterrent to any nation 
or group of nations threatening the peace”.71 The first military measure listed as necessary 
for meeting this objective was to ensure the ability “to carry out strategic bombing by 
all means possible with all types of weapons, without exception” (emphasis added). Allies 
understood that US-based aircraft carrying nuclear weapons would conduct such bomb-
ing. As noted earlier in this report, by late 1954, in accordance with the massive retaliation 
approach, the United States began to deploy artillery-fired “tactical” nuclear weapons in 
the FRG. Eventually, other types of forward-based US nuclear weapons followed, includ-
ing short-range rockets, aircraft-delivered bombs, and atomic demolition munitions. By 
the mid-1970s, several thousand tactical nuclear weapons were present on the territory of 
several European Allies or deployed on US Navy ships assigned to Europe.
70  Although this section focuses on extended deterrence in the European context, the concept also applies to US 
bilateral defence guarantees to its Asia-Pacific allies.
71  Donnelly 1949.
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The existential threat posed by the Soviet Union was not, however, the only US motiva-
tion to provide extended nuclear deterrence to Europe. As previously noted, US concerns 
regarding the possible proliferation of nuclear weapons among certain allies and friendly 
(but non-aligned) states surfaced in the mid-1950s. Washington was concerned that re-
sources and political capital spent by European states to develop independent nuclear 
forces would necessarily detract from needed improvements to their conventional forces 
and, more broadly, their post-war economic reconstruction. France was a particular and 
near-term concern, but US analysts also viewed Sweden and the FRG, for different reasons, 
as potentially interested in building or acquiring nuclear weapons.72 In addition, US ana-
lysts cautioned that a decision by those states to seek nuclear weapons would be domesti-
cally contentious. The resulting debate, it was feared, might mobilize disarmament senti-
ment and jeopardize the forward-basing of US nuclear weapons. 
Some US officials believed the proliferation of European nuclear weapon states could also 
complicate US alliance crisis management vis-à-vis the Soviets. They considered it highly 
unlikely that a European ally or friendly partner might threaten to use a nuclear weapon 
against the Soviets (or others) in the absence of an extreme threat to its sovereignty and 
security. They were less confident, however, in predicting the Soviets’ reaction to the pros-
pect of confronting multiple European nuclear armed powers, especially a nuclear-armed 
FRG untethered from Washington’s command and control. 
While the broad concept of extended deterrence was well understood within the Alliance 
by the late 1950s, additional political and military steps were necessary to operationalize it 
over the following decades. Of these, four inter-related aspects stand out in particular.
First, the United States and its European and Canadian allies soon realized they needed 
mechanisms and procedures to reassure each other and their respective publics that ex-
tended deterrence served their mutual interests. To cite one example of why this came 
about, a NATO air exercise in 1955 indicated that the FRG would suffer catastrophic dam-
age, including potentially millions of casualties, from the blast and fallout effects of some 
two hundred tactical nuclear weapons.73 This undercut the arguments of FRG officials who 
had favoured threatening NATO’s early use of nuclear weapons primarily as a means of 
avoiding any war on their territory. Through NATO and bilateral channels, US, European, 
and Canadian civilian and military officials established structures and protocols to conduct 
consultations, planning and exercises on nuclear issues. These went a long way towards 
reconciling their respective threat perceptions, their views on the relationship between 
conventional and nuclear tools of extended deterrence, and their approaches towards 
72  Michel 2018. 
73  Yost 1992. 
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the deliberate escalation and selective use of nuclear weapons, if deterrence failed, to 
persuade the Soviets to cease their aggression and withdraw.74 These mechanisms also 
permitted the allies to work together on practical issues, ranging from nuclear weapons 
safety and security measures to employment doctrine and declaratory policy. 
Second, the United States and the European allies came to accept that extended deter-
rence depended, in part, on European participation in certain nuclear operational roles 
within a NATO framework. This was not a foregone conclusion. In fact, from 1946 to 1958, 
the Truman and Eisenhower administrations accepted congressionally-mandated prohibi-
tions on sharing nuclear-related information or materials. However, by the early 1960s, it 
was evident that the forward-basing of US nuclear weapons in Europe would be difficult 
to sustain unless a number of European allies, under mutually agreed rules and proce-
dures, could participate in nuclear-related missions, up to and including the delivery of 
US nuclear weapons by European dual-capable aircraft (DCA) and ground-based weapon 
systems.75 
At the time, the military argument for NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements was not par-
ticularly controversial. NATO military officers generally agreed that the addition of Euro-
pean capabilities to deliver US forward-based weapons would complicate Soviet planning, 
thereby strengthening NATO deterrence and defence capabilities. However, the political 
arguments in favour of such arrangements proved decisive. The nuclear sharing arrange-
ments demonstrated to three important audiences – the Soviets, Americans, and Europe-
ans – that the United States and Europe would share the risks and responsibilities inher-
ent in extended deterrence. To be sure, those arrangements were not popular among 
European publics who opposed nuclear weapons on ideological grounds and/or feared 
that their country’s potential direct participation in NATO nuclear operations would make 
them a priority target for Soviet nuclear attack. But given the Cold War context and un-
derlying consensus on the Soviet threat, European political leaders from the centre-left to 
centre-right were willing and able to muster the parliamentary support necessary to carry 
out the agreed nuclear-sharing roles despite anti-nuclear sentiment, which varied in inten-
sity among the concerned allies. 
Third, by the early 1970s the United States had overcome its initial scepticism regard-
ing UK and French decisions to build their own nuclear deterrents, and it came to ac-
cept those independent deterrents as complementary to its own. In fact, US nuclear 
74  Ibid.
75  US presidential authorization is required for release of US nuclear weapons to be delivered by an ally’s “dual ca-
pable aircraft” (DCA) under so-called “dual-key” arrangements. DCA are combat aircraft specially equipped to con-
duct conventional or nuclear missions, and DCA pilots receive specialized training for nuclear missions. 
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cooperation with the British, whose scientists participated in the wartime Manhattan Pro-
ject, had already progressed quite far.76 
76  Lewis & Tertrais 2015.
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U S - U K  N U C L E A R  W E A P O N  CO O P E R AT I O N
The US-UK “special relationship” in the area of nuclear weapons is unique: there exists no other 
programme where the United States has worked so intimately with another country for such 
an extended period of time on the gravest matters of national security. But this was not an easy 
accomplishment.
The two countries’ cooperation during World War II was, at times, subject to serious strains. 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill authorized the development of an atomic bomb in mid-1941. 
Apparently convinced that his country had a lead in the field, he gave a lukewarm response to 
President Franklin Roosevelt’s suggestion in October 1941 to coordinate their countries’ efforts. 
In January 1942, one month after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt gave his 
tentative approval to build an atomic weapon. Later that year, the British, having encountered 
serious obstacles with their own programme, began to seek American assistance. 
However, limited information exchanges with the British were virtually halted by the US 
side between late 1942 and mid-1943 due, in part, to concern that “Britain would use U.S. 
technological innovations for postwar industrial purposes”.77 It was not until the Quebec 
Agreement, concluded in August 1943, that British scientists were effectively incorporated into 
the US Manhattan Project, where they made important contributions to the development of 
the first atomic bombs.
Once the war had ended, new bilateral complications arose as the United States sought to 
retain a monopoly over nuclear weapons. In 1946, Congress pushed for, and President Harry 
Truman approved, the Atomic Energy Act (known as the “McMahon Act” in recognition of its 
leading Senate proponent). The law effectively barred the sharing of atomic information with 
any nation, including the United Kingdom. Other frictions arose between the wartime allies 
over access to African uranium ore and the US desire to terminate the Quebec Agreement, 
which required the United States to obtain British consent prior to use of the atomic bomb. 
By 1947, a combination of factors – including fear of Soviet aggression in Europe, the desire 
to preserve British global prestige, and perceptions of American inconstancy – led the United 
Kingdom (under Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee) to resume an independent programme 
to develop an atomic weapon. British resolve was further strengthened when the Soviet Union 
conducted its first nuclear explosion in 1949. 
Churchill returned to power in 1951, and after trying unsuccessfully to re-establish close 
nuclear collaboration with the United States, he eventually agreed that the United Kingdom 
should develop, manufacture, and deploy its own arsenal of nuclear weapons. However, as one 
expert notes: “(S)trategically, the overall objective of this British independent effort remained 
to secure interdependence with the United States (emphasis added). In British minds, collective 
security was the best, if not the only, viable alternative for preventing attacks on its small and 
77  Center for Strategic and International Studies 2008, 25.
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vulnerable homeland.”78 The United Kingdom exploded its first nuclear device in 1952 and 
deployed its first air-delivered nuclear weapons in 1955. 
The following year, President Dwight Eisenhower approved measures to increase the sharing 
of certain atomic energy-related information. The McMahon Act was amended in 1954 and 
authorized the sharing of data on military characteristics of US nuclear weapons (but not 
their designs) with NATO Allies. After obtaining Congressional approval of the necessary legal 
authorities, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Foreign Secretary Lord Hood signed the 
Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA) in 1958. This watershed agreement provided for extensive 
bilateral information exchanges and cooperation in sensitive areas such as: defence plans; 
personnel training involving nuclear weapons; evaluations of nuclear capabilities of potential 
enemies; nuclear weapons delivery systems; transfer of a US nuclear submarine propulsion 
plant; and nuclear and non-nuclear weapons materials and design. The MDA specified, 
however, that “there will be no transfer by either Party of atomic weapons”.79 
Implementation of the MDA proceeded rapidly over the next few years but was not problem-
free. Initially, the Kennedy Administration was sceptical about the value of an independent UK 
deterrent. Indeed, an April 1961 Policy Directive approved by President John Kennedy stated: 
“Over the long run, it would be desirable if the British decided to phase out of the nuclear 
deterrent business.”80 The Administration’s attitude changed, however, in late 1962, when its 
cancellation of the Skybolt air-delivered nuclear missile programme provoked a serious rift 
with the British. (The British had counted on the Skybolt to extend the credibility of their 
airborne deterrent, whose ability to penetrate Soviet defences was increasingly in doubt.) This 
blow to UK confidence in the United States was solved by the 1963 Polaris Sales Agreement 
(PSA), under which American Polaris missile systems and related services would be provided 
for British-built submarines. The first of four Polaris-armed UK ballistic SSBNs entered service 
in 1968.
The MDA and PSA set the basic pattern for US-UK collaboration on nuclear weapons-related 
systems that continues today. The US and Royal navies work closely together on American 
SLBM and nuclear propulsion systems integrated into British-built submarines; and the US 
national laboratories that support the American deterrent work closely with the UK Atomic 
Weapons Establishment (AWE) on a range of weapons materials, design, and weapons effects 
issues, although the AWE is responsible for design decisions, manufacturing, maintaining, 
and decommissioning British warheads.81 The D-5s deployed on UK SSBNs are US-built, and 
undergo periodic maintenance at the US Navy’s Kings Bay Submarine Base in the state of 
Georgia. The United Kingdom holds title to 58 D-5s. Under pooling arrangements between 
78  Ibid., 49–50.
79  US-UK Mutual Defence Agreement, 1958, accessible at: https://www.cvce.eu/content/publica-
tion/2014/6/12/a1ee4c1f-2166-48f3-a886-2711bd647111/publishable_en.pdf.
80  US Department of State 1961. One year later, Kennedy’s national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, 
advised the President that “we do not really see much point in the separate British nuclear deterrent, be-
yond our existing Skybolt commitment; we would much rather have British efforts go into conventional 
weapons and have the British join with the rest of NATO in accepting a single U.S.-dominated nuclear 
force”.
81  Between 1962 and 1991, the British conducted 19 nuclear explosive tests at the US Nevada Test Site.
40
the two navies, a D-5 deployed on a US SSBN may later be deployed on a UK SSBN, and vice 
versa. Since the UK submarine base at Faslane, Scotland does not have facilities to load the D-5 
SLBMs into their SSBNs, the loading process takes place at Kings Bay. 
The United States and the United Kingdom have always maintained separate and independent 
command and control authority over nuclear weapons; only the US President can authorize 
the use of US nuclear weapons, and only the UK Prime Minister can authorize the use of UK 
nuclear weapons. However, in the mid-1980s, the sides acknowledged a major gap in their 
cooperation. As a former senior US official points out: “The fact that (the United States and 
the United Kingdom)… never discussed the premises of the deterrent process, or the best 
way to ensure effective deterrence of the Soviet leadership, or the optimum employment of a 
common military system (the SLBM) was simply accepted… (T)he blinding reality that we were 
basically ignorant of how the British government thought about nuclear deterrence – and 
that Britons were similarly ignorant of our approach – was unsettling.”82 To begin to address 
this situation, the sides initiated “nuclear staff talks” in 1986. Limited at first to a few senior 
civilian defence officials and military officers, the talks expanded over time in terms of team 
composition and the range and sensitivity of topics. They continue to serve as a senior-level 
policy channel and an operational linkage between target planners.83
82  Op. cit., Center for Strategic and International Studies, 173–4.
83  Ibid., 177.
While US-French cooperation on nuclear weapons-related issues was less extensive, it 
expanded into some sensitive areas after President Charles de Gaulle left office in 1969.84 
NATO’s 1974 Ottawa Declaration publicly acknowledged that the United Kingdom and 
France “possess nuclear forces capable of playing a deterrent role of their own contrib-
uting to the overall strengthening of the deterrence of the Alliance”.85 The declaration 
demonstrated solidarity among the “nuclear allies” to audiences within NATO. It also sig-
nalled to the Soviets that the United States was comfortable with having separate French 
and UK centres of decision-making, which served to complicate Soviet planning without 
undermining allied confidence in the US extended deterrence.
84  Under the 1961 US-French “Agreement for Cooperation on Mutual Defense Purposes”, the United States pro-
vided the French air force with tanker aircraft and specialized training that qualified certain French squadrons to 
execute NATO nuclear missions armed with US weapons based in Germany. When France withdrew from NATO’s 
integrated military structures in 1966, French participation in NATO’s nuclear planning as well as US training of 
French forces for potential nuclear missions came to an end. At their White House meeting in February 1970, Presi-
dents Nixon and Pompidou laid the groundwork for close-hold bilateral discussions and cooperation on a range of 
nuclear weapon-related topics. See Burr 2011.
85  NATO 1974.
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Fourth, a central issue in the extensive discussions among the allies on extended deter-
rence involved the linkage, or “coupling”, of US strategic forces (i.e. those intercontinen-
tal systems that, in wartime, would primarily target the Soviet homeland) and US for-
ward-based tactical nuclear weapons (i.e. those intended primarily to repel a Soviet and 
Warsaw Pact attack across the inner German border). Until the late 1950s, this coupling 
was considered automatic. As Soviet capabilities to strike the US homeland improved, the 
US flexible response policy inter alia put more emphasis on “escalation control”, which 
implied a desire by Washington to avoid strategic strikes against Soviet targets. The Euro-
pean allies, however, insisted on coupling “on the grounds that the threat of Washington’s 
employment of strategic nuclear forces has a powerful effect in deterring Soviet aggres-
sion and thereby preventing war”.86 
In fact, nuclear weapon employment policy directives approved by Presidents Nixon, 
Carter, and Reagan confirm that deterrence of conventional or nuclear attack against US 
allies was considered a fundamental US objective, requiring integrated plans for the em-
ployment of strategic and theatre nuclear forces.87 In other words, while the US presidents 
understandably insisted on a range of options covering possible nuclear employment, the 
coupling desired by Europeans was certainly not neglected, even if some European offi-
cials were not entirely satisfied with Washington’s explanations of the policy. 
Indeed, the issue of coupling was at the heart of perhaps the most serious challenge to 
extended deterrence during the Cold War. This occurred when NATO, prompted in part by 
public warnings in late 1977 by FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, became alarmed over 
Soviet deployment of the SS-20, a new road-mobile missile able to deliver, with high accu-
racy, three nuclear warheads to a range of some 5,000 kilometres. Schmidt’s central point 
was that the advent of virtual US-Soviet parity in intercontinental strategic weapons “neu-
tralize(d)” those capabilities and “magnifie(d) the significance of disparities in nuclear tacti-
cal and conventional weapons” where the Soviets held important advantages.88 
Moscow’s motive behind the SS-20 deployments, and the military implications of those 
deployments for European allies and US forward presence, were hotly debated within 
the Alliance.89 Allies broadly agreed, however, that the deployment of large numbers of 
the relatively invulnerable SS-20s (along with the Soviets’ new “Backfire” bomber) vastly 
86  Yost 1992, 249.
87  The formerly Top Secret nuclear employment policy directives are accessible at: https://www.nixonlibrary.gov/
sites/default/files/virtuallibrary/documents/nsdm/nsdm_242.pdf; https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb390/
docs/7-25-80%20PD%2059.pdf; https://www.archives.gov/files/declassification/iscap/pdf/2013-104-doc01.pdf.
88  Nuti et al. 2009.
89  Some Western military analysts assessed that a priority mission for the SS-20s was to attack Western European 
airfields, ports, and communications centres, blocking US reinforcements and imposing a fait accompli that would 
convince the United States not to engage its tactical or strategic nuclear forces against the Soviets. See Burr 2009.
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exceeded any legitimate defensive needs and represented an attempt by Moscow to “de-
couple” US extended deterrence from the defence of Europe. NATO solidarity was further 
shaken by Carter’s decision in 1978 to stop production of a new type of enhanced-radia-
tion nuclear weapon (popularly known as the “neutron bomb”) designed to counter the 
Soviets’ conventional advantages, especially in heavy armour, while minimizing collateral 
damage. 
NATO’s “dual-track” decision in 1979 aimed, in effect, to avoid any perceived decoupling 
of the US extended deterrent by deploying 108 US intermediate-range ballistic missiles 
(Pershing IIs) in the FRG and 474 land-based cruise missiles in Belgium, the Netherlands, 
Italy, and the United Kingdom. From NATO’s perspective, the deployments track would 
strengthen deterrence, underscore Alliance nuclear risk and burden sharing, and reassure 
the allies by introducing a visible US capability to strike targets deep in Soviet territory 
from Western Europe. In parallel with the deployments, NATO endorsed an arms control 
track to negotiate the lowest possible and equal number of INF systems on both sides. 
For some allies, the dual track decision was particularly difficult.90 However, despite large 
protests in the basing countries, NATO’s consensus held, the Reagan administration pro-
posed a “zero-zero” option in 1981, US INF deployments began in 1983, and the negoti-
ations eventually produced the INF Treaty in 1987, which led to the total and verifiable 
elimination of the INF and shorter-range land-based missiles on both sides.91
The end of the Cold War and collapse of the Soviet Union did not convince the United 
States and its NATO allies to abandon extended deterrence. The emergence of a revanchist 
Russia or a serious nuclear (or chemical or biological) threat to European security from an-
other source, while considered unlikely at the time, could not be excluded. Nevertheless, 
given the disappearance of any plausible conventional threat on its doorstep and the re-
duction of tensions between Europe and Russia, the United States and NATO took several 
measures during the 1990s and early 2000s to reduce the prominence of nuclear weapons, 
including the tools of extended deterrence, in their post-Cold War deterrence and collec-
tive defence strategy. These measures encompassed four areas.
First, US forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe were reduced by about 95 percent 
from their estimated high point of 7,300 in 1971. The lion’s share of these reductions, 
which were endorsed by NATO, took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Thousands 
more warheads were withdrawn beginning in late 1991, with additional withdrawals (to-
talling around 200) reportedly taking place as recently as 2008. Non-government sources 
90  Bell 2018. 
91  The INF Treaty text and abbreviated chronology are accessible at: https://www.state.gov/t/avc/trty/102360.htm.
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estimate that a total of approximately 150 US warheads (B-61 gravity bombs) remain at 
storage sites in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey.92 
Second, NATO took internal measures to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its plan-
ning. The readiness criteria for forces with a nuclear role were significantly relaxed, stand-
ing peacetime nuclear contingency plans were terminated, and exercises involving poten-
tial nuclear employment reportedly became less frequent and realistic. 
Third, in its public statements and documents, NATO underscored its reduced reliance on 
nuclear weapons. Indeed, its 2010 Strategic Concept explicitly committed the Alliance, for 
the first time, to “create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons in accordance 
with the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty”.93
Fourth, the Alliance sought to allay Russia’s professed concerns that new members in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe might seek, or be obliged, to base nuclear weapons on their terri-
tory. Specifically, NATO declared in the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act that there was “no 
intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new mem-
bers, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy – and 
(NATO member states) do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact 
that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear 
weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construc-
tion of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities”.94 In 
addition, NATO’s 2012 Deterrence and Defence Posture stated its readiness to consider fur-
ther reductions in forward-based nuclear weapons provided Russia took reciprocal steps.95
The steps to reduce the prominence of nuclear weapons in NATO’s internal political and 
military deliberations and its relations with Russia also had some unintended conse-
quences. While not questioning the continuing need for extended deterrence, some 
92  See Nuclear Threat Initiative 2019. In September 1991, President George H. W. Bush announced his unilateral 
“Presidential Nuclear Initiatives”, which included the removal from Europe of some 1,700 forward-based nuclear 
warheads, as well as the removal of all nuclear warheads from US surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based 
naval aircraft. As a matter of policy, NATO does not identify the basing countries or the number of US warheads 
present. 
93  NATO 2010.
94  NATO 1997.
95  NATO 2012.
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Europeans argued that US forward-based weapons were no longer essential for that pur-
pose.96 In 2009, at the insistence of her junior coalition partner, Chancellor Angela Merkel 
reluctantly agreed to consult with NATO allies on the removal of the remaining US weap-
ons from Germany.97 Faced with resistance (especially from France, the United Kingdom, 
the United States, and several Eastern and Northern European allies), Germany effectively 
shelved its proposal in 2010 and joined NATO’s consensus on the new Strategic Concept 
whereby allies affirmed that “as long as there are nuclear weapons in the world, NATO will 
remain a nuclear Alliance”; and pledged to “ensure the broadest possible participation of 
Allies in collective defence planning on nuclear roles, in peacetime basing of nuclear forces 
(emphasis added), and in command, control and consultation arrangements”.98
In recent years, and especially since Russia’s 2014 intervention in Ukraine, US and Euro-
pean thinking about extended deterrence has had to adjust to new challenges.
The “geography” of extended deterrence has changed dramatically since the end of the 
Cold War. The most plausible flashpoint for a military confrontation between NATO and 
Russia has shifted from the now erased inner German border to the Baltic allies and Po-
land. While NATO’s overall conventional capabilities are greater than during the Cold War, 
the proximity, size, and improved capabilities and readiness of Russian conventional and 
dual-capable forces in the Baltic region have raised concerns that Russia could have an 
“opening attack” advantage there.99 (See also section 7 of this report.) As previously men-
tioned, some allies also see Iran as a potential future nuclear threat, especially if the JCPOA 
were to collapse. 
The types of threats that allies would like to deter have become more diverse. “Hy-
brid” threats – ranging from “little green men” to cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, 
96  The retention of forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe was vigorously debated within the United States 
as well. Some argued that absent an agreement to greatly reduce or eliminate Russia’s considerable advantages in 
tactical nuclear systems, the forward-based US weapons were necessary to demonstrate the coupling of US strate-
gic forces to the defence of NATO and ensure European nuclear “burden sharing” in contrast with “burden shed-
ding”. See Miller, Robertson, & Schake 2010. Advocates of a withdrawal believed extended deterrence would still be 
credible by relying on US strategic systems. Some also questioned the military utility and costs of relatively small 
numbers of air-delivered gravity bombs. See Perkovich 2010. The Obama administration’s Nuclear Posture Review 
2010 stated: “Although the risk of nuclear attack against NATO members is at an historic low, the presence of U.S. 
nuclear weapons—combined with NATO’s unique nuclear sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear mem-
bers participate in nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weap-
ons—contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional 
threats.” (US Department of Defense 2010a). 
97  During the 2009 election campaign, Guido Westerwelle, leader of the small liberal FDP party who became for-
eign minister under the governing coalition, favoured a speedy German request to Washington to withdraw the 
weapons, which he termed a “relic” of the Cold War. As a candidate, Westerwelle’s proposal was not predicated on 
prior agreement within NATO. 
98  NATO 2010.
99  Binnendijk & Kramer 2018. 
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financial networks, and military command, control, and communications networks – could 
complicate national and NATO decision-making. Depending on the circumstances, these 
threats could trigger Article 5 (the collective defence provision) of the NATO Treaty. Nev-
ertheless, it is difficult to imagine realistic scenarios where the classic tools of extended 
deterrence – US strategic and forward-based nuclear forces – would come into play at an 
early stage in NATO’s response, except as an inherent warning to the aggressor not to es-
calate the situation.
Finally, while Russian military developments over the past several years, especially in nu-
clear weapon-related areas, have prompted responses by NATO and the “nuclear allies”, 
the renewed discussion of nuclear weapons has also re-energized efforts, at least in the 
West, to delegitimize their role in deterrence in general and, in particular, as a necessary 
component of extended deterrence. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(discussed in section 6 of this report) is an example of the former, and the SPD’s decision in 
early 2019 to re-examine Germany’s role in nuclear-sharing arrangements is an example of 
the latter.100 
3.2 Impact of technological change on deterrence 
The interplay between technological change and deterrence has always been complex.101 
Technological change can improve or degrade strategic stability, depending upon fac-
tors such as the nature of the technology involved; how it relates to the broader goal of 
the side adopting the technology (e.g. whether to strengthen deterrence by punishment 
or by denial, or to improve warfighting outcomes); and effects of the technology on the 
structure, missions, and resourcing of other nuclear and non-nuclear military capabilities. 
Moreover, as is the case with other aspects of deterrence, the intent of the side develop-
ing or deploying a specific technology might differ significantly from the perceptions of 
its allies and adversaries. What one side might see as a necessary technological change to 
strengthen its deterrent or defensive posture might be seen by others as provocative or 
intended to augment that side’s offensive potential. 
For most of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union focused the lion’s share 
of their strategic programmes on technologies associated with the design and production 
100  Pancevski 2019.
101  While some analysts have viewed technology as a principal engine of the nuclear “arms race”, historical ex-
perience does not support such a sweeping conclusion. See Hamlett (1990) and Office of the Secretary of Defense 
(1981).
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of nuclear warheads and their delivery systems.102 Both countries constructed nationwide 
and capital-intensive networks of specialized research and development laboratories, 
production facilities (e.g. for fissile materials, weapon assembly, and delivery platforms), 
testing grounds, and deployment sites for ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines, and strate-
gic bombers. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, US strategic programmes accounted for 
one-quarter of the Pentagon budget.103 
At times, the United States and the Soviet Union opted for different approaches based, in 
part, on the availability of preferred technologies. For example, until the late 1950s, the 
United States emphasized the role of strategic bombers with large nuclear payloads able 
to inflict massive damage on urban-industrial targets inside the Soviet Union.104 During 
the same period, the Soviets focused more on missile and air forces primarily to support 
their ground operations in Europe or elsewhere along the Soviet periphery. However, at 
other times, each side seemed to shift its priorities in direct response to the other’s actions. 
For example, alarmed by the Soviets’ successful Sputnik launch in 1957 (which came sev-
eral months after their first ICBM test), the Eisenhower administration accelerated its ICBM 
and SLBM programmes. For their part, the Soviets, worried by what they perceived to be 
the US threat to their homeland, invested heavily in air defences (and, later, missile de-
fences) as well as ballistic missiles and aircraft especially suited to “pre-emptive operations” 
against US forward bases in Europe.105 
While the sides reached an approximate nuclear parity in offensive weapons, at least in 
quantitative terms, by the early 1970s, this did not produce a real convergence of their 
thinking on nuclear weapons and deterrence. Both saw a major role for nuclear weapons 
in war prevention. However, the United States, which had come to believe in the stabiliz-
ing value of MAD, placed its highest priority on nuclear forces that could survive an initial 
Soviet strike with enough weapons to inflict unacceptable damage on the Soviet home-
land, especially by targeting those forces and functions that the Soviet leadership viewed 
as essential to their war plans.106 This approach, which was consistent with deterrence by 
102  This statement is also valid for the United Kingdom, France, and China, although the subsequent discussion 
focuses on the United States and Soviet Union. This section relies heavily on Western sources of information, in-
cluding official archives and non-government studies, because they are more extensive and accessible than Soviet 
or Russian sources. 
103  This does not include the large expenditures directly associated with nuclear warhead development, produc-
tion, and testing, which were then the responsibility of the US Atomic Energy Commission. 
104  Office of the Secretary of Defense 1981. Defence budget increases as a result of the Korean War accelerated 
US development of a variety of nuclear warheads, including high-yield thermonuclear devices. However, the au-
thors concluded that in the early 1950s, US developmental work on warheads and missile delivery systems was not 
significantly influenced by the limited information available on Soviet programmes. 
105  Ibid., 819. For Soviet documents on the early development of an ICBM designed to carry a nuclear warhead, 
see Malyshev et al. 1953.
106  Op. cit., Miller. The US nuclear weapons targeting process at the end of the Cold War is described in “Strategic 
Weapons: Nuclear Weapons Targeting Process” (US General Accounting Office 1991).
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punishment, also reflected an assessment that the likelihood of nuclear war was relatively 
low. 
In contrast, Soviet leaders did not endorse the MAD concept which, according to some 
Western analysts, might have been viewed by their population (and that of other Warsaw 
Pact members) as conceding the vulnerability of the Soviet state. Instead, Soviet strate-
gists appeared to believe that if their forces were better prepared to fight a nuclear war 
and survive US retaliation – in effect, combining deterrence by punishment and by denial 
– the United States would not attack the Soviet homeland and, possibly, not employ its nu-
clear forces in defence of its allies.107 
These different strategic approaches were reflected in (and, perhaps, encouraged by) cer-
tain technological asymmetries between US and Soviet forces. For example, according to 
US assessments in the early 1980s, the Soviets’ emphasis on large ICBMs (which carried 
nearly four-fifths of their total deployed nuclear weapons) gave them a significant advan-
tage in “throw weight” – in other words, the ability to hold at risk a large percentage of 
US ICBMs and launch control centres with high-yield and increasingly accurate MIRVs. At 
the time, the Soviets were also believed to be more advanced in ballistic missile and air 
defence systems, as well as “passive defences” (such as hardened silos and deeply bur-
ied command centres), which together might blunt the effect of a US retaliatory attack.108 
Thus, although US officials considered a Soviet nuclear surprise attack (a “bolt from the 
blue”) to be unlikely, the Soviet force structure appeared, from an American perspective, 
to be better configured to execute a successful “first strike” option. 
On the other hand, by the early 1980s, the United States had placed nearly one half of its 
total deployed strategic warheads on SLBMs and almost one-third on long-range bombers 
– systems that, for a number of reasons, were considered “second strike” or retaliatory forc-
es.109 The US ballistic missile submarine fleet was considered extremely survivable, US ad-
vances in stealth technology promised to improve the ability of bombers and air-launched 
cruise missiles (ACLMs) to penetrate Soviet air defences, and US anti-submarine warfare 
(ASW) and satellite warning systems were viewed as significantly more capable than their 
Soviet counterparts. In addition, over time, significant new US investments were expected 
to improve the survivability of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) 
107  Office of the Secretary of Defense 1981. 
108  Under the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit 
strategic defensive systems to two sites in each country – one to protect an ICBM launch site, and one to protect 
the nation’s capital. The United States opted not to construct an ABM system to defend Washington, D.C., and aban-
doned (in the early 1970s) efforts to deploy an ABM system to defend an ICBM site. The Soviet Union deployed, and 
Russia still maintains, ABM defences around Moscow, at least some of which are nuclear armed. The United States 
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002.
109  Op. cit., Secretary of Defense & Director of Central Intelligence, 29.
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capabilities, making a Soviet “first strike” less effective and therefore less attractive. Mean-
while, the combination of improved warhead designs (which enhanced their reliability, ef-
fectiveness, safety, and security) with increasingly accurate ICBMs, SLBMs, and ALCMs gave 
US strategic planners – and, ultimately, the president – more options for the selective em-
ployment of strategic forces that would not emphasize attacks on “urban-industrial targets” 
likely to cause massive civilian casualties and other undesirable collateral damage.110
To be sure, both sides had reason to be concerned about technological and force structure 
asymmetries, especially given their gaps in understanding of the many other factors that 
could influence their adversary’s behaviour in a crisis. Even at the height of the Cold War, 
however, those asymmetries were not unmanageable. Indeed, as a US assessment stated 
in 1983: “(T)he Soviet advantages, while significant, do not appear to be great enough for 
us to be concerned that we no longer have the capability to deter large-scale nuclear war. 
Clearly we still do. The uncertainties (involved) would make it unattractive for the Soviets 
to escalate to such a level of warfare; they could not expect with high confidence to pre-
vail.”111 
In the post-Cold War period, nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems have 
continued to play a central role in Russian, US, French, and UK deterrence strategies de-
spite the reduced size of their arsenals. This is explained, at least in part, by the unique 
ability of their nuclear forces to deliver unmatched destructive power, with high accuracy 
and at great distances, against several classes of targets, ranging from hardened sites (e.g. 
deeply buried command structures and missile silos) to mobile missiles and critical mili-
tary staging areas (e.g. airfields and naval bases). Hence, all four have undertaken steps to 
maintain and/or modernize their “legacy” offensive systems. 
At the same time, the intersection of technological change and an increasingly multipolar 
threat environment has complicated previous deterrence calculations. Three broad trends 
since the early 1990s are of particular concern.
First, the dissemination of nuclear, missile, and related technologies – facilitated by state 
and non-state actors willing to circumvent international non-proliferation regimes – made 
it possible for additional states (Pakistan and North Korea) to join the ranks of nuclear 
110  Op. cit., Secretary of Defense & Director of Central Intelligence, 8. According to the assessment, “In the past, 
actual targeting plans provided for considerably more emphasis on counter-force and counter-military strikes than 
the public debate would indicate was the case. During much of the 1960s and 1970s the criteria used for force 
planning and programming, as well as the US declaratory policy, emphasized retaliation against urban-industrial 
targets, but US targeting policy, as reflected in SIOP [nuclear war] plans, allocated most weapons to military targets 
(emphasis added). Present declaratory and targeting policies now more closely correspond and are intended to 
maximize deterrence by focusing attacks against those targets and functions that the Soviets see as most essential 
for carrying out their war plans”.
111  Ibid., 1.
49
VALTIONEUVOSTON SELVITYS- JA TUTKIMUSTOIMINNAN JULKAISUSARJA 2019:52 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE REDUX NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
weapon states, and their pace of development has generally exceeded expectations. For 
example, Pakistan has reportedly introduced short-range “battlefield” nuclear weapons, 
while North Korea is developing an ICBM.112 While the production or acquisition of fissile 
material remains the most difficult and expensive barrier to building a nuclear weapon, a 
nuclear programme ostensibly established for energy generation purposes can be used, 
under certain circumstances, for a clandestine enrichment and/or reprocessing effort. 
(This was the root cause of Western concern leading to the JCPOA.) Plans and equipment 
necessary for building nuclear weapons and their delivery systems have been sold on 
what amounts to an international black market. In addition, the scientific, computer, and 
engineering skills needed to build and sustain a viable nuclear weapons programme are 
significantly more accessible to developing countries than during the Cold War.
Second, technological advances have facilitated the development and proliferation of 
non-nuclear and dual-capable weapons that can have strategic effects.113 New preci-
sion-guided intermediate and longer-range strike weapons, ranging from cruise and bal-
listic missiles to unmanned (but armed) submarine vehicles have increased the likelihood 
of standoff and remote operations (known as “anti-access, area denial” or “A2AD”) in the 
initial stages of an armed conflict. With an enhanced capability to deliver conventional or 
nuclear strikes against the defender’s air and naval units, an aggressor might hope to pre-
vent those units from supporting and reinforcing the forward-based forces integral to the 
defender’s deterrence and defence strategy.114 Moreover, the integration of hypersonic de-
livery vehicles into the aggressor’s A2AD arsenal, if successful, would significantly increase 
their capability to quickly engage the defender’s forces – a scenario which might incentiv-
ize the latter to launch pre-emptive strikes of its own against the A2AD threat.115 In such 
a case, the dual-capable nature of certain A2AD systems might further increase the risk of 
escalation, since an attack to suppress those systems might be interpreted as an attack on 
the aggressor’s nuclear arsenal. On the other hand, new missile defence technologies are 
also likely to continue to mature and proliferate, improving the ability of both friendly and 
adversarial state actors to defeat limited ballistic and/or cruise missile attacks. 
112  Pakistan has also tested a nuclear-capable submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). India conducted a sin-
gle nuclear explosion in 1974 and a series of explosions in 1998. India is developing a “triad” of land, sea, and air-de-
livered nuclear weapons.
113  According to some experts, thanks to advances in conventional weapons technology, new highly precise and 
long-range conventional weapons may be capable, within a few years, of performing certain missions currently as-
signed to nuclear weapons. See Younger 2000.
114  An aggressor state could also use advanced, long-range air defence capabilities as part of its A2AD arsenal.
115  Hypersonic weapons incorporate the speed of a ballistic missile with the manoeuvring capabilities of a 
cruise missile. Hypersonic weapons travel at speeds many times greater than the speed of sound, are specifically 
designed for increased survivability against modern ballistic missile defences, and can deliver nuclear or conven-
tional warheads at ultra-high velocities over long distances. See Smith 2019.
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Third, the rapid development of offensive cyber “counter space” (including anti-satellite) 
and artificial intelligence (AI) capabilities pose additional challenges to deterrence. Cyber 
attacks mounted by state or non-state actors could disrupt and, in some cases, cause se-
vere physical damage to critical infrastructure across the energy, financial, water, aviation, 
manufacturing, and government services sectors. 
D E T E R R E N C E  A N D  T H E  C Y B E R  D O M A I N
Will “mutually assured disruption” become a catchphrase for establishing deterrence in the 
new age of cyber operations just as “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) entered the lexicon 
of nuclear strategists during the Cold War? Terminology aside, the challenges involved 
in deterring or, if necessary, responding to the use of weaponized cyber tools are rapidly 
expanding, along with the number of potential “battlefields” and state and non-state actors 
that might be implicated in, or affected by, cyber attacks.
In 2007, Estonia was the first to experience a nationwide cyber attack, which mainly targeted its 
government, banking, and media websites. (Estonian officials attributed the attack to Russian 
government-sanctioned actors.) Since then, the proliferation of cyber threats and intrusions 
has led the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), in his January 2019 report to Congress, 
to rank cyber at the top of his list of “global threats”. In particular, the DNI officially confirmed, 
for the first time, that “Russia has the ability to execute cyber attacks in the United States that 
generate localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure – such as disrupting 
an electrical distribution network for at least a few hours – similar to those demonstrated in 
Ukraine in 2015 and 2016. Moscow is mapping our critical infrastructure with the long-term 
goal of being able to cause substantial damage”.116 
Evidently, Russian cyber threats will not be met just by improved defences. According to a 
recent report by the New York Times, the United States, for its part, has stepped up its previous 
“reconnaissance probes into the control systems of the Russian electric grid” by placing 
“potentially crippling malware inside the Russian (electric grid) system at a depth and with an 
aggressiveness that had never been tried before. It is intended partly as a warning, and partly 
to be poised to conduct cyberstrikes if a major conflict were to break out between Washington 
and Moscow”.117
Russia is not the only US concern, however. The DNI has cited China’s “ability to launch cyber 
attacks that cause localized, temporary disruptive effects on critical infrastructure – such as 
disruption of a natural gas pipeline for days to weeks – in the United States”.118 Similarly, Iran, 
North Korea and (potentially) terrorist groups are said to have the capabilities to conduct 
disruptive cyber attacks.
116  Coats 2019.
117  Sanger & Perlroth 2019.
118  Coats 2019.
51
VALTIONEUVOSTON SELVITYS- JA TUTKIMUSTOIMINNAN JULKAISUSARJA 2019:52 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE REDUX NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
Estimates of the types of damage that could be caused by activating embedded malware in 
an adversary’s digital systems that control infrastructure vary widely. Some experts point to 
the potentially catastrophic effects of prolonged and expansive interruptions of energy grids 
on hospitals, other “first responders” (police and firefighters), transportation, financial, and 
communications networks. More targeted cyber attacks can also wreak havoc. For example, 
the US “Olympic Games” operation, reportedly begun under the George W. Bush administration 
and accelerated under the Obama administration, was credited with temporarily disabling 
some 1,000 centrifuges used by Iran to enrich uranium for possible application in its weapons 
programme.119 However, such attacks can also have unintended consequences, as was 
apparently the case when the cyber weapon designed for “Olympic Games” was unintentionally 
unleashed on the internet. 
In principle, the concepts of deterrence (by punishment and/or by denial) applied to nuclear 
weapons should be applicable to cyber operations. Indeed, in recent years, NATO has 
recognized cyberspace as a domain of military operations and declared cyber defence to 
be a core part of collective defence, meaning that a cyber attack against an ally could lead 
to the invocation of Article 5, the collective defence provision of the NATO Treaty. Moreover, 
in addition to the United States, France and the United Kingdom have acknowledged their 
national capabilities to conduct “offensive” cyber operations.120
But establishing cyber deterrence also presents special challenges, including how to assess 
an adversary’s cyber capabilities and vulnerabilities (which will likely be less susceptible to 
measurement or observation than nuclear or conventional forces), or its doctrine (which might 
not yet be developed), or its command and control structures and procedures (which might 
differ significantly from its nuclear-related counterparts). Moreover, depending on the nature 
of the cyber attack, it might be more difficult to rapidly attribute the disruption, with high 
confidence, to a specific adversary – an obvious prerequisite for taking punitive action that 
allies and partners would be willing, in most circumstances, to support. 
Absent a much improved understanding of how to deal with such challenges, chances 
of establishing effective bilateral or multilateral regimes to lessen the risk of conflict in the 
cyber domain appear bleak. After all, it took nearly two decades of nuclear standoff before 
the United States and Soviet Union initiated serious arms limitation talks. Further, during that 
period, nuclear weaponry, while steadily improving, did so at a much slower pace than has 
been the case with cyber technologies. 
Hence, “mutually assured disruption”, while woefully inadequate, might well become the 
default approach to cyber deterrence for years to come. 
119  Sanger 2012.
120  In late June, the United States reportedly conducted cyber attacks against Iranian intelligence as-
sets believed to be involved in attacks against oil tankers in the Gulf (Barnes & Gibbons-Neff 2019).
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Offensive cyber tools, in combination with technologies such as anti-satellite weapons, 
could degrade or destroy vital components of intelligence, warning, and nuclear com-
mand and control systems. Without such systems, the risks of misinterpretation or mis-
communication among national command and control authorities, as well as between ad-
versaries, would be significantly higher. Moreover, if a military conflict were to take place, 
the ability to control escalation and terminate hostilities would be dangerously degraded. 
Research on the implications of autonomous weapons systems (AWS), enabled by AI 
technologies, is in its early stages. On balance, it seems highly unlikely that national com-
mand and control authorities would, in effect, delegate to computers decision-making 
that affects the employment of strategic weapons. However, by significantly reducing the 
reaction time for both offensive and defensive weapons, which could have a stabilizing 
effect in some deterrence scenarios, AWS come with inherent risks as well. As a US re-
searcher points out: “(T)o the extent that AWS are developed and deployed because they 
enhance a military’s ability to deliver lethal force, it follows that a mistake by an autono-
mous system may have correspondingly greater consequences… (B)ecause AWS rely on 
decision-making processes that differ from human cognitive processes, they may act in 
ways that are difficult or impossible for humans to comprehend or predict. The risk of side 
A’s AWS making a mistake that causes a miscalculation by side B’s commanders is obvious. 
Less obvious is how miscalculation might arise from the interaction of two sides’ AWS.” 121
121  Leys 2018. AWS could also complicate the ability to use deterrent forces – for example, placing strategic 
bombers on heightened alert – for purposes of “signalling” a side’s preparedness to a potential aggressor. As Ley 
notes: “If AWS on balance decrease America’s ability to send costly signals, this could reduce its ability to make cred-
ible threats and assurances in a crisis. This, in turn, could undermine the US alliance system. In such a situation, US 
allies may seek AWS themselves in much the same way that (unmanned aerial vehicle) technologies have prolifer-
ated.”
53
VALTIONEUVOSTON SELVITYS- JA TUTKIMUSTOIMINNAN JULKAISUSARJA 2019:52 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE REDUX NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
4 Capabilities and perspectives of the 
nuclear allies and Russia
What national forces, strategy, and policies will ensure deterrence and safeguard vital 
national interests in the current and foreseeable international security environment? The 
fact that the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Russian Federation ad-
dress this question in different ways should not be surprising. Beyond obvious disparities 
in their size, location, and resources, their different approaches reflect historical factors (in 
particular, their experiences during the world wars and the Cold War), domestic political 
dynamics (including public attitudes towards nuclear weapons), and geo-strategic consid-
erations (especially their threat perceptions and degree of confidence in allies and part-
ners). For each of the four countries, this section describes its current and planned nuclear 
forces, and how they relate to the country’s overall deterrence strategy and policies. 
4.1 The United States
Nuclear force posture highlights: The US strategic nuclear deterrent relies on a “Triad” of 
land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs (launched from ballistic missile submarines, or SSBNs), 
and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and gravity bombs carried by strategic bomb-
ers. In accordance with New START’s central limits, definitions, and provisions on count-
ing weapons launchers and warheads, the United States deploys a total of 1,365 nuclear 
warheads on: 398 Minuteman III ICBMs in hardened silos, each missile carrying a single 
warhead; 209 D-5 SLBMs, armed with multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles 
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(MIRVs) on 14 Ohio-class SSBNs; and 49 nuclear-capable B-52H Stratofortress and B-2A 
Spirit strategic bombers, each attributed with one warhead.122 
The underlying US rationale for maintaining the Triad is essentially unchanged from the 
Cold War. 
•	 ICBMs are the most responsive leg of the Triad. They can respond 
very quickly to a launch order and accurately deliver high-yield 
weapons against targets throughout Eurasia in 30 minutes or 
less. A number of factors – including the number, locations, se-
cure command and control systems, and constant readiness of 
these missiles – make them highly survivable, with the possible 
exception of scenarios involving a massive and precisely coor-
dinated pre-emptive attack by hundreds of high-yield and ac-
curate warheads.123
•	 Strategic bombers provide the most visible and flexible leg of the 
Triad. They can be alerted and widely dispersed (supported by 
air-refuelling tankers) to demonstrate US resolve and capabili-
ties to adversaries and allies when a crisis is brewing, and they 
are the only strategic system that provides the president with 
the capability to recall a strike, if necessary. Their nuclear war-
heads include low-yield options, which can hold at risk a wide 
variety of targets, including some mobile systems, while reduc-
ing unwanted collateral damage. 
•	 SSBNs remain the most survivable leg of the Triad, as they are mo-
bile and deemed virtually undetectable when deployed. Only 
a portion of the SSBN fleet performs deterrence patrols, which 
122  Under New START, the parties are not obligated to report the number of warheads deployed on each mis-
sile at all times, which gives them flexibility in the mix of forces. To comply with the New START cumulative limit of 
1,550 warheads on deployed launchers and bombers for each side, the United States has opted to deploy ICBMs 
and SLBMs with lower numbers of warheads than they can technically carry. In the case of deployed strategic (or 
“heavy”) bombers, each aircraft is counted as carrying one weapon, although the B-52H and B-2A are technically ca-
pable of carrying multiple ALCMs and B-61 gravity bombs, respectively. For the latest New START figures excerpted 
from the US-Russian data exchange, see https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/07/06-26-2019-FACT-
SHEET-Public-Release-of-Dis-aggregate-Data.pdf. Strategic bombers and a portion of the ICBM and SLBM forces 
can be “uploaded” – fitted with additional warheads – if necessary to respond to a strategic surprise, such as the 
discovery of a safety or reliability problem with a specific US warhead type or an adversary’s unexpected break-
out of additional and/or more threatening weapon systems. US officials consider this “hedging capacity” as both a 
deterrent to potential adversaries and an additional assurance measure for allies. For additional descriptions of the 
US triad from both official and non-government sources, see US Department of Defense (n/d); Kristensen & Norris 
(2018b). 
123  According to the Nuclear Posture Review of 2018: “This is an insurmountable challenge for any potential 
adversary today, with the exception of Russia.” But as the NPR 2018 also notes: “The (US) capability to launch ICBMs 
promptly means that no adversary can be confident in its ability to destroy them prior to launch. This option con-
tributes to deterrence of a nuclear first strike attack.” (Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018).
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last an average of 77 days, under normal conditions. An SSBN 
can carry up to 20 SLBMs with high-yield, highly accurate war-
heads able to reach targets across Eurasia from a wide expanse 
of launch areas in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. The SSBN/
SLBM combination provides an assured second strike capabil-
ity. 
In addition to its strategic forces, the United States maintains a non-strategic nuclear capa-
bility (known as “theatre” or “tactical” nuclear weapons during the Cold War) comprised of 
B61 gravity bombs carried by F-15 DCA. As discussed elsewhere in this report (see sections 
on extended deterrence and NATO), a portion of those non-strategic forces are forward 
based in Europe. If necessary, US DCA and non-strategic weapons could be deployed to 
other regions, such as Northeast Asia.
US officials acknowledged years before the early 2014 downturn in relations with the Rus-
sian Federation that a broad effort to recapitalize the nuclear deterrent could no longer 
be postponed. For example, the service life of the Minuteman III ICBMs, first deployed in 
1970, cannot be extended beyond 2030; construction of the B-52 Stratofortress airframes 
stopped in 1962, those still in service rely in part on 1950s-era avionics and engines, and 
their existing ALCM weapons are 25 years past their design life; while the current Ohio-
class SSBNs, which entered into service during the 1980s and 1990s, and their D-5 SLBMs 
must be retired by the early 2040s. Having decided, in its 2010 Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR 2010), that retaining all three legs of the Triad would best maintain strategic stability 
at an acceptable cost, the Obama administration began funding a long-term investment 
programme to modernize the nuclear delivery systems, their strategic command, con-
trol, communications, computer and intelligence systems (C4I), and the associated infra-
structure of nuclear research, design, and development laboratories, as well as facilities for 
weapons production, stockpile maintenance, and disassembly.
Following a year-long review, the Trump administration adopted a nuclear modernization 
programme that closely resembles its predecessor’s approach.124 In the strategic force do-
main, the planned Triad replacement systems will include: at least 12 Columbia-class SS-
BNs (the first of which is expected to enter service in 2031) armed with a new SLBM to re-
place the D-5; 400 new type ICBMS (Ground Based Strategic Deterrent) to replace the Min-
uteman IIIs beginning in 2029; and, beginning in the mid-2020s, a new B-21 bomber (the 
Raider) armed, when assigned to nuclear missions, with the new Long Range Stand-Off 
cruise missile or a modernized version of the B61 gravity bomb with low-yield options.125 
124  Op. cit., Bell.
125  Air Force Technology (n/d).
56
In the non-strategic force domain, the current administration is continuing its prede-
cessor’s policy of upgrading US capabilities by deploying the F-35 dual-capable (and 
“stealthy”) combat aircraft, which can carry the modernized B-61 bomb. However, the 
Trump administration has unveiled additional initiatives intended to respond to Russia’s 
deployment of a nuclear-capable GLCM that violates the INF Treaty.126 The United States 
has begun production of a low-yield variant for a small number of nuclear warheads of the 
type currently used with the D-5 SLBM – a programme likely to be completed by 2021. In 
addition, it has taken initial steps to develop a new nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise 
missile (SLCM), a type of weapons system removed from US ships and attack submarines 
in 1992. Moreover, it has begun research and development of a new, intermediate-range 
and conventionally-armed ground-based ballistic missile and cruise missile, systems for 
which testing or deployment would have been prohibited by the INF Treaty. 
Lastly, the Trump administration is continuing, and in some cases expanding, pre-exist-
ing programmes to modernize the nuclear command and control systems –parts of which 
have not been updated for nearly three decades – and the nuclear weapons infrastruc-
ture.127 As of January 2019, the estimated cost of the administration’s plans for sustaining 
and modernizing the nuclear deterrent is $494 billion over the period 2019–2028.128
Deterrence strategy and policies: As Robert Bell has observed, there is “a perhaps surpris-
ingly high degree of continuity” among official statements on the national security strat-
egy and nuclear policy by the Trump administration and its predecessor administrations.129 
This is particularly true with respect to US strategic goals and the role of nuclear weapons. 
For example:
•	 As stated in the NPR 2018: “The highest U.S. nuclear policy and 
strategy priority is to deter potential adversaries from nuclear 
attack of any scale. However, deterring nuclear attack is not the 
sole purpose of nuclear weapons… They contribute to the: de-
terrence of nuclear and non-nuclear attack; assurance of allies 
and partners; achievement of U.S. objectives if deterrence fails; 
and capacity to hedge against an uncertain future.” 
126  Op. cit., Bell. 
127  Nuclear command and control includes warning satellites and radars; communications satellites, aircraft, and 
ground stations; fixed and mobile command posts; and the control centres for nuclear systems. 
128  See US Congressional Budget Office 2019. The estimate, conducted by the Congressional Budget Office, rep-
resents a 23 percent increase over the previous 10-year estimate published in 2017 and includes spending by the 
Department of Defense (which has primary responsibility for weapon systems and command and control) and the 
Department of Energy (which has primary responsibility for weapons laboratories, warhead production, and sup-
port facilities). 
129  Op. cit., Bell. 
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•	 The same document articulates US policy regarding the potential 
employment of nuclear weapons as follows: “The United States 
would only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in ex-
treme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United 
States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could in-
clude significant non-nuclear strategic attacks… on the U.S., al-
lied, or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks 
on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command and control, or 
warning and attack assessment capabilities. The United States 
will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nu-
clear weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance 
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations.”130
Both statements closely resemble those made by the Obama, Bush, and Bill Clinton ad-
ministrations.131 The NPR 2018 also reaffirmed the longstanding US policy of “ambiguity” 
regarding the precise circumstances that might lead to a nuclear response, while reject-
ing (as have previous administrations) a “no first use” pledge and proposals to “de-alert” 
ICBMs.132
Nevertheless, the NPR 2018’s description of the strategic environment differs in impor-
tant respects from the NPR 2010. Gone is the latter’s hopeful language on further steps to 
“reduce the salience of nuclear weapons in international affairs and moving step-by-step 
toward eliminating them”; on Russia (“Russia is not an enemy, and is increasingly a part-
ner in confronting proliferation and other emerging threats”); and on China (“The United 
States and China are increasingly interdependent and their shared responsibility for ad-
dressing global threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, is growing.”).133 The NPR 
2018, in contrast, underscores Russia’s strategic nuclear force modernization programmes, 
retention of large numbers of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and “adoption of military 
strategies and capabilities that rely on nuclear escalation for their success” as elements of 
130  Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018, 21.
131  Indeed, the highlighted passages are identical to the language of the Obama administration’s 2010 NPR 
(US Department of Defense 2010). This is particularly noteworthy in the case of the second passage, wherein the 
Obama administration strengthened the previous US “negative security assurance” language.
132  Two controversial options to change longstanding US nuclear policy – by declaring a “no first use” policy 
and that “the sole purpose of nuclear weapons would be to deter others from launching a nuclear attack” – were 
hotly debated within the Obama administration, but were ultimately not adopted. Many US and allied officials 
have viewed such declarations as fundamentally incompatible with extended deterrence. The NPR 2018 arguments 
against “de-alerting” – i.e. that it could weaken deterrence by making the ICBM force more vulnerable to a potential 
first strike and compel the US to “re-alert” in a crisis, giving an adversary greater incentive to strike first – are con-
sistent with the views of previous administrations.
133  US Department of Defense 2010a.
58
“Moscow’s decided return to Great Power competition”.134 China’s nuclear modernization 
programmes and challenges to US military superiority in the Western Pacific are high-
lighted as well. 
This shift in tone and emphasis, however, appears to reflect a broad bipartisan consensus. 
As a result, criticism of the Trump administration’s approach to nuclear force structure and 
policy issues has been relatively mild and has not fallen neatly along partisan lines – at 
least so far. For example, some American experts, including prominent national security 
figures from the Clinton and Reagan administrations, have voiced concern that introduc-
ing a low-yield warhead option on a small number of SLBMs might have the effect of low-
ering the nuclear threshold and raise the spectre of “nuclear war-fighting”. But others, in-
cluding former senior officials in the Obama administration, have supported the low-yield 
SLBM warhead, arguing that it would reinforce deterrence against regional aggression by 
ensuring that potential adversaries, such as Russia and North Korea, would see no realistic 
advantage to be gained by attempting a “limited” nuclear escalation. 
Partisan differences are more apparent in ongoing congressional debates on funding the 
nuclear programme. Yet it is far from certain that outspoken Democratic critics of the pro-
gramme’s price tag will rally support from a majority of their party colleagues. Moreover, 
while competition for the Democratic Party’s presidential nomination in 2020 is in its early 
stages, it seems unlikely – absent a major international crisis – that any of the top contend-
ers would elevate nuclear issues to the top tier of their eventual presidential campaign 
platform.
Non-nuclear capabilities: Non-nuclear systems are poised to assume greater prominence 
in US deterrent strategy and policies. For the purposes of this report, two categories of 
such systems are particularly noteworthy: missile defences and conventional prompt 
global strike (CPGS) weapons.
US efforts to defend its homeland and its allies from missile attack have a long and cheq-
uered pedigree. After a string of abandoned prototype programmes dating back to the 
1940s, a nuclear-armed ballistic missile defence system (Safeguard), designed to protect 
an ICBM base in North Dakota (as permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty), became fully opera-
tional in late 1975, only to be deactivated less than six months later.135 In 1983, Reagan an-
nounced a Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), the stated aim of which was to “intercept and 
134  Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018, 1. 
135  The deactivation decision was a result of the high cost of the system as well as questions about its opera-
tional effectiveness. For a history of US missile defence efforts, see https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/
first70.pdf. 
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destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our allies”.136 
By 1987, the Pentagon developed a national missile defence concept, including space 
and ground-based sensors and non-nuclear kinetic (“hit to kill”) interceptors, intended 
to degrade a massive Soviet attack. Research, development, and testing of potential SDI 
components showed some positive results. Nevertheless, the overall effort was plagued 
by controversy over its cost, incompatibility with the ABM Treaty, and scepticism regard-
ing its ability to outpace the Soviets’ large offensive capabilities, which could be expanded, 
if necessary, to overwhelm virtually any plausible defence architecture. 
With the end of the Cold War, successive US administrations reoriented missile defence 
efforts away from large-scale threats – specifically from Russia and, to a lesser degree, 
China – towards more modest programmes designed to: protect the US homeland against 
a “limited” ICBM attack involving some two dozen incoming warheads; and protect US 
allies, and US and allied deployed forces against various intermediate- to shorter-range 
missile threats. While the scope and cost of specific missile defence programmes, as well 
as the Bush administration’s withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, were subject to heated Con-
gressional debates in the early 2000s, a broad consensus favouring missile defence has 
emerged since then, mainly in reaction to North Korean and Iranian missile developments. 
Today, missile defences are generally accepted as a means of strengthening deterrence by 
denial in several ways: by dissuading potential adversaries from building ballistic missiles 
in the first place (in effect, short-circuiting their potentially destabilizing missile capabil-
ity); by deterring those with such missiles from using them (since the aggressor could not 
have high confidence that missile attacks would be successful); by reassuring allies and 
partners that US forces would not be intimidated by regional missile threats, and hesitate 
to meet US defence commitments; by giving the US president options to respond to a 
limited attack other than by ordering a retaliatory nuclear strike; and by limiting US, allied, 
and partner losses if deterrence fails. Supported by a global network of land-, sea-, air- and 
space-based C4I systems, US missile defences currently include: 44 Ground Based Inter-
ceptors deployed in Alaska and California for homeland defence against North Korean 
(and, potentially, Iranian) ICBMs; 38 multi-role naval combatants armed with SM-3 and 
SM-6 guided missile interceptors; a missile defence site in Romania armed with a land-
based version of the SM-3 for defence of NATO allies against Iran and other potential Mid-
dle East threats (a second site is under construction in Poland for the same purpose); and 
land-based interceptors (THAAD and Patriot) for the defence of US allies (e.g. South Korea) 
and US and/or allied deployed forces against medium- and short-range threats.
136  Reagan 1983.
60
Although there are areas of continuity between the Trump administration’s Missile De-
fense Review (MDR), published in January 2019, and a similar review by the Obama ad-
ministration nine years earlier, there are notable differences and ambiguities, as well.137 For 
example, according to the MDR 2019, the United States will expand the existing home-
land missile defence deployments to deter and defend against growing North Korean 
and, potentially, Iranian threats, while “(relying) on nuclear deterrence to address the large 
and more sophisticated Russian and Chinese (ICBM) capabilities”.138 Those approaches 
are broadly consistent with the previous administration’s policy. However, the MDR 2019 
also hints at a new initiative to defend the homeland against Russian and Chinese cruise 
missiles and hypersonic glide vehicles, as well as improve capabilities for early warning of 
any such attacks. Similarly, the MDR maintains (and, in some areas, accelerates) the pre-
vious administration’s cooperation with European and Asia-Pacific allies and partners on 
regional missile defences. It also takes a new step by suggesting future testing of an ad-
vanced version of the SM-3 against an ICBM target. Moreover, while the previous adminis-
tration clearly oriented its regional missile defence efforts against “rogue states” (notably 
North Korea and Iran) and Chinese short- and intermediate-range missiles, the MDR sug-
gests a US effort to strengthen regional defences against Russian A2AD ballistic and cruise 
missile threats. 
If funded by Congress and implemented by the Trump administration, those arguably new 
directions for US missile defence policy will almost certainly be denounced by Russia and 
China. Both have alleged for many years that the underlying objective of US missile de-
fence efforts is to degrade their respective strategic deterrent capabilities. Trump’s public 
statement (upon announcing the MDR 2019’s completion) that “(o)ur goal is simple: to en-
sure that we can detect and destroy any missile launched against the United States – an-
ywhere, anytime, anyplace” is a sweeping formulation that does not appear in the review 
itself, but will doubtless serve to fuel Russian and Chinese suspicions on that score. His 
words could also revive past European worries about potential US decoupling of its de-
fence systems – and, ultimately, its strategic deterrent – from that of its allies and partners. 
CPGS weapons are intended to strengthen US capabilities to deter and defeat potential 
adversaries without resorting to nuclear weapons. The CPGS concept, which emerged in 
the early 2000s, envisions a US capability to strike targets virtually anywhere in the world, 
in approximately one hour, with high-precision conventional weapons. These weapons 
137  Missile Defense Review of 2019 accessible at: https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Interac-
tive/2018/11-2019-Missile-Defense-Review/The%202019%20MDR_Executive%20Summary.pdf. Ballistic Missile 
Defense Review of 2010 accessible at: https://archive.defense.gov/bmdr/docs/BMDR%20as%20of%2026JAN10%20
0630_for%20web.pdf.
See also Bunn 2019. 
138  Ibid., Office of the Secretary of Defense 2019.
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could include SLBMs or ICBMs modified to carry conventional warheads, or conventional-
ly-armed and manoeuvrable hypersonic cruise missiles.
The strategic rationale for CPGS, as explained by prominent US defence experts in 2011, 
is straightforward: “The United States has global security commitments to deter and re-
spond to a diverse spectrum of threats, ranging from terrorist organizations to near-peer 
competitors. (It) might need to strike a time-sensitive target protected by formidable air 
defenses or located deep inside enemy territory. Small, high-value targets might pop up 
without warning in remote or sensitive areas… A long-range nuclear-armed ballistic mis-
sile has the speed and global reach to overcome these obstacles. But a President would 
probably prefer a conventional strike option as an alternative to nuclear weapons in most 
contingencies… Additionally, in many potential crises, a nuclear threat might lack cred-
ibility in the eyes of U.S. allies and adversaries regardless of a U.S. President’s willingness 
to employ nuclear force.”139 As these and other analysts have pointed out, CPGS weapons 
would not rely on forward basing or overflight permissions, adding flexibility and auton-
omy to the US response in a range of contingencies.
To date, US efforts in the field of CPGS have not produced a specific weapons system ready 
for deployment. A new SLCM incorporating hypersonic technologies currently appears to 
be the favoured approach, and recent Pentagon budgets have included increased – but 
still relatively modest – funding for research, development, and testing purposes.
If the CPGS concept proves technically feasible and affordable, it may nevertheless raise 
new and complex issues for strategic deterrence and stability. Many US strategists do not 
see CPGS as a direct substitute for nuclear weapons, due in part to inherent limitations of 
conventional explosives against certain types of targets. Yet “even without direct substi-
tution… CPGS still might reduce U.S. reliance on nuclear weapons, because with more 
conventional options, a President might be less likely to authorize the use of a nuclear 
weapon to attack a critical target”.140 While some allies and partners might view this in a 
positive light, others might be concerned that it raises the nuclear use threshold too high, 
thereby weakening deterrence against a broad spectrum of possible threats. 
Other issues arise from the possible risk of misinterpretation of the nature of an attack. 
Critics of the CPGS concept argue, for example, that under certain scenarios, Russia could 
misinterpret a CPGS strike (for example, against A2AD systems based on Russian territory) 
as a nuclear attack. Others point out that even if the target of the US hypersonic weapons 
did not believe them to be nuclear armed, the shortened timelines involved could be 
139  Bunn & Manzo 2011. 
140  Congressional Research Service 2019. 
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destabilizing. “Because the weapons could be launched and reach their targets quickly, 
they would shorten the amount of time available to an adversary both for detecting and 
responding to an attack. But pressure to respond promptly, possibly in response to am-
biguous information and before countervailing capabilities were destroyed in an attack, 
could lead to inadvertent or unnecessary escalation during a crisis.”141 Of course, Russian 
or Chinese use of hypersonic weapons could pose the same dilemma for US commanders. 
4.2 France
Nuclear force posture highlights: France’s strategic nuclear deterrent rests on two compo-
nents.142 The sea-based component includes four Triomphant-class SSBNs, each carrying 
up to 16 M51-type SLBMs armed with MIRVs and able to reach targets at intercontinental 
range approximately 30 minutes after launch. Under longstanding French policy, at least 
one SSBN is operationally deployed at all times (normally for some 70 days), with a second 
SSBN available, if necessary, for simultaneous deployment. The air component includes 
two squadrons (totalling approximately 40 aircraft) of land-based Rafale DCA operated 
by the Strategic Air Forces. Upon presidential order, an additional force of approximately 
10 maritime-version Rafale DCA, operated by the Naval Nuclear Aviation Force, can be 
deployed on the Charles de Gaulle aircraft carrier. Each Rafale can carry a single nucle-
ar-armed air-to-surface missile (ASMPA). The total inventory of French SLBM and ASMPA 
warheads is less than 300.143 
According to French officials, all their nuclear weapons are considered strategic, but the 
two components have somewhat different attributes. French SLBMs represent a highly 
survivable and reliable second strike capability against a “major power” (Russia or China), 
but they could also be employed in a limited strike against a less capable regional adver-
sary. The air component allows greater flexibility for the president to signal French inten-
tions at various crisis stages – for example, by raising the DCA aircraft alert status in a way 
that is visible to the adversary; by de-alerting the aircraft, or recalling them after launch, 
if the crisis subsides; or by delivering a “final warning”, that is, a “single, non-renewable 
limited strike” intended to demonstrate French preparedness to engage its larger nuclear 
forces if the adversary does not cease its aggression.144 Depending on the specific contin-
141  Ibid., 35.
142  In 1996, President Jacques Chirac ordered the closing of France’s single intermediate-range ballistic missile 
(IRBM) base at Plateau d’Albion in southeastern France. The last of the 18 IRBMs, which carried MIRVs, was elimi-
nated in 1999.
143  Tertrais 2018b, Tertrais 2019, Kristensen & Korda 2019a. 
144  Ibid., Tertrais 2018b.
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gency, the air component’s more accurate and relatively lower-yield weapons might also 
be more appropriate than SLBMs for selective use against a regional adversary, especially 
one that does not have highly capable air defence systems.
Under current plans, France will replace the existing SSBNs, on a one-for-one basis, in the 
mid-2030s, thereby preserving the capability to maintain at least one SSBN on operational 
deployment at all times. The new SSBNs will also carry 16 M51-type SLBMs armed with 
MIRVs. Meanwhile, studies are underway to allow a presidential decision by 2021 on op-
tions to replace the ASMPA (possibly incorporating hypersonic and stealth technologies) 
in the 2030–2035 timeframe and the Rafale DCA in the 2040 timeframe.145 Over the next 
six years, the estimated cost of maintaining and modernizing the nuclear deterrent will 
increase from €4.5 to €6.2 billion annually, which would represent more than 20 percent of 
projected defence spending for equipment (or around 12 percent of total defence spend-
ing) over the same period.146 Despite occasional calls by critics of the nuclear programme 
to reduce the future SSBN fleet to three boats and/or eliminate the air component – prin-
cipally as cost-saving measures – the Emmanuel Macron government firmly supports their 
retention, as do many opposition politicians, so neither action is likely to occur. 
Deterrence strategy and policies: French ambitions to build an independent nuclear de-
terrent date back to the early post-Second World War period. In some respects, French mo-
tivations for doing so – in particular, fear of Soviet aggression and perceptions of Ameri-
can unreliability – were similar to those of the British. France’s searing experience of defeat 
by Germany in 1940 and concerns (broadly shared within the political class and elements 
of the military) regarding its international stature in the early 1950s no doubt played an 
important role as well. In retrospect, the 1956 Suez crisis probably helped to seal the po-
litical consensus that was already taking root. Unlike the British, who evidently concluded 
after the crisis that they should not put at risk their “special relationship” with the United 
States by deploying hard power without at least tacit American support, the overwhelm-
ing French reaction was to question Washington’s (and, to some extent, London’s) depend-
ability when it came to protecting French strategic interests.147 
Soon after his return to power in 1958, de Gaulle accelerated the expensive and techno-
logically demanding programme (begun, in fact, by his predecessors) to build a credible 
nuclear deterrent, resulting in France’s first nuclear test in 1960. By 1970, its Strategic Air 
145  Assemblée Nationale 2018.
146  Ministère des Armées 2018.
147  Moreover, the Soviet threat that France could be attacked “by more powerful states possessing all types of 
modern weapons of destruction” if it did not withdraw from Suez was seen by Paris as “nuclear blackmail”. Evidence 
of French concern over the Soviet threat can be seen in a message from Prime Minister Guy Mollet to Eisenhower 
(US Department of State 1956).
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Forces were theoretically capable of inflicting in the order of 15 to 20 million deaths in an 
attack on the Soviet Union –a level of potential destruction that continued to grow with 
the addition of thermonuclear weapons, SSBNs, and MIRVs to the French arsenal over the 
following two decades. According to Bruno Tertrais, “during the Cold War, French strategy 
focused on counter-cities strikes targeting both the economy and the population” of the 
Soviet Union, an extension of the concept of “deterrence from the weak to the strong”.148 
At the same time, consistent with their emphasis on strategic autonomy, especially in nu-
clear affairs, de Gaulle and his successors opted not to participate in NATO’s formal body, 
the Nuclear Planning Group, which serves as the Alliance’s senior body on a range of nu-
clear policy issues.149 
During the two decades or so following the end of the Cold War, France took several steps 
that, viewed in their totality, amounted to a reduced role for nuclear weapons in its na-
tional security strategy. It unilaterally reduced the nuclear force structure by dismantling 
tactical nuclear systems, cutting the SSBN fleet from six to four, deactivating one of three 
DCA squadrons, and downsizing the warhead stockpile by approximately one-third. In 
related areas, it ratified the NPT and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and stopped 
plutonium and highly enriched uranium production. 
The articulation of the French deterrence strategy and nuclear-related policies has also 
evolved. 
As Tertrais points out, France still considers its deterrent force as an “indispensable tool 
for its freedom of action and its strategic autonomy. For Paris, this freedom must exist in 
relation to a potential adversary: nuclear weapons make it possible to ensure that it will 
not be subjected to blackmail intended to prevent it from acting militarily or politically… 
(to fulfill) its international commitments (international mandate, Article 5 of the Washing-
ton treaty, defence agreement, etc.) or to ensure the protection of its strategic interests 
(protection of territory, security of supplies, freedom of navigation, etc.).”150 Descriptions 
of French doctrine emphasize that the use of nuclear weapons would be considered only 
in “extreme circumstances of legitimate defence” and not for any offensive purpose. Hence, 
148  Tertrais 2019. As Tertrais points out, while France had a theoretical capability in 1980 to destroy about 20 
percent of the Soviet population and up to 50 percent of Soviet industry, “in practice, Soviet anti-aircraft and an-
ti-ballistic defences would certainly not have enabled France to achieve this objective”. The “deterrence from the 
weak to the strong” concept posited that to deter aggression by a larger power, a smaller power need not match 
the aggressor’s military capabilities. Instead, the smaller power needed to ensure it could cause enough damage 
to the aggressor to convince it not to put the smaller power’s existence at risk. An anti-cities targeting strategy was 
a logical outcome of the “deterrence from the weak to the strong” concept, at least until missile accuracy could be 
substantially improved. 
149  However, this did not prevent discussions on sensitive nuclear issues between France and the other nuclear 
allies in other formats. Ullman 1989; Tertrais 2019. 
150  Ibid., Tertrais 2019.
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the size of the French deterrent is limited “to the minimum deemed necessary, i.e., to the 
sole capacity to exert unacceptable damage in all circumstances”.151 
At the same time, recent French presidents have been careful not to limit the possible use 
of nuclear weapons to retaliate against nuclear attack, thus leaving open the option of 
their use in response to conventional, chemical, biological, or even cyber attack on a scale 
that threatens French “vital interests”. It is noteworthy in this regard that “vital interests” 
have never been precisely defined, and the responsibility for doing so ultimately rests with 
the French president, who has the sole authority to order nuclear use.
While it is widely understood that Russia and China currently possess the nuclear capabil-
ity to pose an existential threat to France, French officials, as a rule, are more circumspect 
than US counterparts regarding the public identification of specific “major powers” or “po-
tential adversaries” who are the object of their respective deterrence policies and capa-
bilities. That said, in recent years, Russian and, to a lesser extent, Chinese military devel-
opments in general, and their nuclear programmes in particular, appear to be attracting 
increased attention in various official statements.152 
For example, the Macron government’s 2017 strategic review notes that increased Russian 
flights of strategic bombers and submarine deployments in the North Atlantic are a “major 
concern”, since “(t)hese areas are vital for NATO’s collective defence, the economic interests 
of Europe, and the freedom of action of French forces, including for nuclear deterrence” (em-
phasis added).153 Moreover, in testimony to French parliamentarians in early 2019, a senior 
foreign ministry official expressed concern over Russia’s violation of the INF Treaty and lack 
of transparency on the “volume, number, and deployment zones” of the Russian cruise 
missiles in question. The official added that “one of the essential elements of the military 
and nuclear strategy of the Russian Federation is to play the card of strategic ambiguity as 
a form of intimidation and certainly (a means of ) weakening European actors and sowing 
divisions among them and between (Europeans) and the Americans”.154
151  Ibid., 31. As Tertrais explains, since the end of the Cold War, French officials have moderated their public lan-
guage dealing with the level of destruction to be imposed on an adversary. For example, previous references to 
“anti-cities” targeting or inflicting “appalling destruction” or damage “out of proportion with the objective of an ag-
gression” have been replaced by more neutral formulations, such as targeting the aggressor’s “centres of power, i.e., 
its political, economic, and military nerve centres”. 
152  Ibid., 33. Tertrais notes that in 1999, Prime Minister Lionel Jospin “stressed that French deterrence could 
equally well concern a ‘distant’ threat – codeword for China”. The French White Book published in 2013 noted that: 
“Alongside its allies, in case of an open crisis, France would bring an appropriate political and military contribution.” 
(Ministère des Armées 2013). French security and defence interests in the Indo-Pacific region are discussed in a re-
cent report by the Ministry for Armed Forces, “France and Security in the Indo-Pacific” (Ministère des Armées 2019). 
France, like the United States and the United Kingdom, conducts “freedom of navigation” operations through inter-
national waters in the South China Sea, which China considers part of its maritime territory. 
153  Republique Française 2017.
154  Assemblée Nationale 2019.
66
However, in the post-Cold War era, the potential adversary is no longer necessarily a ma-
jor power. Chirac, for example, implied in a 2006 speech that a state-sponsored terror-
ist attack against French interests could prompt a nuclear response against that state.155 
Further, the Macron government’s 2017 strategic review voices concern over North Korea, 
noting that the regime’s “stated priority, which is to have an operational nuclear force of 
global reach, may soon become a reality, thus directly threatening the United States, as 
well as European territory” (emphasis added).156 
4.3 The United Kingdom
Nuclear force posture highlights: The United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent consists of four 
Vanguard-class SSBNs, each of which is technically capable of carrying up to 16 D-5 SLBMs 
armed with up to 12 MIRVs.157 After a reassessment of British “minimum necessary require-
ments for credible deterrence”, the Conservative-led government of Prime Minister David 
Cameron decided in 2010 to reduce the number of operational missiles on each subma-
rine to “no more than eight”, and to reduce the total number of warheads carried by an in-
dividual SSBN from 48 to 40.158 As a matter of longstanding policy, at least one SSBN is on 
operational patrol at all times, and it can respond very quickly to a launch order and accu-
rately deliver high-yield weapons against targets at intercontinental range in 30 minutes 
or less. The UK nuclear stockpile totals “no more than 180” warheads, of which “no more 
than 120” are operationally available.
After more than a decade of intense study and debate, in July 2016 the House of Com-
mons approved the government’s decision to replace the SSBN fleet, on a one-for-one 
basis, with new Dreadnought-class SSBNs, the first of which is under construction and ex-
pected to enter service in the early 2030s. The missile compartment (containing the SLBM 
launch tubes) for the new SSBNs is under development in conjunction with the United 
States, since the compartment will house the existing D-5 missile.159 The estimated cost 
of design and manufacture of the four new SSBNs (not including the D-5s) is £31 billion 
over the expected 35-year life of the programme, with annual in-service costs (once the 
new SSBNs are operating) representing approximately six percent of the total defence 
155  Chirac appeared to be thinking of Iran, see Bernard 2006. 
156  Ministère des Armées 2013.
157  Mills 2016.
158  Government of the United Kingdom 2010.
159  The United Kingdom is participating in the US programme to extend the service life of the D-5, which will 
potentially keep the D-5 in service until the early 2060s. The new SSBNs are expected to carry no more than eight 
SLBMs (Mills 2019).
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budget.160 Brexit is expected to have an impact on the SSBN programme, since elements 
of the programme’s supply chain are based elsewhere in the EU. However, the extent of 
the impact in terms of cost and schedule will depend on how Brexit is finally decided and 
implemented in practice. 
Deterrence strategy and policies: In broad terms, the strategic rationale for the UK de-
terrent during the Cold War was two-fold: to provide a “second centre of decision” within 
NATO, thereby complicating Soviet planning of any potential aggression against the Alli-
ance; and to retain a capability to act independently if British “supreme national interests” 
were threatened. In fact, the United Kingdom willingly committed, as part of the agree-
ment to purchase the US Polaris system, to assign its SSBNs to NATO and target them 
according to NATO plans, “except where the UK government may decide that supreme 
national interests are at stake”.161 
In this way, the United Kingdom could demonstrate its bona fides as a reliable ally while 
reducing the risk, during a crisis, of Soviet miscalculation. As a UK defence ministry official 
explained in 1980: “We need to convince Soviet leaders that even if they thought that at 
some critical point as a conflict developed the US would hold back, the British force could 
still inflict a blow so destructive that the penalty for aggression would have proved too 
high.”162 Or as Quinlan framed it, the US deterrent was a “massive insurance policy”, and 
the UK’s “supplementary capability based on a ‘second-centre’ rationale (served) as an in-
surance policy against the failure of the first insurance policy”.163
During the last two decades of the Cold War, the UK nuclear deterrent had strategic, 
non-strategic, and tactical components. Upon their entering service in 1968, the principal 
function of the UK SSBNs was strategic – specifically, to hold at risk military forces, industry, 
and population centres in the Soviet Union. According to one study, “by the time Polaris 
(SSBNs) began to be deployed in the North Atlantic in 1968, the target set (included) 7–10 
Soviet cities… These included Moscow and Leningrad… with a minimum level of destruc-
tion of 50 percent (and) the remainder had to have populations exceeding 300,000”.164 The 
Royal Air Force, which had primarily targeted Soviet cities and high-value military targets 
before the SSBN deployments, carried gravity bombs intended for limited strikes against 
individual targets on Warsaw Pact territory. Lower-yield US warheads were available to the 
UK forces in Europe under “dual-key” arrangements for employment with heavy artillery 
160  Ibid.
161  WEU Secretariat General 1962.
162  Ministry of Defence of the United Kingdom 1980.
163  Op. cit., Quinlan.
164  Stoddart 2008. The author argues that the “Moscow Criterion” – the ability to strike Moscow with relative cer-
tainty – became the dominant British “touchstone” for its independent nuclear deterrent for nearly 30 years.
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and short-range surface-to-surface missiles. And as a demonstration of solidarity with the 
United States and other NATO allies, the British government, despite large public protests, 
agreed to the basing of US GLCMs at Greenham Common in 1982. 
With the end of the Cold War, the United Kingdom took several steps to adapt its deter-
rence strategy and posture to what it anticipated would be a less menacing international 
environment. By the early 1990s, its tactical systems were dismantled (most of the US war-
heads having been withdrawn as part of President George H. W. Bush’s nuclear initiative 
in 1992), and in 1993, the Conservative-led government decided not to renew the aging 
bomber component. In 1995, it issued a “negative security assurance”, stating that the 
United Kingdom “will not use, or threaten to use, nuclear weapons” against any non-nu-
clear weapons state that is party to the NPT and in compliance with its obligations. 
In 1998, the Labour government under Prime Minister Tony Blair cut the warhead stock-
pile by one-third (which, combined with reductions by its Conservative predecessors, 
reduced its aggregate yield by more than 70 percent). It relaxed the patrol cycle and 
readiness of SSBNs (although keeping the minimum of one SSBN on patrol at all times), 
reduced the number of deployed SLBM warheads by one half, and cancelled a pending 
order for additional D-5s. In addition, the United Kingdom ratified the CTBT and (slightly) 
downsized its fissile material stocks.165 
In its most recent comprehensive strategy review, the UK government (once again under 
Conservative leadership) recommitted to “maintaining the minimum amount of destruc-
tive power needed to deter any aggressor” and to “ensure that our deterrent is not vulner-
able to pre-emptive action by potential adversaries”. The meaning of “minimum” was never 
precisely defined, presumably because the level of damage that the UK nuclear force 
must be capable of delivering in order to be credible is not absolute. (It would depend on 
various assumptions, such as whether the United Kingdom needed to be prepared to act 
alone or would only do so in concert with its allies.) Still, UK declaratory policy emphasized 
that the use of nuclear weapons would occur “only in extreme circumstances of self-de-
fence, including the defence of our NATO Allies”. Moreover, echoing US and French doc-
trine, the review stated that “we will remain deliberately ambiguous about precisely when, 
how and at what scale we would contemplate their use, in order not to simplify the calcu-
lations of any potential aggressor”.166 In other words, like its nuclear allies, the United King-
dom viewed its nuclear forces as a deterrent against possible non-nuclear threats as well. 
165  Dodd 1998.
166  Government of the United Kingdom 2015.
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As Tom Plant observes, of the three nuclear allies, the United Kingdom faces the greatest 
uncertainty in terms of domestic support for its nuclear status.167 Except for the Conserv-
ative party, all of its major political parties have advocated, at some point, for steep re-
ductions to, or complete elimination of, the UK nuclear deterrent. Indeed, several senior 
government ministers who defended nuclear policies while in office later voiced dis-
comfort with those very policies. Even former PM Blair revealed after leaving 10 Down-
ing Street that “I could see clearly the force of the common sense and practical argument 
against (the UK’s SSBN deterrent), yet in the final analysis I thought giving it up too big 
a downgrading of our status as a nation, and in an uncertain world, too big a risk for our 
defence”.168 And while the Labour party’s 2017 manifesto included supported renewal of 
the SSBN fleet, its current leader, Jeremy Corbin, a long-standing opponent of the deter-
rent, has also insisted that his party would pursue “multilateral disarmament” through the 
NPT.169
On balance, it seems highly unlikely that any British government would reverse course 
entirely and abandon the deterrent renewal programme. Such a move would jolt the UK 
role in NATO and bilateral ties with the United States and France in unpredictable ways.170 
As an independent experts commission (including prominent figures linked to the Con-
servative, Liberal Democrat, and Labour parties) argued in 2014, when it concluded unan-
imously that Britain should retain and deploy a nuclear arsenal: “We cannot expect the 
United States to shoulder indefinitely the awesome responsibilities that lie in providing 
extended nuclear deterrence to Europe, particularly if the United Kingdom were to aban-
don its own nuclear force.”171 Moreover, all of the major political parties, including Labour, 
would be concerned about a backlash from voters tied, directly or indirectly, to invest-
ments and employment in the affected defence industries.
Nevertheless, two future scenarios merit consideration. First, a change from a Conserva-
tive-led to a Labour-led government and/or serious economic downturn (tied to Brexit or 
167  Tom Plant is Director, Proliferation and Nuclear Policy, Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Secu-
rity Studies, and an expert contributor to this project. 
168  Ibid.
169  BBC 2017. At a February 2016 rally organized by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), Corbin 
stated that “I don’t want us to replace Trident (the UK SSBN fleet), everybody knows that… I believe in a nucle-
ar-free Britain and a nuclear-free future” (Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament n/d). Corbin voted against the deter-
rent renewal during the House of Commons debate that summer.
170  Under the 2010 Lancaster House treaty, the United Kingdom and France share two laboratories related to 
nuclear weapons safety and reliability. Beyond the cost savings of such arrangements, the French have a strategic 
stake in keeping Britain in the nuclear weapons business. As retired General Henri Bentégeat, a former French chief 
of defence, told French parliamentarians in April 2014: “By helping the British… we are also protecting our own 
nuclear deterrent. Imagine the intense pressures that France would confront if (the British) were forced to abandon 
their deterrent.” (Assemblée Nationale 2014).
171  Trident Commission 2014. Ironically, the commission had been assembled by BASIC, a British-American think-
tank whose stated goal is a nuclear weapon-free world.
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some other external shock) could reopen debate on the SSBN replacement costs and, in 
particular, the programme’s one-for-one approach. Although the Conservative govern-
ment studied alternative approaches, including the possibility of ordering only three new 
SSBNs, those were ultimately dismissed for a variety of reasons.172 In particular, the study 
found that only the four SSBN option is “capable of sustaining a continuous deterrence 
posture for the 25-30 year life of the system”, and no alternative posture would offer the 
same degree of resilience or “guarantee a prompt response in all circumstances”. A succes-
sor government, however, might weigh the cost, capability, and credibility factors differ-
ently.
A less probable but still plausible scenario cannot be excluded. In 2014, the Scottish 
National Party (SNP), campaigning for a “yes” vote in the referendum on independence, 
pledged to terminate arrangements, dating from the 1960s, for basing UK SSBNs and their 
warheads at Faslane and Coulport on Scotland’s west coast. While the referendum failed 
that year, the SNP is strongly opposed to Brexit, and First Minister (and SNP leader) Nicola 
Sturgeon declared, in April 2019, that Scotland should hold a new referendum on inde-
pendence by 2021 if Brexit takes place.173 Official and non-government studies conducted 
in 2014 concluded that hypothetical options for moving the deterrent out of Scotland 
could be prohibitively expensive, with former senior British officials warning that it would 
effectively mean the “unilateral nuclear disarming” of the remaining parts of the United 
Kingdom.
4.4 The Russian Federation
Nuclear force posture highlights: Russia’s strategic nuclear forces rest on the triad of 
ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers. Russia has the largest nuclear weapons stockpile 
in the world, although it has been greatly reduced from the Soviet high-water mark of 
some 45,000 warheads during the Cold War. The total inventory is estimated to exceed 
6,490 warheads, of which 4,490 are assigned to long-range strategic launchers and short-
er-range tactical nuclear forces. 174 According to New START data as of March 2019, Russia 
deploys a total of 1,461 warheads on 524 ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.175 The stock-
pile of non-strategic nuclear weapons is considerable, about 1,820 warheads, although 
172  These are described in detail in the government’s 2013 Trident Alternatives Review. See https://assets.pub-
lishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/212745/20130716_Trident_Al-
ternatives_Study.pdf. 
173  Meyer 2019.
174  Kristensen & Korda 2019b, 73.
175  US Department of State 2019.
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estimates vary widely. The rest of the warheads are either in storage or awaiting disman-
tlement. 
Russia’s ICBM inventory comprises silo-based, rail-based and mobile systems. Russia is esti-
mated to have around 318 ICBMs, which are able to carry roughly 1,165 warheads. Further-
more, it has 10 SSBNs, able to carry up to 720 warheads. (Since several SSBNs are normally 
in overhaul, only a fraction of those warheads are operationally deployed.) Lastly, Russia 
operates two different types of heavy bombers, armed with ALCMs and gravity bombs. 
In addition to the considerable arsenal of offensive strategic weapons, Russia possesses 
the largest inventory of non-strategic nuclear weapons in the world, which many analysts 
believe is intended to offset Moscow’s perception of its own conventional inferiority. The 
largest holder of tactical nuclear weapons is the Russian Navy, followed by the Air Force 
and air and missile defence forces.176 
Russia has an ongoing nuclear modernization programme, which has met approximately 
80 percent of its planned goals.177 Some aspects of the programme are not surprising, 
since older systems needed replacement. The scope of the modernization programme, 
however, has raised concerns in the West about its underlying objectives.
Russia is modernizing every component of the strategic triad. This involves upgrading 
road-mobile ICBM systems, including the Topol-M and the RS-Yar (a MIRVed version of the 
Topol-M), and the silo-based (and MIRVed) Sarmat. Three new SSBNs entered service in 
2013–2016, and five additional submarines are under construction.178 A new, next-genera-
tion strategic bomber is planned to enter serial production in the late 2020s. Moreover, old 
Tupolev-160s have been modernized.179 
One aim of the programme is to sustain approximate numerical parity with the US strate-
gic forces and to maintain a retaliatory capability against a potential aggressor. As Eldridge 
Colby points out, “Moscow is seeking to build and deploy a strategic nuclear force that is 
able to demonstrate clearly to Washington that such a [U.S.] first-strike capability is out of 
reach and that U.S. attempts to use force to disarm Russia of its strategic deterrent would 
result in devastating retaliation”.180
A notable driver of the Russian modernization efforts has been the US withdrawal (in 
2002) from the ABM treaty, which limited development and deployment of missile 
176  Kristensen & Korda 2019b. See also Woolf 2019. 
177  Statement by Russian defence minister in December 2018, as reported in Kristensen & Korda 2019b.
178  Podgvig 2018.
179  Gady 2019.
180  Colby 2016.
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defence systems.181 Although it is very unlikely that existing or planned US systems (see 
previous discussion of US non-nuclear capabilities) could undermine Russia’s strategic de-
terrence, persistent Russian concern about potential technological breakthroughs by the 
US anti-missile defence programmes has influenced the modernization process in terms 
of decision-making, budget allocation and acquisition process. Russia’s new systems, such 
as the Sarmat ICBM and the Avangard boost-glide hypersonic vehicle, are designed to cir-
cumvent or counter US missile defence.182 
Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union built, and Russia still maintains, a silo-based 
missile defence system around its capital, consisting of approximately 68 nuclear-armed 
A-135 interceptor missiles. A new interceptor missile was recently tested at a Russian-con-
trolled site in Kazakhstan.183 In addition, Russia has deployed various types of short-
er-range, mobile missile defence systems (such as the S-300 and S-400) in parts of its ter-
ritory, and is reportedly developing an S-500 system able to track and destroy up to ten 
missile warheads, including hypersonic targets, according to Russian media.184
Deterrence strategy and policies: Russia’s approach to deterrence is holistic. In other 
words, in Russian strategic thinking the line between conventional and nuclear deterrence 
on the one hand and between defensive and offensive actions on the other is blurred. 
Kristin ven Bruusgaard has called Russia’s approach “strategic deterrence”. According to her, 
strategic deterrence “is conceived much more broadly than the traditional Western con-
cept of deterrence. It is not entirely defensive: it contains offensive and defensive, nuclear, 
non-nuclear and non-military deterrent tools”.185 This view is also echoed by other scholars. 
Dmitry Adamsky, for example, speaks of cross-domain coercion, which refers to “the host 
of Russian efforts to deter (preserve the status quo) and to compel (change the status quo) 
by orchestrating soft and hard forms of influence across the nuclear, conventional and 
informational (cyber) domains through all stages of strategic interaction (peace, crisis and 
war)”.186
Importantly, ven Bruusgaard notes that Russia’s nuclear weapons are the cornerstone 
of the strategic deterrence approach. Russia’s deterrence strategy can be divided into 
181  Upon US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, Russia withdrew from the START II Treaty, which had been appro-
ved for ratification by the US Senate in 1996 and the Russian Duma in 2000. A major accomplishment of the START 
II Treaty – the elimination of MIRVed ICBMs – was therefore never implemented. As previously noted, the United 
States has opted against MIRVed ICBMs under New START, while Russia retains and is modernizing its MIRVed 
ICBMs.
182  Podvid 2018, 259–260. 
183  Moscow Times 2019. See also Rozin 2018. 
184  Sputnik News 2018.
185  Ven Bruusgaard 2016, 7. 
186  Adamsky 2018, 36. 
73
VALTIONEUVOSTON SELVITYS- JA TUTKIMUSTOIMINNAN JULKAISUSARJA 2019:52 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE REDUX NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND EUROPEAN SECURITY
two dimensions. First, there is global nuclear deterrence, which simply aims at deterring 
nuclear aggression. Secondly, there is regional nuclear deterrence, aimed at deterring a 
large-scale conventional war. 187 Russia’s concrete warfighting plans, strategies and doc-
trines remain secret, which is the case with other nuclear weapons states as well. However, 
for deterrence purposes, Russia selectively reveals some elements in its military strategy.188
Russia’s unclassified nuclear doctrine has evolved in the post-Cold War years. The first 
military doctrine from 1993 was deterrence-oriented, but it did withdraw from the Soviet 
no-first use policy. Reflecting conventional inferiority to the West, Putin expanded the role 
of nuclear weapons in the doctrine revealed in 2000, which stated that Russia could use 
nuclear weapons not only as a response to nuclear attack but also in situations critical to 
its national security. In the subsequent doctrines from 2010 and 2014, the role of nuclear 
weapons was restricted. In the most recent 2014 doctrine, the formulation is as follows: 
“The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use 
of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and/or its allies, and 
also in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation involving the use of conven-
tional weapons when the very existence of the state is under threat.”189
This more restricted formulation of nuclear weapons use indicates that Russia’s confidence 
in its conventional capabilities has grown since the chaotic 1990s. 
Russia’s doctrine regarding its non-strategic nuclear weapons is much less clear. David Yost 
has provided perhaps the most detailed description of the strategic rationale behind Rus-
sia’s tactical nuclear weapons stockpile. More precisely he has listed nine functions for the 
weapons:
1. To deter external aggression; 
2. to serve as an ‘equalizer’ or ‘counterbalance’ to the conven-
tional force superiority of potential adversaries;
3. to help maintain the ‘combat stability’ of forces engaged in an 
operation;
4. to make possible the ‘de-escalation’ of conventional conflicts;
5. to make it possible for Russia to conduct limited nuclear 
strikes in a regional (or theatre) war while avoiding an escala-
tion to intercontinental nuclear operations or any other geo-
graphical extension of the conflict;
187  Adamsky 2014, 91–92. 
188  Johnson 2016, 22.
189  For a useful comparison of Russia’s military doctrines see: https://www.offiziere.ch/wp-content/up-
loads-001/2015/08/Comparison-of-the-Russian-Military-Doctrine-1993-2000-2010-and-2014.pdf. 
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6. to inhibit the intervention of outside powers (such as the 
United States or NATO) in regional conflicts involving Russia;
7. for non-strategic nuclear forces to substitute for advanced 
long-range non-nuclear precision strike systems;
8. to enable the high command to change the correlation of 
forces in specific theatres or sectors of military operations;
9. to compensate for reductions in Russia’s strategic nuclear forc-
es.190 
Based on an extensive analysis of Russian strategic debate, Adamsky in turn argues that 
Russia has no articulated mission nor deterrence framework for its non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. He claims that “nuclear reality in Russia is a constellation of contradictory trends 
and narratives unlinked by either unifying logic or official policy”.191 Some authors argue 
that ambiguity at the official level may be deliberate, and aimed at complicating Western 
thinking and planning.192 
Interestingly, the ambiguity concerning Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons doctrine has led 
to an exchange of arguments among strategic affairs experts within and outside govern-
ment. In particular, the existence of an “escalate to de-escalate doctrine” has become a 
subject of debate. For some, the de-escalation doctrine refers to the “idea that, if Russia 
were faced with a large-scale conventional attack that exceeded its capacity for defence, 
it might respond with a limited nuclear strike”.193 For others, a pre-emptive use of nuclear 
weapons by Russia could be part of an offensive strategy, whereby a Russian seizure of 
territory by conventional forces would be coupled with the limited use of tactical nuclear 
weapons as a part of “standoff” operations to block rescue or reinforcement efforts on be-
half of the invaded country.194 
While the expression “escalate to de-escalate” does not appear verbatim in Russia’s official 
military doctrine, many analysts believe it is strongly implied by the language in the 2000, 
190  Yost 2001, 534–537.
191  Adamsky 2014, 92. 
192  Tertrais 2018c. 
193  Sokov 2014.
194  Savelyev 2010; Carlsson, Norberg, and Westerlund 2013. These references are cited by Roberts. As Roberts 
points out, Russia’s possible pre-emptive use of nuclear weapons “(p)resumably follows from the calculus of Rus-
sian leadership that their employment of nuclear weapons against NATO forces would signal their resolve and alert 
Western decision makers to the asymmetry of stake, as Russian leaders perceive it, while being sufficiently limited 
not to risk a strategic response. In this (Russian) assessment, the asymmetry of stake favors Russia because any con-
flict between NATO and Russia would jeopardize vital Russian interests whereas it would involve important but not 
vital NATO or U.S. interests” (emphasis added), Roberts 2016, 134.
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2010, and 2014 versions of the doctrine.195 Those experts who argue for the existence of 
the doctrine point out that some of the more recent Russian strategic documents, such as 
the 2012 and 2017 naval doctrines, included references to a line of thinking that bears a 
resemblance to the escalate to de-escalate approach.196 Moreover, some commentators 
have also paid attention to Russia’s recent exercises, dual-use capabilities and provocative 
rhetoric coming from Moscow and seen them as indicators of the escalate to de-escalate 
strategy.197 
It is noteworthy, in this context, that statements by top US defence and military officials 
from both the Obama and Trump administrations indicate that they take the escalate to 
de-escalate doctrine very seriously. In June 2015, for example, the US Deputy Secretary of 
Defence, Robert Work, and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral James Win-
nefeld, stated that “Russian military includes what some have called an ‘escalate to de-es-
calate’ strategy (that) purportedly seeks to de-escalate a conventional conflict through 
coercive threats, including limited nuclear use” – a strategy that they described as “playing 
with fire”.198 Moreover, the NPR 2018 states that “Moscow threatens and exercises lim-
ited nuclear first use, suggesting a mistaken expectation that coercive nuclear threats or 
limited first use could paralyze the United States and NATO and thereby end a conflict on 
terms favorable to Russia”.199
On the other hand, there are also respected scholars who seriously question the existence 
of such a doctrine. Olga Oliker and Andrey Baklitskiy have argued that exercises, capa-
bilities and rhetoric are not definitive proof that Russia’s threshold for the use of nuclear 
weapons is low. More specifically, they claim that Russian exercises do not fit the model of 
a small-scale nuclear strike early in a conflict. Moreover, other countries – like the United 
States – have dual-use capabilities (albeit in much smaller numbers), and they have not 
been subject to accusation. Finally, they posit that President Putin’s rhetoric and his oc-
casional references to nuclear weapons are meant to underline that Russia is a nuclear 
weapon state. Thus, the purpose is to consolidate Russia’s nuclear deterrence and not to 
signal that Russia’s nuclear threshold has suddenly been lowered.200
195 According to the 2010 version: “The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response 
to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in re-
sponse to large-scale aggression utilizing conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the 
Russian Federation and its allies. See also Sokov 2000.
196  Zysk 2018. 
197  Oliker & Baklitskyi 2018.
198  Work & Winnefeld 2015.
199  Office of the Secretary of Defense 2018, 39.
200  Ibid. 
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Tertrais is also of the opinion that Russia has no definite escalate to de-escalate doctrine. 
He concludes that “Russia is not building new dedicated theatre-nuclear systems, and 
there is little evidence of new ‘low-yield’ warheads; it does not have an ‘escalate to de-es-
calate’ doctrine; and it is not practising the use of nuclear weapons in large-scale military 
exercises. The Russian nuclear problem is real and serious – but it is political more than it is 
military”.201 Interestingly, Tertrais suggests that the alleged de-escalate doctrine resembles 
the idea of the limited use of nuclear weapons for conflict termination – an approach that 
Western nuclear powers have traditionally shared.202 This is in fact a view that some of the 
proponents of the explicit escalate to de-escalate doctrine seem to hold.203 
According to Tertrais, the real problem regarding Russia’s nuclear weapons policy is its po-
litical dimension – namely, the use of the nuclear card for political coercion. One can also 
speak of nuclear sabre-rattling. 
There are numerous examples of Russia’s provocative behaviour involving a nuclear weap-
ons dimension. In 2013, Russia launched a mock attack against Sweden with a strategic 
bomber. Moreover, as pointed out, Putin has continuously reminded the West that Russia 
is a nuclear weapons state. Such comments have often been associated with the situa-
tion in Ukraine.204 Indeed, Putin mentioned his disagreement with the United States over 
missile defences when publicly justifying his intervention in Crimea.205 However, the most 
provocative statements have come from below the Kremlin, which is crucial to understand. 
Dmitry Kiselyov – a television presenter loyal to Putin – has said that Russia is capable of 
turning the US into radioactive ash.206 The Russian ambassador to Denmark threatened 
that Denmark can become a target of Russia’s nuclear missiles if it joins the NATO missile 
defence shield.207 Further, in 2016 a member of the Federation Council Committee on De-
fence and Security threatened Norway with being added to “the list of targets of our stra-
tegic weapons” because of the rotational presence of a few hundred US Marines.208 
201  Tertrais 2018c, 35. Some observers contest the assertion that Russia is not practising the use of nuclear weap-
ons in large-scale exercises. A NATO staff member has pointed out, for example, that Russia’s large-scale ZAPAD ex-
ercise in 2017 not only included dual-capable systems, including the ISKANDER missile system, but also concurrent 
test launches of ICBMs and a simulated SLBM attack against a “simulated enemy” (presumably Western) force. See 
Johnson 2017. A 2013 assessment by the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) also notes that “exercises involv-
ing sub-strategic nuclear strikes seem to be continuing” (Carlsson, Norberg & Westerlund 2013).
202  Tertrais 2018c, 41. 
203  See e.g. Kroenig 2018, 5. However, there is arguably an important distinction between the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons to terminate an aggression (e.g. a Russian seizure of NATO territory) and such a threat or use to 
consolidate the gains of such aggression.
204  Freeman 2014; BBC 2015.
205  Op. cit., Roberts, 120.
206  Kelly 2014. 
207  Withnall 2015. 
208  Local 2016.
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Russia’s nuclear sabre-rattling fits well with its active and coercive deterrence policy. As 
one commentator has pointed out: “The nuclear sabre-rattling […]indicates that Russia’s 
nuclear arsenal has become an integral element in its approach to political messaging 
and conflict, an approach that skilfully merges non-military and military, conventional and 
asymmetrical instruments.”209
Thus, in summary, Putin’s frequent reminders about Russia’s status as a nuclear power and 
the more reckless comments by the Kremlin’s subordinates are meant both to deter a po-
tential aggressor and also to change their behaviour, intentions and policy goals.210
209  Durkalec 2016. 
210  Oliker & Baklitskyi 2018. 
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5 Adaptation of the “nuclear Alliance” and 
prospects for a “European dimension” of 
nuclear deterrence 
As discussed in other FIIA publications, for more than two decades following the end of 
the Cold War, NATO pursued steps to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in its deterrence 
and collective defence strategy, and to allay stated Russian concerns that enlargement of 
the Alliance would lead to changes in NATO’s nuclear posture that would threaten Russian 
security.211 Since the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has focused 
renewed attention on nuclear issues as part of its broader efforts to accomplish its deter-
rence and collective defence objectives. However, as NATO proceeds to adapt its approach 
in the nuclear domain, new complications – and, potentially, a new “European deterrent” 
concept – need to be explored.
5.1 NATO 
By way of background, a few essential facts on NATO’s nuclear posture and how it man-
ages nuclear policy are summarized below.
•	 NATO, as an organization, does not “own” nuclear weapons. Instead, 
it relies on multi-layered relationships among its three nucle-
ar-weapons states– the United States, France, and the United 
Kingdom (the “nuclear allies”) – and its non-nuclear members. 
The nuclear allies have both overlapping and distinctive roles. 
The “strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the 
United States, are the supreme guarantee of the security of the 
211  The background summary draws largely on these papers: Michel (2017a), Bell (2018), Michel (2017b).
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Alliance”, while the “independent strategic nuclear forces of the 
United Kingdom and France have a deterrent role of their own 
and contribute significantly to the overall security of the Alli-
ance”.212 Only the US President, French President, and UK Prime 
Minister can authorize the employment of his/her nation’s stra-
tegic nuclear weapons, and NATO cannot direct them to do so. 
•	 Over the years, NATO has established policies and procedures 
(known as “nuclear sharing arrangements”) under which US 
non-strategic nuclear weapons based in Europe could be re-
leased – only upon US presidential authorization – to NATO 
allies with DCA capabilities who are prepared to conduct nu-
clear missions under NATO command and control. As a matter 
of policy, NATO does not publicly identify the DCA-capable al-
lies or the locations and numbers of US non-strategic nuclear 
weapons based in Europe. Various non-government sources es-
timate that a total of some 150 US B-61 nuclear gravity bombs 
may be deployed in five NATO members: Germany, Belgium, 
the Netherlands, Italy, and Turkey.213 Those countries –plus 
Greece – are also understood to have DCA capabilities (at vari-
ous stages of readiness), and some US DCA are forward-based 
in Europe as well. 
•	 As Bell points out in his FIIA Working Paper, allies can make valu-
able contributions to NATO’s deterrence operations in areas 
other than conducting nuclear strike missions, including: aerial 
refuelling to extend the range of DCA; combat fighters to pro-
tect the DCA; and precision strike aircraft to suppress enemy air 
defences. No ally is required to provide such assets, although 
many do so.
•	 The North Atlantic Council (NAC) is the Alliance’s principal deci-
sion-making body and includes all 29 allies. Since the role of 
nuclear weapons in NATO deterrence and defence strategy af-
fects all allies, the subject is discussed and decided in the NAC. 
The Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) has comparable authority 
to the NAC for more specific policy and technical matters in-
volving nuclear weapons, including the aforementioned nucle-
ar-sharing arrangements, but France has opted not to join this 
body.
212  NATO 2018.
213  Kristensen & Norris 2018b. 
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•	 Faced with Russia’s approach – specifically its evolving doctrine, 
nuclear modernization programmes, exercises and deploy-
ments, and instances of nuclear sabre-rattling – NATO has 
taken important steps in response. These steps have included 
strengthening the Alliance’s conventional defence capabilities, 
especially in the Baltic Sea region, and declaratory language 
intended to disabuse Russian leaders of any notion that they 
could employ nuclear weapons as part of an “escalate to de-es-
calate” strategy to terminate a conflict (sparked by their own 
aggression) on advantageous terms.
•	 At the same time, it remains highly unlikely that NATO will refash-
ion its approach to nuclear weapons in ways that mirror Russian 
concepts and/or exercise practices. For example, NATO does 
not target Russia for nuclear strikes and does not conduct sim-
ulated nuclear strikes near Russian territory; indeed, its nuclear 
exercises are conducted without reference to Russia or Russian 
territory. Similarly, long-standing NATO policies intended to re-
duce tensions and risks of miscalculation are highly unlikely to 
change.
However, looking ahead, it seems likely that NATO will face additional challenges related 
to nuclear aspects of deterrence in the not-too-distant future. For the purposes of this re-
port, two related issues merit particular attention: repercussions for the Alliance of the ter-
mination of the INF Treaty; and long-term sustainment of nuclear-sharing arrangements.
INF: Although NATO was not a party to the INF Treaty, its security and solidarity were 
clearly at stake in the US-Soviet negotiations and parallel deployments of US INF systems 
that produced the historic agreement. With the treaty’s recent demise, NATO needs to 
manage the military and political fallout in a way that preserves those core interests – and 
the US extended deterrence that underpins them. This will not be easy.
The US administration’s clumsy announcement, in October 2018, of its plan to withdraw 
from the treaty roiled the allies and initially diverted attention away from the Russian vi-
olation. Some of the diplomatic damage has been repaired by formal NATO statements 
supporting the US action and public acknowledgement by European officials (for example, 
in the Netherlands and France) that their governments had independently confirmed the 
violation. 
NATO now faces the more difficult task of reaching a solid consensus on the military im-
plications of the Russian deployments which, according to some experts, will improve 
Moscow’s ability to strike theatre-level targets in Europe and Asia with mobile, land-based 
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cruise missiles that are less vulnerable than weapons carried by aircraft (which can be shot 
down or destroyed on runways) or ships (which can be sunk.) Norway, the three Baltic 
states, and Poland— – which are particularly concerned that the Russian A2AD strategy 
could deny the United States and NATO access to key ports, airfields, and command and 
control centres during a conflict – may feel more exposed than some allies in central and 
southern Europe, even if the latter also fall within the range of the Russian INF-range GL-
CMs. 
Assuming that NATO Military Authorities, who will perform the military implications as-
sessment, reach a consensus, even thornier questions will arise regarding the Alliance’s 
response. In principle, options range from imposing further economic sanctions on Russia 
(an area where the EU, not NATO, commands the requisite tools), to upgrading the readi-
ness of NATO DCA assets, to increasing defence systems with anti-GLCM capability, to aug-
menting US offshore capabilities (for example, air-delivered weapons and/or new SLCMs), 
to development and deployment of new US GLCMs or ground-based ballistic missiles of 
the previously prohibited INF range, or some combination of such measures. 
But all of those would raise concerns in various parts of the Alliance. In particular, the for-
mer US INF basing countries are presumably anxious to accept new US systems on their 
territory and risk a replay of the domestic protests of the 1980s, despite recent assurances 
by US and NATO officials that any such systems would be armed with conventional, not 
nuclear warheads.214 Deploying new ground-based systems of INF range on the territory 
of NATO allies in eastern and northern Europe would raise many political-military ques-
tions, including but not limited to their vulnerability to pre-emption and “provocative” na-
ture (from the Russian perspective.). That said, any discussion of new military deployments 
would quickly raise the question of who pays for them, opening a potential Pandora’s Box 
with a Trump administration critical of European defence spending levels and anxious to 
increase sales of US military systems.
Sustaining nuclear sharing arrangements: Prior to the 2014 Russian intervention in 
Ukraine, the role and importance of NATO’s nuclear sharing arrangements were subject 
to periodic – and sometimes contentious – debate.215 Since then, NATO’s declarations on 
the subject have become more categorical. Moreover, at their last summit, NATO heads of 
state and government left no doubt about their view, stating: “NATO’s nuclear deterrence 
posture also relies on United States’ nuclear weapons forward-deployed in Europe and 
the capabilities and infrastructure provided by Allies concerned. National contributions of 
214  In late June, the Acting US Secretary of Defence stated that US research and development on INF-range 
missiles is limited to “conventional missiles – not nuclear”, and NATO’s Secretary General reiterated that “we do not 
intend to deploy new land-based nuclear missiles in Europe.” (Esper 2019)
215  See, for example, the earlier reference (section on extended deterrence) to Germany’s proposal in 2009–2010.
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dual-capable aircraft to NATO’s nuclear deterrence mission remain central to this effort” (em-
phasis added).216 But how these commitments will be sustained is not so clear-cut.
One looming problem concerns the aircraft. Except for Germany and Italy (which fly Eu-
ropean-built Tornado combat aircraft), NATO’s European DCA contributors currently rely 
on US-built F-16s, which entered into service decades ago, for potential nuclear missions. 
Several allies, including the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium, are purchasing the “stealthy” 
US F-35, one version of which can be configured to carry the B-61 bomb. For its DCA re-
quirements, Germany relies on a portion of its aging Tornado fleet, which reportedly must 
be replaced beginning around 2025. However, according to a German defence ministry 
announcement in January 2019, it has ruled out purchasing the F-35, leaving the replace-
ment aircraft competition to the European-built Typhoon (which has not been certified 
to carry US nuclear weapons) and the US-built F-18 Super Hornet (which, to date, has not 
been certified for that purpose either).
A second (and related) potential problem concerns the US weapons. According to press 
reports, in early 2019 Germany’s Social Democratic Party (SPD) appointed a commission to 
re-evaluate its positions on foreign and security policy, including “nuclear-sharing”.217 SPD 
figures have already threatened to block any F-18 purchase, and it seems implausible that 
the new commission would not examine the basing of US weapons as well. As the SPD 
is the junior partner in the governing coalition, it is unclear whether a recommendation 
by the new commission to seek the removal of the weapons would force a change in the 
Merkel government’s policy.218 But anti-nuclear sentiment appears to be widespread in 
Germany, especially among younger voters, so renewed public debate on its nuclear-shar-
ing role could have unpredictable results.
A variety of outcomes could be envisioned. Germany might try to preserve the status 
quo by procuring a small number of F-18s (and obtaining the nuclear certification, which 
might involve additional cost) and tamping down the debate on the weapons themselves. 
The least plausible outcomes would be to retain a DCA capability while terminating the 
weapons-basing arrangements; or to retain the weapons, but not the DCA capability. 
In past years, there has been widespread concern among allied officials and non-gov-
ernment experts that if the Germans were to break ranks on the nuclear sharing arrange-
ments, other DCA countries would follow their example, sooner or later. This should not 
be a foregone conclusion, given NATO’s more recent and repeated reaffirmations that it is 
216  NATO 2018.
217  Pancevski 2019.
218  Ibid. According to the article, a Merkel spokesman said the government saw “no reason to debate this aspect 
of NATO deterrence. We continue to fully support the defensive nuclear strategy of NATO”.
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a “nuclear Alliance”, and persistent concerns among many allies (including Germany’s close 
partner, France) about “decoupling” the US extended deterrent. Nevertheless, reopening 
the nuclear-sharing question would risk another fractious intra-European and transatlantic 
debate most allies would prefer to avoid. 
5.2 Prospects for a “European dimension” of nuclear 
deterrence
If the existing architecture of deterrence in Europe – based on NATO and, in particular, US 
extended deterrence guarantees – appears to be under strain, for different reasons, from 
Russia and the United States, is there another option? What might a “European dimension” 
of nuclear deterrence look like? As part of his contribution to this project, Tertrais exam-
ines the possibilities of a significant evolution of the European nuclear deterrence land-
scape and sets the stage for future research and reflection on the topic.219 
As Tertrais points out, France and the United Kingdom – Western Europe’s only nuclear 
weapon states, and likely to remain so – have much in common when it comes to nuclear 
affairs.
•	 Their main rationale for maintaining nuclear deterrents is to pro-
tect their security, not their “prestige”.
•	 They have similar threat perceptions (Russia, followed by China 
and North Korea, and potentially Iran). 
•	 Their doctrines are largely convergent; both would restrict nuclear 
use to “extreme circumstances of self-defence” if “vital interests” 
were at stake. (The British do not, however, share the French 
concept of a “final warning”.) 
•	 They have similar criteria for sizing their deterrents: an ability to 
inflict “unacceptable damage” on an aggressor, even after an 
enemy first strike.
•	 Both governments have concluded that to guarantee an effective 
sea-based deterrent force, each of their respective navies re-
quire four SSBNs to maintain at least one SSBN on operational 
patrol at all times. 
219  Tertrais 2018b. This section largely draws upon Tertrais’ paper.
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In addition, their views on non-proliferation (and the importance of the JCPOA with Iran), 
keeping their “minimum” nuclear deterrents outside US-Russian arms control regimes, and 
opposition to the proposed Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are gen-
erally in close alignment. Furthermore, over the past two decades, and especially since the 
2010 Lancaster House agreements, UK-French technical cooperation has expanded with-
out diminishing their respective bilateral nuclear ties with the United States. 
For Tertrais, the British and French deterrents “were never designed to exclusively cover 
strictly national vital interests and always had at least a de facto European dimension”. The 
fact that UK SSBNs have been “assigned” to NATO since the 1960s is well-known, but Ter-
trais’ research demonstrates that the French, too, “have always seen a European dimension 
to their nuclear deterrent”. The creation of the EU provided additional impetus for French 
leaders to consider a “European dimension of deterrence”. Indeed, by 1992, President 
François Mitterrand “signaled his acceptance of the need for the member states of the 
newly-born Union to tackle the nuclear issue together when the time came”.
More recently, changes in the political and strategic context – here, Tertrais points, in par-
ticular, to Russia’s “new assertiveness and territorial aggression” and “doubts about the 
reliability of the US guarantee to Europe” aggravated by various Trump statements – have 
renewed interest in “thinking about Europe’s nuclear role in securing the continent”, espe-
cially in Germany and France. Indeed, the Treaty of Aachen signed by Macron and Merkel 
in January 2019 states that their countries “shall afford one another any means of assis-
tance or aid within their power, including military force, in the event of an armed attack 
on their territories”.220 Moreover, when he was subsequently asked if “all means” would in-
clude the French nuclear deterrent, Macron confirmed that it would – a public pledge that 
appears to go further than his predecessors.221
Tertrais rules out several “non-starters”, which are summarized below: 
•	 “There will be no ‘joint nuclear force’ controlled by the European 
Union… 
•	 Another unrealistic proposal is that European partners could partly 
fund the French force in return for a say in French national pol-
icy.”
•	 “(Another) arrangement that will almost certainly not take place 
is a pooling of UK and French assets…If Brexit happens, Britain 
220  Franco-German Treaty of Aachen accessible at: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/
france-and-germany/franco-german-treaty-of-aachen/. 
221  Drozdiak 2019.
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will want to cling to its strategic assets – which include an inde-
pendent nuclear force.”
•	 “Paris is unlikely to join the NPG or assign part of the airborne com-
ponent to the Atlantic Alliance... French absence from the NPG 
and NATO nuclear arrangements is part of the country’s ‘strate-
gic DNA’, mostly for political and symbolic reasons.”
•	 “Furthermore, it is unlikely that any serious nuclear discussion will 
happen in the context of the European Union institutions.”
This does leave various “realistic” scenarios open, according to Tertrais, with the key varia-
ble being the continued existence of the current NATO nuclear arrangements. 
In essence, Tertrais argues that if those arrangements hold, Paris can provide “comple-
mentary insurance for European NATO members and nuclear reassurance for non-NATO 
EU members”. For example, France could “state more clearly that the French force protects 
Europe as a whole… Another way of putting it would be to make it clear that Article 42.7 
of the Lisbon Treaty – the mutual defence clause of the EU – could be exercised by any 
means, thus including nuclear weapons”. A practical demonstration of this could be “rota-
tions of Rafale fighter-bombers (without their nuclear missiles)… to allied bases, including 
on the territory of the most eastern countries of the Alliance in order to demonstrate its 
solidarity”.
On the other hand, if dramatic changes were to occur with NATO – such as the falling 
apart of its nuclear-sharing arrangements – “it is likely that France would be ready to con-
sider playing a stronger, visible role in ensuring that Europe feels protected by nuclear 
deterrence. Options would include both ‘sharing’ and ‘basing’. France could base part of its 
airborne arsenal (say, in the order of ten missiles) in Germany or in Poland (basing) and/or 
agree that they could be carried by European fighter-bombers (sharing).”
As for the British role under such circumstances, Tertrais seems cautiously optimistic. “In 
the context of Brexit,” he observes, “London is eager to bolster its European security cre-
dentials. If we are correct in predicting that the European deterrence question will not be 
treated within formal EU circles, it is conceivable that the United Kingdom could be part 
of such arrangements one way or another. It would be an irony of history to see London 
take a greater part in the security of Finland and Sweden – or Ireland for that matter – after 
having left the Union.” 
Anticipating counterarguments to his ideas – for example, that a French and/or UK-based 
deterrent “would not have the necessary credibility” – Tertrais responds: “This is a debata-
ble question. A smaller arsenal can deter a major power provided it has the ability to inflict 
damage seen as unacceptable by the other party. This has always been the premise of 
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‘deterrence of the strong by the weak,’ and is not connected to the size of the other par-
ty’s nuclear arsenal as long as no counterforce strategy is sought. Most importantly, again, 
deterrence exercised by a European power might be seen as more credible than when it 
is exercised by a distant protector.” To his credit, Tertrais does not suggest that his contri-
bution represents a comprehensive examination of all the potential opportunities and 
obstacles (political, military, diplomatic, and economic) inherent in either broadening or 
transforming the “European dimension” of deterrence. But his challenge to more orthodox 
thinking about deterrence opens a valuable debate. 
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6 Risk reduction and arms control 
approaches
Over the past 56 years, several types of US-Soviet and, later, US-Russian formal agree-
ments, coordinated actions, and other activities have demonstrated that “hostile states al-
most always have important interests of military policy in common”. 222 Those agreements 
and activities have also shown that a risk reduction approach (efforts to improve crisis-pre-
vention and crisis-management communications, avoid incidents, facilitate compliance 
with formal arms control commitments, and promote dialogue) and an arms control ap-
proach (formal agreements or coordinated actions intended to directly limit weapons or 
technologies) are not necessarily antithetical to deterrence. Rather, like deterrence, both 
approaches can contribute to strategic stability and reduce the risk of war through misun-
derstanding or miscalculation.
However, with the collapse of the INF Treaty, doubts over the future of New START, and 
China’s emergence as a major nuclear weapons power, the already fraught US-Russian re-
lationship involving formal arms control might become even more precarious. Hence, at 
least in the near term, renewed emphasis on a risk reduction approach might be the best 
available option to improve strategic stability and maintain deterrence in the near term.223
6.1 Risk reduction: a useful but limited role
US-Soviet and, later, US-Russian risk reduction efforts have included a range of formal 
agreements. For example: 
222  Jervis 1993. 
223  “The international legal framework: The divide between non-proliferation and abolition” included in the 
chapter is authored by Katja Creutz, senior research fellow at Finnish Institute of International Affairs. 
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•	 Communications links. The first of these – the June 1963 agreement 
establishing a Direct Communications Link (or “hotline”) – re-
sulted from the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which con-
vinced both sides of the need for a prompt, direct means of 
communication at the head of government level. The hotline 
was reportedly used during two Middle East wars (1967 and 
1973) and the 1971 India-Pakistan war. (Subsequent instances 
of its use have not been made public.) The 1963 agreement was 
superseded by a 2008 agreement establishing a “direct secure” 
communications system for “emergency and non-emergency 
communications between the highest leadership of the two 
countries”.224 A separate communications link (Nuclear Risk Re-
duction Centers) was established in 1987 to send bilateral no-
tifications (such as ballistic missile test launches and on-site in-
spection requests) and periodic data exchanges required under 
arms control and confidence-building measure agreements.225
•	 Confidence-building measures. Following several incidents be-
tween US and Soviet naval forces, in May 1972 the two govern-
ments concluded an “Incidents at Sea” agreement on steps to 
avoid collisions, simulated attacks, and other potentially dan-
gerous manoeuvres on and over the high seas. (The Russian 
Federation later assumed all rights and responsibilities of the 
former Soviet Union under the agreement.) Under the agree-
ment, the US and Russian navies have established procedures 
to discuss alleged violations, which have proved useful over 
the years to defuse confrontation. That said, worrisome inci-
dents can still occur. In fact, US and Russian nuclear submarines 
collided in the Barents Sea in February 1992, and other similar 
(but unreported) collisions are said to have taken place.226 In at 
least two incidents in 2018, Russian combat aircraft performed 
“unsafe” manoeuvres close to US patrol aircraft in international 
air space above the Black Sea, according to US Navy spokes-
persons.227 Added to this, the US Navy accused a Russian naval 
ship of “unsafe and unprofessional” conduct following a near 
collision in the Philippine Sea in June 2019.
224  US Department of State 2008.
225  US Department of State (n/d). The US Center’s role was subsequently expanded to include information ex-
changes required by several multilateral, non-nuclear arms control agreements.
226  Cushman 1992.
227  Woody 2019.
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•	 Cooperative Threat Reduction. In autumn 1991, the United States 
launched an initiative to provide technical and material assis-
tance to the Soviet Union to improve the security, and facilitate 
the dismantlement, of weapons of mass destruction and asso-
ciated infrastructure. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, US 
assistance – later known as the Cooperative Threat Reduction 
(CTR) programme – focused on four states: the Russian Federa-
tion, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. In Russia, CTR-financed 
programmes facilitated the dismantlement of ballistic missiles, 
missile launchers (land- and submarine-based), and bomber 
aircraft, security upgrades to nuclear material storage sites, 
and chemical weapons elimination. Russia opted not to renew 
the CTR agreement when it expired in 2013, reportedly to halt 
US contractors’ access to their military facilities. Over the life 
of the programme, the value of the US technical and material 
assistance reached an estimated $5–6 billion.228 While the CTR 
agreement did not place limits on Russian weapons, it unques-
tionably helped Russia comply with treaty-mandated reduc-
tion and elimination obligations more expeditiously and safely, 
and at reduced economic cost to the Russian government. 
In addition to formal agreements, since the end of the Cold War, US and Russian officials 
have held government-to-government and military-to-military talks, under various for-
mats, aimed at improving their mutual understanding on thorny issues. During the Clin-
ton administration, for example, meetings between Secretary of Defense William Perry 
and Russian Minister of Defense Pavel Grachev ultimately produced an agreement in 
November 1995 to permit Russian peacekeeping battalions to serve in Bosnia under the 
commander of US forces in Europe. As Secretary of Defense in both the Bush and Obama 
administrations, Robert Gates met periodically with his Russian counterpart, and in 2010, 
the sides established a defence relations working group “to foster ties across major policy 
issues, not just military relations”.229 
The frequency and scope of US-Russian discussions touching on broad strategic issues 
appear to have slowed in recent years, with diplomatic engagement focused mainly on 
the INF dispute and military-to-military contacts placing highest priority on mitigating the 
228  Woolf 2012. Total CTR authorizations for the period 1992–2010 were $8.7 billion. Russia received the lion’s 
share of the assistance. Most CTR funding was drawn from the budgets of the US Department of Defense and De-
partment of Energy.
229  Shanker & Schwirtz 2010. 
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risk of miscalculation in operational theatres, especially Syria.230 Top US military officers 
have voiced concern about the current level of dialogue with Russian counterparts. Ac-
cording to General Curtis Scaparrotti, the former SACEUR and Combat Commander, US 
Forces in Europe: “During the Cold War, we understood each other’s signals. We talked. I’m 
concerned that we don’t know them as well today. I personally think communication is 
a very important part of deterrence.”231 As a former senior US diplomat notes: “(Strategic 
stability) talks are useful, particularly when new developments, such as those in the cyber 
and space domains, emerge and when Russian nuclear doctrine has provoked concern in 
Washington and led to changes in the U.S. nuclear posture. Even if strategic stability talks 
do not spin off specific negotiations, they provide a venue for the sides to exchange views 
and better understand the concerns of the other.”232 Under the Trump administration, such 
talks have been sporadic; the latest US-Russia “strategic security dialogue” took place in 
Geneva on July 17, 2019. 
6.2 Arms control at a crossroads
The first agreement to impose legally-binding constraints affecting nuclear weapons de-
velopment was the Limited Test Ban Treaty, signed by the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Soviet Union in August 1963, which banned nuclear explosive testing in outer space, 
in the atmosphere, and underwater.233 Since then, the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion – and, later, Russia – have signed seven bilateral agreements to place legally binding 
limits on nuclear weapons and ballistic missile defence systems. Of those seven, only one 
remains in force: New START, which will expire in February 2021, unless the sides agree to 
extend it for another five years.234
230  Brookings 2019.
231  Burns 2019. 
232  Pifer 2019.
233  Previous negotiations on a comprehensive test ban had collapsed, ostensibly over verification issues, but in 
fact the parties had concluded that their nuclear requirements could be met by underground testing, which posed 
fewer health risks and provoked much less public opposition than the atmospheric blasts. A subsequent US-Soviet 
treaty, signed in 1974, limited the size of underground nuclear explosions to 150 KT, which – at least for the United 
States, but presumably for the Soviet Union as well – permitted significant improvements to warhead safety, relia-
bility, and effectiveness. The last US nuclear test was conducted in 1992. In 1996, under the Clinton administration, 
the United States signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), but the US Senate has not given its “advice 
and consent” to the Treaty, which is required for ratification. The NPR 2018 stated that the Trump administration 
“will not seek Senate ratification” of the CTBT and “will not resume nuclear explosive testing unless necessary to en-
sure the safety and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear arsenal”. The last Soviet nuclear test took place in 1990. Russia 
signed the CTBT in 1996 and ratified it in 2000. 
234  For a convenient summary description of these agreements, with links to treaty texts and additional narra-
tives, see Arms Control Association 2019b.
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The benefits of those agreements have been substantial. From the 1972 Interim Agree-
ment on Offensive Arms (also known as SALT I) to the full implementation in 2018 of the 
New START ceilings, the permitted number of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs for each side 
was cut by more than one half. During the same period, the permitted number of de-
ployed strategic warheads was reduced to 1,550 for each side – their lowest level since the 
1950s. The progress on verification methods has been remarkable as well. The early agree-
ments relied exclusively on “national technical means”, such as satellites, to monitor com-
pliance. The INF Treaty, followed by the 1991 START agreement, introduced various on-site 
inspection and monitoring provisions. The New START verification regime drew upon val-
uable lessons from INF and START, and included unprecedented provisions for the actual 
counting of warheads on deployed missiles and bombers in the course of on-site inspec-
tions. As recently as May 2019, a top Pentagon official stated that “we assess Russia to be 
in compliance with the central limits of New START”.235
In sum, from SALT I through New START, the sides have progressively increased transpar-
ency (the ability of each side to count and track the other’s weapons systems with high 
confidence) and predictability (the ability to understand the other’s force structure and 
anticipate changes), while promoting greater strategic stability (by reducing each side’s 
incentives and capabilities to risk a “first strike” on the other’s strategic weapons). At the 
same time, neither side sacrificed its ability to deter the other, nor its ability (within the 
overall ceilings) to modernize its forces. However, the expectation – at least during the 
Obama administration – that New START would pave the way for further deep reductions 
proved short-lived. As mutual recriminations mounted in the wake of Russia’s intervention 
in Ukraine and Syria, and became exacerbated by the demise of the INF Treaty, longstand-
ing arms control issues that were left unresolved by past agreements have resurfaced, and 
new issues have arisen. 
On the US side, officials emphasize three areas of concern when explaining why the Trump 
administration has yet to decide on a potential extension of New START or a proposal to 
launch negotiations on a strategic arms treaty to replace New START:
•	 Neither the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty nor New 
START addressed Russia’s active stockpile of approximately 
2,000 non-strategic nuclear weapons that can be deployed on 
ships, bombers, tactical aircraft, Moscow’s anti-ballistic mis-
sile system, and with ground forces.236 (The INF Treaty covered 
INF-range launchers but not their warheads.) According to US 
235  Trachtenberg 2019.
236  As previously noted, the US has approximately 150 nuclear bombs forward-based in Europe under NATO nu-
clear-sharing arrangements. 
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officials, these Russian capabilities are being modernized and 
expanded “to facilitate a doctrine that envisions the potential 
use of nuclear weapons”.237 However, Russian officials have re-
portedly spurned or ignored US and NATO offers – first made 
during the Obama administration – to open a dialogue on 
transparency measures for those systems, which could lead to 
eventual talks on their reduction or elimination.
•	 Russian nuclear force modernization programmes permitted un-
der New START are a growing worry; even permitted systems 
– such as new versions of road-mobile and silo-based ICBMs 
– can change perceptions of the strategic balance over time. 
Moreover, in a March 2018 speech, Putin announced the de-
velopment of five new nuclear armed systems, some of which 
might be fielded before the treaty’s expiration date. According 
to US officials, at least two of them (a new “heavy” ICBM and the 
“Avangard” hypersonic system) should be subject to New START 
counting rules, while the others (a nuclear-armed submarine 
drone and nuclear-powered cruise missile) would constitute a 
“new kind of strategic offensive arms” and, therefore, must be 
discussed in the bilateral commission set up by the treaty to 
deal with compliance issues.238 But according to US officials, as 
of February 2019 the Russians were dragging their heels on dis-
cussing these issues.239
•	 As previously mentioned, China’s expanding military capabilities 
– especially its strategic nuclear weapons able to strike the US 
homeland, as well as US territory (Guam) and forces in the In-
do-Pacific region – mean that US planners can no longer afford 
to consider those capabilities a “lesser-included problem”. As 
Chinese nuclear forces grow and become more sophisticated, 
US officials and experts worry that China, like Russia, might 
miscalculate that those weapons provide it with a means of co-
ercion or leverage in a crisis. However, according to a US offi-
cial, China “has rebuffed multiple US attempts to engage in a 
meaningful bilateral dialogue on nuclear posture and risk re-
duction issues”.240 Indeed, in May 2019, a Chinese foreign min-
istry spokesman categorically dismissed the idea (which Trump 
237  Hyten 2019.
238  Ibid.
239  Ibid.
240  Trachtenberg 2019.
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said he had discussed with Putin) of any trilateral negotiations 
on “nuclear disarmament” with Russia and the United States. 
While Russian officials have declared their readiness for holding talks on extending New 
START, their stated concerns about US capabilities and intentions would be very difficult, if 
not impossible, to reconcile with current or foreseeable US positions. 
Russia’s longstanding objections to US missile defence developmental programmes and 
deployments have intensified in recent years and constitute the major obstacle to a fol-
low-on agreement to New START. Put simply, Moscow sees those programmes as pre-
cursors for systems intended to negate its deterrent and not, as the US has long main-
tained, intended to defend NATO allies and the US homeland from a limited attack by an 
aggressor such as North Korea or Iran. (The Obama administration intensified efforts to 
address Russian concerns and find areas of cooperation soon after signing New START, but 
the talks essentially collapsed by 2012.) The Russian president has been especially vo-
cal on the subject, going as far as to declare in April 2014 that his intervention in Ukraine 
was “partially prompted” by his concern that US missile defences had “offensive potential” 
against Russia.241 However, Moscow’s apparent position that any future talks on strate-
gic offensive arms must include limits on US missile defences would almost certainly be a 
non-starter with Washington. 
In fact, it is likely that US missile defences are not the only stumbling block to a new ac-
cord. If Moscow believes that its non-strategic nuclear weapons, reinforced by its new INF 
systems, are necessary to deter or defend against a perceived NATO threat to the Russian 
heartland, there is little reason to believe it will place them on the negotiating table. At 
the same time, Russian experts reportedly want to negotiate a wide-ranging arms control 
agreement that, in addition to limits on missile defences, would place tight constraints on 
US non-nuclear strike capabilities and space-related technologies, such as space-based 
interceptors and directed energy systems.242 Moreover, Russian officials have previously 
suggested that further reductions in strategic offensive arms should include limits on the 
independent French and British deterrents as well – a step that Paris and London (with 
support from Washington) have consistently rejected, given the relatively modest size of 
their respective nuclear forces. On the other hand, Moscow may feel disinclined to put 
at risk its recently improved relations with China by trying to convince it to join trilateral 
arms control negotiations with the United States.
241  Op. cit, Roberts, 55.
242  Miller & Rose 2018; Younger 2000. 
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Given this tableau of complex issues, it would appear very unlikely that the United States 
and Russia – which have yet to agree, in principle, on holding negotiations – could com-
plete a new arms control agreement by the current New START deadline.243 Chances are 
slightly better that the sides might agree before February 2021 on a five-year extension 
for the treaty, judging that the status quo is, on balance, preferable to a renewed strategic 
competition with no agreed constraints. But it is hard to predict how decision-makers will 
ultimately balance the political costs and benefits of such an agreement.
The political cross-currents in Washington are especially challenging. In 2017, Trump 
disparaged New START as “one sided”, and “just another bad deal that the country made” 
under Obama.244 His current National Security Advisor, John Bolton, a longstanding critic 
of arms control, reportedly criticized New START for perpetuating US-Russian numerical 
parity in key treaty limits. Moreover, it remains an open question whether they appreciate, 
as Bell points out, that NATO allies expect to see a “robust” arms control posture by Wash-
ington as a quid pro quo for their closing ranks behind enhancements to NATO’s nuclear 
posture required to respond to Russia’s threatening behaviour.245 On the other hand, if the 
Trump administration is perceived as indifferent or openly hostile to extending New START, 
it will risk losing the necessary approval of the Democratic-controlled House of Represent-
atives to fund the nuclear modernization and missile defence programmes.
To avoid an arms control impasse, some former US officials favour a pragmatic solution: 
the United States, in their view, should agree to a five-year extension for New START, 
thereby preserving its transparency, predictability, and stability benefits, while initiating 
high-level “strategic stability” talks in various formats – bilaterally with Russia, trilaterally 
(to include China), and multilaterally (to include France, the United Kingdom and poten-
tially others). The purpose of these talks would not be to negotiate a new arms control 
treaty, but to have an in-depth discussion of each side’s strategic concerns and to identify 
practical measures to reduce the risk of war – which is, after all, the shared objective of de-
terrence and arms control.246 In their recent article urging the resumption of a productive 
dialogue with Moscow, a former senior Obama administration official and retired US sena-
tor widely respected for their expertise on strategic affairs summed up the situation as fol-
lows: “For decades, strategic stability between the United States and Russia included a mu-
tual recognition of vital interests, redlines, and the means to reduce the risks of accidents 
or miscalculations leading to conflict, and especially the use of nuclear weapons. Today, 
243  A US National Security Council staff member stated in late May 2019 that a presidential decision on whether 
to extend New START would be made “next year” (Reuters 2019).
244  Landay & Rohde 2017.
245  Op. cit., Bell.
246  Keynote speech by the Honourable Frank Rose, former US Assistant Secretary of State for Arms Control, Veri-
fication and Compliance (2014–17), at FIIA public seminar in Helsinki, March 2019.
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however, clashing national interests, insufficient dialogue, eroding arms control structures, 
advanced missile systems, and new cyberweapons have destabilized the old equilibrium. 
Political polarization in Washington has only made matters worse, undoing any remnants 
of a domestic consensus about US foreign policy toward Russia. Unless Washington and 
Moscow confront these problems now, a major international conflict or nuclear escalation 
is disturbingly plausible—perhaps even likely.”247
247  Moniz & Nunn 2019.
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T H E  I N T E R N AT I O N A L  L E G A L  F R A M E W O R K :  T H E  D I V I D E  B E T W E E N  N O N -
P R O L I F E R AT I O N  A N D  A B O L I T I O N  ( K ATJ A  C R E U T Z )
The multilateral regulatory framework on nuclear weapons has so far focused on preventing 
the proliferation of nuclear weapons with the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons (NPT). A number of international conventions also exist establishing nuclear-
weapon-free zones, in addition to which there are different international initiatives on export 
control.248 However, there is currently no general prohibition in place for the use of nuclear 
weapons, unlike other weapons of mass destruction. Besides arms control treaties, there are 
several branches of international law regulating issues that are relevant for the legality of 
threat or use of nuclear weapons. These include primarily the law on the use of force and 
international humanitarian law, but also international environmental law and international 
human rights law. 
The main regulatory regime on nuclear weapons, namely the NPT, builds upon the three 
pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. While seeking 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and the expansion of existing arsenals 
(Arts. I and II), it promotes nuclear and general disarmament (Art. VI), while recognizing the 
rights of states to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes (Art. IV). The nearly universal treaty 
enjoys broad political backing with five nuclear weapon states and 186 non-nuclear weapon 
states as state parties to the convention. The NPT regime has generally been considered more 
effective in terms of non-proliferation than disarmament, which may in part explain why much 
international attention has in the recent years been paid to humanitarian and environmental 
aspects of nuclear weapons. Yet, it is worth mentioning that some of the states now possessing 
nuclear weapons have never joined the NPT to begin with, such as India and Pakistan, in 
addition to which North Korea withdrew from the NPT in 2003.
Parallel to the non-proliferation regime, there is a long-term, ongoing process seeking to 
prohibit or abolish nuclear weapons. Since 1946, the UN General Assembly has pursued the 
elimination agenda at the initiative of non-aligned states, and it has on several occasions 
adopted resolutions describing the threat or use of nuclear weapons as violations of the UN 
Charter’s Art. 2(4) and as a crime against humanity.249 One milestone in the battle to abolish 
nuclear weapons was reached in 1994, when the UN General Assembly decided to ask the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ), the world organization’s main judicial organ, for an advisory 
opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the Court’s opinion,250 
nothing in international law authorizes or prohibits the threat or use of nuclear weapons as 
such. However, the legality of threat or use depends upon how pertinent international legal 
obligations are followed: all situations must abide by international humanitarian law and the 
UN Charter obligations, especially Art. 51 of the UN Charter. However, according to the ICJ: 
“The Court cannot conclude definitely whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be 
248  An example of the former category is the 1967 Treaty on Tlatelolco, which prohibits nuclear weap-
ons in Latin America and the Caribbean, and of the latter category, the Nuclear Supplier Group’s (NSG) 
Guidelines of 1978.
249  For example UNGA res. 46/37D, 6 December 1991.
250  Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1996, 226.
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lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence, in which the very survival of the 
State would be at stake.”251 Thus, the Court effectively delivered a non liquet.252
Another major step for the abolition movement seeking to ban nuclear weapons was taken on 
7 July 2017, when the UN adopted the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 
with 122 signatory states.253 The TPNW was motivated by ethical and humanitarian concerns as 
the state parties note “the catastrophic humanitarian consequences that would result from any 
use of nuclear weapons”.254 Other drivers were the slow pace of nuclear disarmament, and the 
continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security policies and doctrines. While 
the Treaty prohibits state parties from the threat or use of nuclear weapons, its prohibitions 
extend also, inter alia, to developing, testing or possessing nuclear weapons, as well as allowing 
nuclear weapons in the territory of state parties. The Treaty also contains novel regulation on 
victim assistance and environmental remediation. 
The Treaty was adopted after a remarkably short period of negotiations, but it will enter into 
force only 90 days after 50 ratifications. At the time of writing, twenty states have ratified the 
TPNW, most of which are from Latin America, the Caribbean or Asia. None of the nuclear powers 
have ratified the treaty, and the United States, United Kingdom and France have declared 
that they will never sign up to the TPNW as it is incompatible with deterrence policy. US allies 
are also generally reluctant to embrace the new Treaty. Accordingly, the future of the TPNW 
remains uncertain. The high number of signatory states does not automatically indicate that 
the Treaty will enter into force. There is no correspondence between support for a treaty at the 
time of its adoption and subsequent rates of ratifications, which is a completely independent 
procedure.255 Yet signatory states are already under an obligation not to undermine the 
purpose of the treaty even before ratification.256 
The quick adoption process of the Treaty nevertheless reveals deep disappointment among 
a large number of non-nuclear weapon states with the review process of the NPT, another 
round of which will take place again in 2020. The TPNW also aims to fulfil an expressive 
function, namely to signal which states are for a nuclear weapons-free world and which are not. 
Such divisive aims have nevertheless been criticized in today’s world where the trust deficit 
increasingly undermines the cooperative dialogue.257 It has also been claimed that the most 
fundamental objection against the TPNW is that it makes the policy of deterrence unlawful. 
Indeed, the policy of deterrence is central to both regulatory approaches to nuclear weapons. 
When it comes to the non-proliferation regime, deterrence is essential as it allows allied 
countries to stay nuclear weapons-free while benefiting from deterrence. For example, the 
251  Ibid., para 105E.
252  Koskenniemi 1997, 140.
253  Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, UN Doc. A/CONF.229/2017/8, 7 July 2017.
254  Ibid., preamble, para. 2. 
255  Paddeu 2018, 96 (citing Simma 1986).
256  Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Vienna 1969, in force 1980, 1155 United Nations Treaty 
Series 331, art. 18.
257  Ford 2018.
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NATO nuclear arrangements are taken to form an accepted part of the NPT regime,258 and 
a concrete way in which the spread of nuclear weapons is hindered. However, the NPT also 
imposes an obligation upon nuclear weapon states to eventually disarm, which would affect 
deterrence policies as well. Nonetheless, this would take place only through a step-by-step 
process, in stark contrast to the TPNW, which explicitly prohibits the threat to use nuclear 
weapons (Art. 1d). Moreover, the TPNW also outlaws seeking or receiving assistance “from 
anyone to engage in any activity prohibited to a State party” (Art. 1e). Accordingly, the policy 
of deterrence seems incompatible with the TPNW. 
It is noteworthy that there are other legal developments that signal support for the prohibition 
of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, for instance, within international human rights law. 
One recent example is to be found in the work of the UN Human Rights Committee, which in 
2018 issued General Comment 36 on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’ 
(ICCPR) Article 6 on the Right to Life. This General Comment seeks to instruct state parties, inter 
alia, on the right to life and the use of nuclear weapons. The Committee observes that nuclear 
weapons are irreconcilable with respect for the right to life and may amount to a crime under 
international law due to the indiscriminate character of the weapons, as well as the disastrous 
scope of destruction of human life.259 The General Comment fails, however, to urge contracting 
states to sign up to any treaty, such as the TPNW. It is also noteworthy that the legal relevance 
of such comments is disputed.
All in all, international law has since the Lotus case followed the principle that what is not 
explicitly prohibited under international law, is permitted.260 The humanitarian movement 
has nonetheless persistently and effectively voiced its concern about the acceptance and 
use of nuclear weapons due to the enormous and irreversible effects on humankind, without 
managing conclusively thus far to swing the pendulum towards comprehensive abolition. The 
new TPNW is not insignificant, however, as it will force the NPT regime to prove itself. It has 
also highlighted for public debate both the lawfulness of the use of nuclear weapons and the 
policy of nuclear deterrence. Its adoption ends the twenty-year-long period of stagnation in 
multilateral nuclear arms control, and it will most certainly put pressure on nuclear weapons 
states and their allies. But as long as the nuclear powers reject abolition policies, international 
law will be uncertain about the threat or use of nuclear weapons, as political agreement is 
needed to settle the matter. 
258  NATO 2017.
259  General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, on the Right to Life, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/36, 30 October 2018, para. 66.
260  PCIJ, Series A, No 10, 18–19.
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7 Challenges for Northern Europe
This chapter scrutinizes the challenges that the re-emergence of nuclear weapons and 
strategic deterrence as prominent factors in world politics pose for Northern Europe. The 
main thrust is that after two or three decades of expeditionary operations, territorial de-
fence concerns have resurfaced and, consequently, Nordic-Baltic states have increasingly 
engaged in deterrence efforts during the recent half a decade. National deterrence pos-
tures notwithstanding, extended deterrence provided by NATO (and the United States) 
plays a crucial role not only for the regional NATO members but increasingly for militar-
ily non-aligned countries, namely Finland and Sweden. Nuclear weapons are part of the 
game. Russia has the full nuclear triad in the region, and NATO’s regional deterrence is ul-
timately based on the possibility to use nuclear weapons against a potential aggressor. So 
far, the deterrence-related concerns have overshadowed arms control activities, which is 
evident, for example, in Nordic-Baltic governments’ reactions to the TPNW. 
One of the most crucial recent trajectories for Northern Europe’s security has been inten-
sified strategic competition between major powers, which has accentuated the geostrate-
gic importance of the region. Northern Europe consists of two distinct areas, both having 
high strategic significance. First, the High North – home to the Russian Northern Fleet, in-
cluding SSBN and SSN bases on the Kola Peninsula – is once again attracting the attention 
of Western defence planners. Second, there is the Baltic Sea region, where, as a reaction to 
Russia’s military posture and increased activities in the region (large-scale “snap” exercises, 
provocative intrusions into national airspace and territorial waters), NATO has taken con-
crete measures to enhance deterrence and reassure its members. 
Understanding the geostrategic realities of Northern Europe is crucial not only for re-
gional policy-makers but also for decision-makers in the Euro-Atlantic community. The 
region is tightly connected to global security dynamics, particularly to West-Russia rela-
tions, and cannot be isolated from growing strategic competition. Conventional and nu-
clear deterrence will be part of the respective toolboxes of the regional players in the new 
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competitive era.261 In other words, regional players, allied and non-allied, must view their 
national efforts in the larger context. This applies to Finland, which has increasingly inte-
grated itself into the Western defence and deterrence system. 
7.1 Northern European geostrategy: the big picture
There is both continuity and change in the post-Second World War geostrategy of North-
ern Europe. The High North started to gain increasing strategic importance in the latter 
half of the 1960s. Although the planned flight routes of US strategic bombers had under-
scored Northern Europe’s significance in the early post-war years, NATO’s flexible response 
strategy further elevated the importance of the Alliance’s flanks, including the northern 
one. Moreover, the Alliance responded to the Soviet naval build-up and woke up to the 
threat of ballistic missile submarines that the Soviet Union introduced at the end of the 
1960s. The region became a strategic theatre in its own right.262 
The end of the Cold War changed the lenses through which policy-makers perceived the 
Arctic region. Compared to its predecessor, post-Soviet Russia was a much weaker power, 
with limited means to achieve its geopolitical ambitions. As a result, West-Russia rela-
tions entered a new era, characterized by efforts to build partnership, not antagonism. 
Suddenly, the Arctic region and the North Atlantic lost much of the importance it had 
gained during the Cold War. In fact, the High North emerged as a zone of cooperation and 
low tensions. This was exemplified by the 1996 launch of the Arctic Council, for example, 
which remains a forum addressing various Arctic issues in a cooperative spirit. 
The transformation brought about by Russia’s assertiveness, especially after its interven-
tion in Ukraine in 2014, and NATO’s subsequent increased emphasis on collective defence 
have once again thrust the region to the forefront of strategic thinking. Again, the High 
North has profound geostrategic importance for both NATO and Russia akin to the Cold 
War era. In short, the Russian strategic nuclear triad is present in the region, and ballistic 
missile submarines are of utmost importance for the country since they constitute the 
most potent second strike capability Russia has in the highly unlikely event of a nuclear 
war. Moreover, the Arctic Ocean provides Russia with the only uncontested access to the 
Atlantic Ocean, further underscoring the importance of the Arctic for Russia’s great-power 
261  Bowers 2018. 
262  See e.g. Dyndal 2011.
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ambitions and security. Hence, it is no surprise that Russia has strengthened its military 
presence in the region during recent years.263 
From NATO’s vantage point, the Arctic has gradually increased its significance, since con-
trol of the North Atlantic (including the so-called GIUK gap) is crucial for NATO in terms of 
potential US crisis-time reinforcements to Europe. Consequently, NATO has established 
a new Joint Force Command, which focuses on the improvement of NATO’s deterrence 
capabilities in the North Atlantic region. Moreover, in addition to pre-positioning military 
equipment in Norway, the United States has deployed a rotational force in the country 
consisting of 700 marines.264 
The regional security constellation of the Baltic Sea region – the other Northern theatre 
– changed dramatically after the end of the Cold War. First, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania 
regained their independence and established strong democratic systems. The collapse 
of the Soviet Union resulted in Russia’s withdrawal to the eastern corner of the Baltic Sea. 
Second, NATO’s foothold eventually grew stronger in the region. In 1999, Poland joined 
the Alliance, to be followed in 2004 by the three Baltic states. The enlargement process – 
which was not accompanied by any deployment of NATO forces (or infrastructure) – did 
not immediately change the strategic reality of the region. Russia’s response was rather 
mild, and it had not yet started the ambitious modernization project of its armed forces. 
NATO took charge of the Baltic states’ air-policing requirement, but the Alliance did not 
seriously address contingency planning for the defence of its new members until the early 
2010s. Indeed, the first NATO exercise (Steadfast Jazz) involving defence of Poland and the 
Baltic states took place in 2013. 
Russian aggression against Ukraine strongly reverberated across the Baltic Sea region, 
convincing NATO to step up efforts to establish credible deterrence and reassure its mem-
bers there. NATO has relied solely on conventional forces for this purpose, including the 
relatively modest deployment of rotational “trip-wire” NATO multinational battalions.265 
Along with the Western powers, Russia has significant interests in the region. Russia’s main 
interests in the Baltic Sea region are connected to protecting its second largest city, Saint 
Petersburg, and the exclave of Kaliningrad. Moreover, the bulk of Russia’s exports are 
transported through the Baltic Sea, and hence the region is highly important for Russia’s 
economy. Compared to Russia’s capabilities in the High North, its nuclear assets in the re-
gion are perhaps less considerable. However, in recent years, Russia has deployed various 
263  Mikkola 2019.
264  Mikkola 2019; Flanagan 2018. 
265  For a summary of NATO’s actions, see https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_136388.htm.
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modern weapon systems – often referred to as A2/AD capabilities – to the area. At the mo-
ment, the systems are conventional, but some of them – like the 9K720 Iskander – are also 
capable of carrying nuclear warheads. From Moscow’s perspective, a key purpose of the 
A2/AD resources is undoubtedly to protect Russia’s territory from a Western incursion. The 
second purpose is to erect a potential “shield” against NATO efforts to reinforce defences 
in the Nordic-Baltic region in case Russia decides to attack some of the countries in its vi-
cinity. In addition to these aims, Moscow has also used the deployment and (occasionally 
dangerous) manoeuvring of these systems to convey a strategic message about its mili-
tary prowess.266 The region has duly become an arena for Russian sabre-rattling. Moreover, 
during the last decade, Russia has beefed up the size and power of its Western military dis-
trict and enjoys a considerable advantage in the regional force correlation.267 New missile 
systems deployed to the region have increased Russian firepower, which has been demon-
strated in increasingly sophisticated military exercises. 
7.2 Deterrence postures in Northern Europe
The Nordic-Baltic states’ chief response to Russia’s aggression has been the enhancement 
of conventional deterrence. The countries in the region pursue considerably different de-
terrence strategies, and it is useful to present a brief overview of the diversity of national 
approaches because the strategies effectively constitute the broader regional deterrence 
framework. The Northern European deterrence system is thus a mélange of national ef-
forts, buttressed by extended deterrence provided by NATO and, effectively, the United 
States.268 
The Baltic states have pursued rather similar defence strategies, with some notable differ-
ences regarding the emphasis and tempo of their respective policies. After the re-inde-
pendence of the trio in 1991, the Baltic countries planned to pursue strategies inspired 
by a total defence concept. Their successful bids to join NATO, however, shifted their 
emphasis onto expeditionary operations, such as the NATO operation in Afghanistan, as 
the states wanted to express their bona fides as trustworthy allies. Estonia in particular 
took an active role in developing its defence capabilities, whereas Latvian and Lithuanian 
ambitions were somewhat lower. When Russia’s resurgence started becoming evident, 
the Baltic states swiftly reverted to territorial defence. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have 
increased their defence budgets and they now reach the NATO 2 percent of GDP target 
266  Dalsjö et al. 2019. 
267  Boston et al. 2018. 
268  For a recent assessment on how the Baltic states might employ emerging technology to defend against Rus-
sia, see Hammes 2019.
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for defence spending.269 However, and importantly, given their small economies and the 
glaring asymmetry between them and Russia, it is practically impossible for the Balts to 
establish a credible independent deterrence posture. Rather, their respective armed forces 
follow a “porcupine strategy” aimed at winning time before NATO reinforcements reach 
the theatre.270
As to extended deterrence in the Baltic Sea area, NATO and US presence in the region 
complements the respective deterrence and defence efforts of Estonia, Latvia and Lithu-
ania. The Readiness Action Plan begun in 2014 was the Alliance’s first considerable step 
back to the direction of collective defence. Furthermore, at the 2016 Warsaw Summit, 
NATO decided to establish a multinational battalion-sized Enhanced Forward Presence 
operation in the Baltic states and Poland. The main objective is to create a “trip-wire” effect 
against a potential aggressor. In other words, the presence of NATO troops from vari-
ous allies is meant to convince Russia and to reassure the Baltic states that an aggression 
against any of the states would launch a NATO response to defend allied territory. Conse-
quently, NATO deterrence in the region is based on both principles of deterrence – denial 
and punishment.271 Importantly, what often remains unsaid in everyday political parlance 
is the fact that the supreme guarantee is provided by the Alliance’s strategic nuclear forces, 
which makes a military aggression against the regional NATO allies incredibly risky and 
thus highly unlikely. It is also noteworthy that both European nuclear weapon powers, the 
United Kingdom and France, are present in the region. Thus, a Russian attack on the Baltic 
states would quickly encounter forces from two nuclear weapon states – thereby raising 
the risk to Russia of unleashing a confrontation that it could not necessarily control.
Of the actors in Northern Europe, Norway’s focus is primarily on the High North, not on 
the Baltic Sea region. It has also refocused on territorial defence questions during recent 
years, after making significant cuts particularly to its land forces by reducing the number 
of brigades from 13 to one. As said, the deteriorated security environment has brought 
the Arctic back into the geopolitical game, and it is the High North and North Atlantic 
where Norwegian threat perceptions reside. Moreover, Norway has made important pro-
curements lately, which further underscore its defence policy reappraisal. As early as 2008, 
it decided to purchase F-35s, and the first fighters were delivered in 2017. In addition to 
F-35s, it has decided to buy new submarines from Germany and P3 maritime patrol planes, 
both indicators of traditional defence concerns.272 It is important to note that Norway’s 
deterrence relies largely on NATO, and from the Alliance’s vantage point, the territory and 
adjacent waters of Norway are crucial for collective defence operations. 
269  Hedberg & Kasekamp 2018.
270  Clark et al. 2016. 
271  See e.g. Kofmann 2016; Milevski 2018; Shea 2018.
272  Friis 2019.
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As the potential frontline retreated further to the east, Denmark made a notable shift in its 
defence policy. In other words, Copenhagen became a highly active actor in high-intensity 
crisis management, and is still taking an active part in multiple expeditionary operations, 
including in Afghanistan. However, in terms of force structure, it has intentionally not 
maintained a full-spectrum defence force. Although the general Western focus has now 
changed, Denmark has not taken significant steps to reintroduce territorial defence capa-
bilities.273 Some adaptation is nonetheless underway, and the importance of the Baltic Sea 
region has also grown in Copenhagen’s eyes. The latest defence agreement from 2018 sets 
the goal of having the capability to deploy a heavy brigade, for example, to assist the Bal-
tic states from 2024.274 
In order to form a complete picture of Western deterrence efforts in Northern Europe, one 
should not omit militarily non-aligned Finland and Sweden. 
Finland has long been an exceptional actor in post-Cold War Europe in terms of its de-
terrence posture. Regardless of all of the positive developments in European and global 
security, it decided to adhere to conscription and a territorial defence system, when other 
countries discontinued obligatory military service and geared their defence policy to-
wards expeditionary operations. The Finnish system has long relied on the idea of deter-
rence by denial, which is the case in the current security environment as well. However, af-
ter the shocks of 2014, Finland has intensified defence cooperation with the United States, 
NATO, and Sweden, for example, with the stated aim of improving deterrence. Finland 
will, however, remain as a country not belonging to a military alliance, and the form of ex-
tended deterrence that Finland might expect from the Alliance is ambiguous in nature.275 
Suffice it to say that Finland, as a close Partner of NATO but not a member of the Alliance, 
does not benefit from the same treaty commitment, under NATO’s Article 5, that serves to 
reassure NATO’s 29 allies and to deter possible aggression. Moreover, while Finland (like 
Sweden) has intensified its interactions with NATO as a result of its status as an “Enhanced 
Opportunity Partner”, those interactions do not include – and almost certainly will not be 
extended to – participation in NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.276 
Sweden was among those European nations that greatly reduced their territorial defence 
capabilities following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Sweden’s decision can be seen as 
exceptionally drastic, since its Cold War total defence system was strong and impressive. 
Subsequently, Sweden has decided to revert to territorial defence as the primary objec-
tive of its defence policy, and Stockholm has shifted its focus back to defending its own 
273  Petersson 2018.
274  Szymański 2018. 
275  Salonius-Pasternak 2019. 
276  See e.g. Michel 2016.
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territory. It has reintroduced conscription, increased its defence budget and deployed 
troops to the island of Gotland. On the procurement side, Sweden has also decided to 
buy the Patriot air defence system. These developments notwithstanding, the country 
allegedly suffers from a “deterrence deficit”,277 and despite its military non-alignment, its 
defence essentially relies on foreign assistance. Sweden’s national security strategy, for ex-
ample, explicitly states that Swedish defence forces will defend Sweden with others.278
To conclude, territorial defence concerns have made a comeback in Northern Europe. The 
regional actors have limited capabilities to establish an independent deterrence posture 
partly due to the defence policies they pursued in the first decades of the post-Cold War 
era. More importantly, the potential aggressor that the states in the region face – Rus-
sia – is still a military great power, which makes force asymmetry between the West and 
Russia a noteworthy challenge. The regional NATO members explicitly rely on extended 
deterrence provided by the Alliance. Moreover, the Northern European allies have either a 
NATO or a US presence on their respective soils. Lastly, NATO’s defence strategy in the re-
gion is primarily based on deterrence by punishment. 
7.3 Nuclear weapons and regional security
As previously stated, nuclear weapons are part of deterrence in Northern Europe, which 
has implications for all of the regional players. The only deployed nuclear weapons in the 
region are those possessed by Russia, as NATO has no nuclear weapons in the region. Nor-
way and Denmark have pursued a consistent policy, refusing to station nuclear weapons 
on their soil in peacetime. Moreover, as previously noted, according to the NATO-Russia 
Founding Act, the Alliance has no intention or plans to establish nuclear weapon storage 
sites on the territory of new member states such as Poland and the Baltic states .279 
Given that Northern Europe is a contact zone for two actors armed with nuclear weapons, 
a regional military conflict between NATO and Russia is highly prone to nuclear escala-
tion.280 For example, in their article arguing for NATO to adopt a deterrence-by-denial 
approach in the Baltic Sea region, Jüri Luik and Tomas Jermalavičius envisage a sce-
nario where, after seizing the Baltic states, Russia seeks to dissuade NATO from fulfilling 
its collective defence obligations. They claim that “Moscow might even order the actual 
277  Dalsjö 2019. 
278  Government offices of Sweden, Prime Minister’s office 2017.
279  NATO 1997.
280  Kofman 2016.
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detonation of a nuclear weapon in some non-populated yet strategically important area 
(e.g. above the high seas in the Greenland-Iceland-UK gap) to reinforce the message and 
underline the credibility of the threat”. Such a move would force NATO to decide whether 
it would respond in kind or even take a further step on the escalation ladder.281
7.4 Nuclear arms control
Deterrence-related concerns have clearly dominated Nordic-Baltic agendas in the last half 
decade. Owing to this emphasis, arms control policies have been somewhat eclipsed. Cur-
rently, there is no new activity in sight, but the situation might be changing, as the rever-
berations of a changing world order become stronger in Northern Europe. A rules-based 
international order is particularly crucial for small states such as the Nordic-Baltic coun-
tries. From the perspective of lesser states, effective and stabilizing arms control regimes 
are part and parcel of such an order, since they can easily be the first victims of unravelling 
great- power stability. Therefore, the recent developments, such as the collapse of the INF 
Treaty, have been a cause for concern among Northern Europeans to a varying degree. 
Nuclear arms control has been a traditional item on the foreign policy agendas of the Nor-
dic countries.282 However, every state has had its own distinctive “national nuclear style”, 
which has again affected its respective policies in the field of arms control. After giving up 
its own nuclear weapons programme in the mid-1960s, Sweden has been a vocal propo-
nent of nuclear arms control. In the post-Cold War era, Sweden has for example criticized 
nuclear weapon states and their lack of progress in nuclear disarmament. Moreover, it has 
also voiced its concern over the non-strategic nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. In 
2010, for example, the foreign ministers of Sweden and Poland called on the US and Russia 
to reduce the stockpile of their tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.283 
More recently, Sweden – unlike Finland, Norway and Denmark – participated in the TPNW 
negotiations. Sweden has not proceeded to ratification, however. The TPNW question duly 
became a political bone of contention in the country, particularly between the foreign 
and defence ministries, both led by prominent Social Democrats. To resolve – or to bury – 
the question, the government decided to commission an independent study, which was 
conducted by former diplomat Lars-Erik Lundin. The report suggested that Sweden should 
not join the treaty in its current form. In July 2019, the Swedish Government announced 
281  Luik & Jermalavičius 2017, 235–236.
282  See e.g. van Dassen & Wetter 2006. 
283  Bild & Sikorski 2010.
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that it “will refrain from signing or pursuing ratification of the TPNW at the present time.” 
At the same time, according to the government statement, the government parties “are 
continuing to work for a ban on nuclear weapons through Sweden’s participation as an 
observer (to the UN TPNW)”, and the government will establish a Swedish “knowledge cen-
tre on nuclear disarmament” aimed at ensuring that Swedish knowledge in related areas is 
“strengthened and updated…on a broad front, among diplomats and politicians, but also 
students, civil society and the media.”284 
In the Cold War, Finnish nuclear non-proliferation activities were focused on its immediate 
security environment.285 The most notable Finnish initiative was the proposal to create a 
nuclear weapons-free zone in Northern Europe. In the last few decades, Finland’s activity 
in nuclear arms control has been less visible. Compared to Sweden, for example, the Finn-
ish approach can be described as pragmatic.286 Finland sees the NPT as the cornerstone of 
global nuclear arms- control efforts, and the NPT-based approach was also the main argu-
ment for not being part of the TPNW process.287 Public interest towards nuclear weapons 
is nevertheless low, which partly explains why there was little bottom-up pressure for the 
Finnish government to study the possibility of ratifying the TPNW.288 More recently, Fin-
land has played an active role in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
Norway and Denmark have traditionally been balancing between their Alliance commit-
ments and anti-nuclear sentiments within some political parties and in the broader civil 
society. Whereas in Denmark nuclear weapons do not feature prominently in the public 
debate and the country has no strong nuclear arms control agenda, in Norway nuclear 
weapons attract public attention. The TPNW is a case in point. Norway did not partici-
pate in the negotiations but, due to public pressure, parliament pushed the government 
to study the issue. The report concluded that Norway could not ratify the treaty without 
compromising its obligations as a NATO member.289 However, Norway has traditionally 
retained nuclear arms control on its agenda. In 2013 for example, it hosted the first con-
ference on the humanitarian impact of nuclear weapons. It also plays an active role in the 
nuclear verification regime. 
The Baltic states have signed the key treaty on the prevention of nuclear proliferation, 
namely the NPT, but are not known for strong advocacy of a nuclear-free world. The 
284  Swedish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2019; Regeringskansliet, Utrikesdepartementet 2019.
285  Vesa 1987.
286  Juntunen 2018.
287  Patokallio 2017.
288  Finland has not categorically ruled out the possibility joining the TPNW in the future, but the ratification of 
the treaty remains unlikely. 
289  Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2018.
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extended deterrence provided by NATO is extremely important for them, and sacrificing 
the ultimate guarantee is not in their interests. In line with this policy and their critical ap-
proach to Russia, the Balts were not particularly shocked by the collapse of the INF treaty. 
The Baltic states might potentially be interested in regional arms control. Russia’s stockpile 
of non-strategic nuclear weapons and the new dually capable long-range systems pose a 
concrete threat to the Baltic states. Thus far, Russia has shown zero interest in negotiating 
the reduction or elimination of its tactical nuclear weapons. 
Since the Nordic-Baltic countries have diverse approaches to their respective foreign, se-
curity and defence policies, and their ‘nuclear styles’ duly differ, it is doubtful that they 
could pursue a joint arms control agenda.290 The Nordic countries, particularly Sweden, 
Finland and perhaps Norway, could find some common ground. In his FIIA Working Pa-
per, Tapio Juntunen suggests that the Nordics could call for “the Europeanization of the 
INF Treaty”. In other words, they should advocate limiting the INF’s geographical scope to 
Europe. Given Russia’s dual use and non-strategic capabilities, Northern European coun-
tries might also have a strategic interest to promote such an initiative. Juntunen argues 
that “the Nordic countries could also use the proposal as a platform to assert the specific 
sub-regional security concerns together with their allies”.291 The Europeanization of the INF 
might face difficulties, however, owing to the potentially one-sided nature of such a treaty. 
Russia could easily redeploy its weapon systems west of the Urals, whereas US systems (if 
it were to build new INF ground systems) would have been banned from Europe. 
There are also additional, low-key measures to ensure regional stability, which do not di-
rectly touch upon nuclear weapons but are nonetheless indirectly linked to managing es-
calation between nuclear powers. For instance, Ulrich Kühn has suggested three broad risk 
reduction measures to strengthen regional stability in the Baltic Sea region. These include 
the introduction of military-to-military crisis communication channels between NATO and 
Russia. Moreover, Brussels and Moscow could talk about how best to avoid accidental es-
calation in the region. Here, the Finnish initiative to improve air safety in the Baltic Sea re-
gion is one useful example. Finally, resuming NATO-Russia talks about military and nuclear 
weapons matters might help to mitigate misperceptions and reduce the risk of inadvert-
ent escalation.292 Wolfgang Richter has made similar suggestions. His proposals include, 
for example, the intensification of Open Skies flights, greater transparency of military exer-
cises and the establishment of an Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in order 
to avoid miscalculations and escalation.293 
290  See e.g. Iso-Markku et al. 2018, 30. 
291  Juntunen 2019. 
292  Kühn 2018, 63–64. 
293  Richter 2016. 
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Any joint activity on nuclear arms control promotion must start from a common under-
standing of the security environment. Thus, the Nordic-Baltic countries should endeavour 
to enhance understanding on both (nuclear) deterrence and arms control matters. These 
issues could be addressed in elite-level formats such as Nordefco and the Nordic-Baltic 
Eight. Furthermore, regional epistemic communities should also strive to enhance their 
understanding of the elements of strategic stability, which could eventually translate into 
solid official policies. 
110
8 Conclusions
In the last few years, nuclear deterrence has made a comeback to the forefront of interna-
tional politics. The return is associated with great-power politics, regional security dynam-
ics and technological advances. At the same time, the strategic environment is becoming 
increasingly complex, which has implications not only for the great powers but also for 
small states such as Finland. 
In terms of the nature of strategic deterrence, the new adversarial era differs from the 
Cold War in one crucial respect. The primary nuclear weapon powers, the United States 
and Russia, must now cope not only with themselves but also with multipolar challenges. 
As China is slowly taking on the mantle of a superpower, its nuclear capabilities can no 
longer be treated as a mere footnote. China invests considerable resources in maintaining 
a limited, survivable nuclear force that can guarantee a damaging retaliatory strike, and 
it is also developing new capabilities such as new mobile missiles armed with MIRVs. The 
key conclusion is that the United States (and its European nuclear allies) must increasingly 
take China into account in their nuclear planning. 
In addition to the changing balance of power, there are new regional players and concerns 
related to nuclear weapons. North Korea’s leadership views the country’s nuclear capa-
bilities as a guarantee of regime survival, and Pyongyang uses nuclear brinkmanship as a 
means of advancing policy objectives. Unlike North Korea, Iran has stopped short of be-
coming a nuclear-armed state. However, owing in part to the Trump administration’s with-
drawal from the JCPOA, the regional situation has become volatile. Despite their disagree-
ment over the JCPOA, a number of European and Middle East governments broadly share 
long-standing American concerns about the implications of a potentially nuclear-armed 
Iran.
The security landscape in Europe has also changed, and European thinking about ex-
tended deterrence has had to adjust to new factors. First, the “geography” of extended 
deterrence has dramatically changed since the end of the Cold War, as former Soviet Re-
publics and satellites joined NATO. Secondly, the types of threats that allies would like 
to deter have become more diverse. “Hybrid” threats –ranging from “little green men” to 
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cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure, financial networks, and military command, control, 
and communications networks – could complicate national and NATO decision-making. 
Finally, the renewed discussion on nuclear weapons has also re-energized efforts, at least 
in the West, to delegitimize their role in deterrence in general and, in particular, as a neces-
sary component of extended deterrence. 
Additionally, since the Russian military intervention in Ukraine in 2014, NATO has focused 
new attention on nuclear issues as part of its broader efforts to accomplish its deterrence 
and collective defence objectives. The key questions vis-à-vis adjustments will concern the 
sustainability of existing nuclear-sharing agreements and the prospects for a more inde-
pendent European nuclear deterrent. 
The intersection of technological change and an increasingly multipolar threat environ-
ment has further complicated previous deterrence calculations. Three broad trends since 
the early 1990s are of particular concern. First, the dissemination of nuclear, missile, and 
related technologies made it possible for additional states (Pakistan and North Korea) 
to join the ranks of nuclear weapon states, and their pace of development has generally 
exceeded expectations. Secondly, technological advances have facilitated the develop-
ment and proliferation of non-nuclear and dual-capable weapons that can have strategic 
effects. Thirdly, the rapid development of offensive cyber, “counterspace”, and AI capabili-
ties pose additional challenges to deterrence. 
Furthermore, and importantly, the three nuclear allies and Russia are all modernizing the 
core elements of their existing nuclear forces, which further highlights the persistence of 
nuclear deterrence. Both the United States and Russia will maintain and develop their re-
spective nuclear triads in the future. In particular, Russia’s ambitions to introduce hyper-
sonic systems have attracted considerable interest. Furthermore, France will modernize 
its existing sea- and airborne capabilities, and nuclear deterrence will remain the bedrock 
of its strategic independence. In the United Kingdom, political support behind the coun-
try’s nuclear deterrent is shakier than in France. This fact notwithstanding, its moderniza-
tion programme, aimed at replacing the current SSBN fleet with new vessels, is currently 
underway, and without dramatic changes in its domestic environment the UK will remain 
a nuclear weapon power. 
Nuclear arms control has been the other element of strategic stability for decades, but 
now the existing regimes between the United States and Russia are at a crossroads. The 
INF has collapsed, and the future of the New START Treaty, expiring in 2021, looks bleak, 
as mutual political will seems to be lacking and obstacles and different interests appear 
insurmountable, although treaties from SALT I through New START have been beneficial. 
Washington and Moscow have progressively increased transparency, while promoting 
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greater strategic stability. At the same time, neither side has sacrificed its ability to deter 
the other, nor its ability to modernize its forces. 
Growing great-power competition and the associated return of nuclear deterrence have 
profound implications for Northern Europe in general and the Nordic-Baltic countries in 
particular. The changed security landscape has already emphasized the importance of 
the High North. Control of the strategic locations of the Arctic region is crucial for both 
NATO’s and Russia’s defence. Furthermore, as a response to Russian aggression in Europe, 
NATO has considerably consolidated its extended deterrence efforts in the Baltic Sea re-
gion. Extended deterrence provided by NATO, and the independent deterrence efforts of 
the allied countries and Finland and Sweden, form the general deterrence framework of 
the region. 
Nuclear weapons are part of the regional reality in Northern Europe. Russia’s nuclear triad 
is present in the region, and it has increasingly deployed dual-capable conventional sys-
tems in the areas proximate to NATO. Moreover, NATO’s deterrence ultimately rests on 
nuclear weapons, and all three nuclear allies have troops either in one of the Baltic states 
or in Poland as part of NATO’s Enhanced Forward Presence.
The erosion of arms control regimes primarily poses a foreign policy challenge for the 
countries in Northern Europe. However, the Nordic-Baltic states do not share a similar 
approach to nuclear arms control, and forging joint policy is difficult even between like-
minded countries such as Finland, Sweden and Norway. The most realistic option going 
forward would be to advocate additional risk-reduction measures that would mitigate 
the risk of a potentially disastrous military escalation. Moreover, the Nordic-Baltic coun-
tries should improve both bureaucratic and societal expertise on nuclear deterrence in 
order to be effective agents in a global world arena in which the nuclear dimension is 
ever more notably present. 
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